The Stellenbosch Socratic Journal

To jettison the mind

Reid Donson — 2025-11-18

Ever since Descartes first introduced it, the mind–body problem has been the subject of much philosophical debate. I believe, however, that the key concept upon which these arguments hinge, the mind, is a nonsensical term. In this paper, I argue that the mind cannot be conceived of understandably, and that when we speak of the mind, we do not in fact know of what we speak. I begin with a brief description of the origin of the mind in Cartesian dualism, as well as an explanation of the two main opposing sides of the mind–body debate: physicalism and dualism. Thereafter, I explain my argument (inspired by AJ Ayer) as the Inconceivability Argument, which states that the mind is not conceivable in a way that makes an understandable difference in the world, and that we thus do not truly understand the mind. After addressing several potential objections, I explain the consequences that the Inconceivability Argument hold for dualism and physicalism. I conclude that dualism no longer has a place in debates about consciousness and that physicalism must narrow its definition so that it only includes measurable cognitive processes, but not subjective experience. If we wish to understand what we speak, write, and argue about, then it is necessary to jettison the concept of the mind.

On slow reading and slow violence

Robin Bruce — 2025-11-18

Could reading about nature in a different way aid us in recognising and addressing the damage humans are doing to it? In this paper, I argue that Michelle Boulous Walker’s theory of slow reading can help us recognise and address climate change, radiological violence, deforestation, and other slow violences done to nature. Reading slowly, and taking one’s time to dwell is an open, understanding, and embodied concept, one that values returning, again and again, to uncover anew the wisdom that lies within a text. Slow violence, conceptualised by Rob Nixon, is a pervasive and seemingly uneventful violence, where its effects are temporally and spatially removed from its cause. With slowness being a common factor between these concepts, I argue that one must first slow down to recognise slow violence. I will defend this view by discussing three aspects of slow reading and analysing how those three aspects connect to slow violence and aid in recognising and addressing slow violence. These three aspects of slow reading are openness, understanding, and embodiment. Through these aspects, slow reading not only aids in recognising slow violence, but it also aids in holding space for the other, therefore holding a twofold approach; both recognising and addressing slow violence.

A labour rights-based critique of Nozick’s entitlement theory

Sasha Söderlund — 2025-11-18

Robert Nozick’s libertarian theory of justice as entitlement proposes that any transfer of private property, including one’s skills, based on voluntary consent is legitimate. Applied to the labour context, Nozick contends that labour agreements free from direct coercion are just and should be unregulated to preserve autonomy and liberty, regardless of potential exploitation. This paper argues that Nozick’s understanding of consent neglects the lived realities and socioeconomic inequalities that are evident in, for example, employment in the mica mining industry in India, and thus fails to address the unjust exploitation of workers. Mica mining is characterised by hazardous working conditions, child exploitation, and poor compensation rooted in socioeconomic desperation. This paper aims to highlight the necessity-driven, rather than consensual, participation of vulnerable members of society. Through a detailed analysis of Nozick’s libertarian principles and their application to labour in a case study of mica mining, this paper demonstrates that the overemphasis on consent and minimal state intervention integral to this theory fails to protect those most vulnerable. This critique uncovers the limitations of Nozick’s theory in addressing socioeconomic injustices and emphasises the need for a more comprehensive approach that considers social context and workers’ rights. The conclusion of this paper is that Nozick’s entitlement theory is incapable of achieving substantive justice in the context of labour rights.

What’s desert got to do with it?

Ivan Bock — 2025-11-18

In this paper, I argue that the belief in free will and basic desert is not necessary to participate in our various responsibility practices. I discuss various concepts related to our responsibility practices, including attributability, answerability, and accountability responsibility, showing how they can be practically understood and grounded in both backwards-looking and forward-looking responsibility practices. By doing so, I show that holding people morally responsible can be justified without referencing classic free will or basic desert. Therefore, I propose that, when it comes to our moral and responsibility practices, we do not need to believe in and can discard our classical understanding of free will and embrace a minimalist pragmatic freedom.

In the shadow of performance and repression

Alissa Welman — 2025-11-18

This paper explores the phenomenon of overparenting by analysing behaviours associated with overparenting, such as obsessing over a child’s achievements or weight, using Marcuse’s notions of surplus repression and the performance principle. The literature on the micromanagement of children reveals a pattern, and motivations of overparenting, that can be understood in light of the Freudian concepts of repression and identity. By taking a closer look at the micromanagement of childhoods, parents can be interpreted as producers of surplus repression that concentrate the pressures of capitalism on their child. This paper proposes the term ‘surplus-parenting’ as a micro manifestation of surplus repression on a societal level as discussed by Marcuse. By using the term surplus-parenting, the author is able to articulate the consequences of surplus repression in the lives of the children and parents on this micro and macro scale. By questioning the motivations of overparenting, the concepts of the performance principle and surplus repression can be seen as manifesting in the parent-child identity.

Restricted freedoms of menstruating women

Hanrié Viljoen — 2025-11-18

Period poverty can generally be defined as a lack of access to or an inability to acquire, access, and perform menstrual health products, facilities, and practices. It is estimated that around 500 million women worldwide live in period poverty. This is a phenomenon which can incapacitate women from performing basic functions and from participating fully in society. In this paper, I will use the Capability Approach developed by Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen to show conclusively that period poverty poses a real restriction to the freedoms of menstruating women and girls. Under the Capability Approach, well-being is measured by the real ability of an individual to have certain capabilities. Specifically, period poverty restricts freedoms by having an adverse effect on education, health, and social functioning. While many of these women and girls have the formal abilities or rights to the restricted spheres, period poverty acts as a hidden barrier to successfully acquiring the capabilities of being educated, being healthy, and being social.

Death

Thomas Russell — 2025-11-18

At one time or another every human being will be troubled by death. One may be troubled by the idea of death, or one may be troubled by what death is. Under the idea of death, I include the prospect of death for people one cares about and for oneself; but being troubled by what death is, is to be troubled by the nature or the realisation of death, which is to say what death (being dead) entails for the subject. Of course, those are not two definitively separate concerns. I am interested in something Lucretius is famous for saying about death, that it should not in fact trouble us, and that it only troubles us because we misunderstand something about the nature of death; we think that nonexistence could be bad for us, hence we are right to fear it: all this, says Lucretius, is a mistake arising from misunderstanding death. In this paper I argue that Lucretius is wrong in saying that we should not be troubled by death because (1) the very thing he thinks is irrational to fear is rational to fear, and (2) his argument is self-defeating. In short, (1) annihilation, or the absence of the subject’s point of view anywhere, is a reasonable thing to fear; (2) Lucretius erroneously relies on a conflation of the stateless nature of annihilation with the present experienceable nature of the human being to sustain his conclusion. I conclude that, qua Lucretius’s argument, it is the very loss of the possibility of having possibilities, which fact is entailed simply by being alive, that humans fear, and are quite rational to fear.

Foreword

Tamlyn February — 2025-11-18