PSYCHOLOGY IN SOCIETY



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EDITORIAL

In this issue we continue some of the psychoanalytic discussion which we started in our focus on psychoanalysis in **Psychology in society 14** (1990). Leonard Bloom presents a challenging re-assertion of what he considers to be the four main basic insights of Freud. These are (1) the unconscious, (2) sexuality and the libido, (3) repression, and (4) transference processes. Readers might want to take issue with what exactly constitutes the "basic insights" of Freud's work, but what seems incontrovertible is Bloom's argument about the revisionism of much of contemporary psychoanalysis. Bloom also criticises the dampening of Freud's radicality by neo-behavioural perspectives in psychology. He tries to reclaim Freud's centrality as a thinker about human experience and the value of human life in his application of Freud's work to a consideration of questions of racism and freedom. Bloom presents us with an account of Freud as a humanist thinker concerned with social dilemmas.

Robert Young presents a very accessible account of "all-you-ever-wanted-to-know-about-British-psychoanalysis-and-politics-but-didn't-know-who-to-ask". In his illuminating survey of British psychoanalysis, Robert Young outlines some of the recent developments between left politics and psychoanalysis. While the centrist position of British psychoanalysis is probably still dominant, Young points to quite a few interesting and established forums where politics and psychoanalysis are seriously discussed. He concludes his article with a remark that should hopefully/certainly find a lot of support within the left in South Africa. Young says " .. that no political movement which does not take full account of the lights and shadows of human nature - in their full complexity and including their shameful and distressing aspects - has any hope of enduring".

Some of the "light and shadows of human nature" are investigated in the provocative article by Eric Harper and Mark Tomlinson on family murder

and violence in South Africa. They attempt to unravel the complexities of family murders by intersecting intrapsychic explanations with social explanations. Their intrapsychic explanations are predominantly Jungian, while at the same time incorporating Freudian and Lacanian thinking. It is a daunting task integrating the social and the individual, and one which many social thinkers shy away from, and yet is arguably one of the central problems of the "human sciences". Whether or not one agrees with Harper and Tomlinson's approach to this problem is less important than the fact that they have at least addressed the problem head-on.

While much progressive psychology has focussed on social and community issues, and less so on intrapsychic issues, this has not been the only omission. Linda Chisholm opens her article on the history of welfare and juvenile crime with the comment that "recent writing by psychologists and social workers is curiously ahistorical". It is hoped that by publishing Chisholm's fascinating work on "state policy and juvenile crime" in South Africa during 1911-1939, that we shall encourage further historical work. A misinformed view about historical research is that it is about the past, and so tells us very little about the present. Chisholm's article certainly upsets that view as it raises many pertinent issues of current concern. For example, South Africa of the 1920s and 1930s is clearly not the South Africa of the 1990s, but the progressive welfare sector would do well to consider the historical trajectory of the racial and class character of welfare provision (of juvenile offenders). With rampant privatisation as part of current State policy how are young, black, working class "offenders" going to be properly cared for? Will a non-racial government be able to escape the history of social policies structured around race and class conceptions, where most of the poor and young "criminals" are going to be black? These and many other interesting questions come to mind when reading Linda Chisholm's article.

Our plea to readers to respond to some of the discussions and debates that appear in **PINS** sometimes pays off. Victor Nell takes issue with many of the authors that appeared in **Psychology in society 12** (1989). His criticisms are not only directed at Ronnie Miller, Kevin Solomons and Kedibone Letlaka-Rennert, but also at the **PINS** editors. He castigates the above authors and the editors for not drawing the line between sound intellectual criticism and personalistic attacks.

This issue ends with three book reviews. Ray Lazarus reviews a local publication on mental handicap, while Ann Levett takes a critical look at

another local text - Lloyd Vogelman's study of rapists. Psychotherapy comes under the spotlight in Jennifer McCaul's review of Nini Herman's **Why psychotherapy?**

As this number - **Psychology in society (PINS) 15** - comes out a long time after **PINS 14** (1990) we would just like to assure our subscribers and readers of the journal's future. We apologise for the inconvenience of these "irregular production intervals". **PINS 16** (1991) will be out soon.

Grahame Hayes

OUT SOON OUT SOON OUT SOON OUT SOON

PINS 16 will be out soon. Here is some of the contents of **PINS 16**.

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Psychology in society (PINS), 1991, 15, 4-23

Back to Freud: A radicalism recalled*

Leonard Bloom
London

I intend in this paper to review Freud's understanding of human psychology, and to remind both psychoanalysts and main- stream psychologists of its essentially radical approach. The psychological process with which Freud was concerned is more complicated than the shrivelled thing described and studied by behavioural scientists. I believe, too, that Freud's style, with its subversive vein of social and intellectual anti-authoritarianism is another facet of his radicalism. Even now, psychoanalysis is opposed because of its power to strip the pretensions from the complacent conservatism of the political right and left, both in public life and in the **soi-disant** social sciences.

The paper will introduce some points of divergence between main-stream behaviourist and cognitive psychologies (on the one hand) and psychoanalysis (on the other). This will lead into a discussion of Freud's basic insights into human psychology. I then examine Freud's psychobiological assumptions, and suggest that these, far from being conservative, offer an anti-racist and progressive biological understanding of human nature. The relevance of psychoanalysis to the problem of human freedom is next evaluated, and finally, I shall illustrate Freud's essential radicalism from the humanist-psychoanalytic approach of Erich Fromm.

INTRODUCTION.

In 1991, Freud's insights into the psychology of individual and collective life still disturb. The barely-concealed hostility of, for example, Gellner

and Eysenck, hint at the emotional edginess that Freud still arouses. **The decline and fall of the Freudian empire** (Eysenck, 1985) is, I hope, the last shot in his tiresome sniping against the Freudian contention that human beings are not simply biological organisms. Gellner's (1985) bizarre historical-anthropological treatment of psychoanalysis as though it were a religion like Christianity, is two hundred and twenty pages of demonology that totally misses the point of Freud's human enquiry into the human condition.

And what is the point of psychoanalysis? Psychoanalysis " .. shows its strength in its willingness to ask 'semantic' questions of great provocativeness. It asks ... for the meaning of actions, their significance and intention, and the subjective position they hold within the life of the person concerned. In doing so, psychoanalysis demonstrates the inadequacy of the questions asked by psychology, if one is concerned to develop a discipline that genuinely engages with the experiences as well as the competencies of human subjects." (Frosh, 1989, p6).

It is possible to go further. Freud exposed the shallowness of the psychology and sociology that ignored or mocked the efforts of psychoanalysts to both describe individual and collective experience and to appreciate the obscure and tangled emotional states that motivate them. People are neither "subjects" in a psychometrician's mad game of reducing people to index numbers. Nor are people neatly-fitting components into what Gellner oddly describes as " .. a system of such seemingly self-evident connections ... known as culture." (Gellner, 1985, p105).

PSYCHOANALYSIS AND PSYCHOLOGY.

Psychology and psychoanalysis have always been distinct disciplines. Their subject matter, methods of enquiry and philosophy of mind have been far apart. Few attempts have been made to bring the two disciplines together, although Freud himself was influenced by the innovative "act psychology" of Franz Brentano (Barclay, 1964, passim), and some fields within psychology, e.g. personality and motivation, have been influenced by psychoanalysis.

Both psychoanalysis and psychology have suffered by their oversensitivity to possible encroachments of their fields by other human and biological sciences. In this section I will argue that the distance between them, although wide, is often exaggerated. Moreover, Freud's determination to

study human behaviour and experience with little or no contact with psychology, has enlarged dramatically the areas of human behaviour and experience that it is respectable for psychologists to study. Even though Freud's epistemology and ontology are dramatically unlike those of psychology, they can no longer be disregarded by those psychologists who are concerned with the philosophical and methodological foundations of psychology.

Freud's approval of Brentano's psychology was eloquently expressed in his letter to his friend Eduard Silberstein of March 15, 1875. Freud sets out Brentano's departures from contemporary psychology and his new direction. Freud approved of Brentano's criticism of the sterile cataloguing of the **content** of experience by those psychologists and philosophers who ignored the **act** of experiencing. What happens when we experience a colour, an emotion or have an idea? Brentano turned psychology to the problems of "intentionality", and in doing so he anticipated the phenomenological and functional psychology. Brentano, too, was not afraid to extend the boundaries of psychology to include dreams and other experiences that were ignored by other psychologists. He was interested in psychological development and even looked at the motivation of "the will" in the almost Freudian terms of the relationships of love and hate. Perhaps Freud took from this remarkable man his distrust of mere categorising and his interest in spontaneity and the complexities and ambiguities of intention (See Freud, 1989, p143-147).

Like Brentano, Freud was concerned to bring psychological thinking away from philosophical speculation and to scientific and empirical enquiry that took seriously the phenomena of everyday psychological activity, however bizarre they might appear to the conventional investigator. They were both fascinated by the connections, usually indirect and complex, between the surface behaviour and the deep emotional and cognitive structures that formed them. They were both concerned with those human potentialities that are only gradually revealed as infant becomes child, and child moves through adolescence into adulthood.

Ricoeur summarises his evaluation of psychoanalysis as a system of psychology by emphasising its originality in bringing together different epistemologies. Unlike psychology, psychoanalysts use interpretation to make sense of the observable. They are concerned with the minutiae of behaviour, but accept that it may be latent, based upon phantasy, motivated by the irrational. Psychoanalysis accepts that there are two

realities: the external and the individual's. Often the two coincide: the food that I eat is of a different order of reality from the food that I dream about. But both are real! The conflict between the individual's and external reality is, perhaps, most severe, in human relationships - individual and collective. Ricoeur notes that psychoanalysis resembles the organismic and holistic emphasis of Gestalt psychology. Both treat the mind as composed of many interacting structures, and look for hierarchies of integrations. He concludes that "psychoanalysis is a unique and irreducible form of praxis; as such it puts its finger on what phenomenology never perfectly attains, namely, 'our relation to our origins and our relation to our models, the id and the superego'" (Ricoeur, 1970, p418).

Perhaps the fundamental conflict between psychoanalysis and psychology is that psychoanalysis is, significantly, a **verstehende** psychology that attempts both understanding and explanation. "Psychoanalysis, advocates as opposed to ... mere description, the right of psychology to explain and construct hypotheses .... Furthermore, psychoanalysis claims that phenomenological research is only one condition, though an essential one, for the fulfilment of its task" (Hartmann, 1964, p374). In addition, " .. that method of analogy on which the analytic interpretation of unconscious processes is based has enormously broadened our knowledge of mental connections" even though it is still regarded with deep scepticism by psychology (Hartmann, 1964, p397).

But even this conflict is growing less intense with the growth of a cognitive psychology that is both more humanist and more sensitive to culture than conventional, positivistic psychology. One of the more imaginative cognitive-developmental psychologists now pleads that " .. to insist upon explanation in terms of 'causes' simply bars us from trying to understand how human beings interpret their worlds and how **we** interpret **their** acts of interpretation .... Are not plausible interpretations preferable to causal explanations, particularly when the achievement of a causal explanation forces us to artificialize what we are studying to a point almost beyond recognition as representative of human life?" (Bruner, 1990, pxiii). Both psychoanalysis and psychology deal with the ambiguities of "reality". Reality is not immediately and distinctly defined by social and cultural factors alone, because (to a lesser or greater extent), individual phantasy, originating in the unconscious and developed during the cognitive and emotional development of the child, often distorts and interprets idiocyncratically what is presented as reality by society and culture.

Perhaps the sharpest contrast between psychoanalysis and psychology - and plausibly one of the most radical features of psychoanalysis - is that psychoanalysis is both **teleological** and **reflexive**. Psychoanalysis is concerned with the reasons and goals, both rational and irrational, that motivate our behaviour and colour our experiences and our feelings about them. Unlike psychology, psychoanalysis has built in to its very foundations, the requirement that psychoanalysts are as self-aware and self-questioning as their clients are expected to be. How many psychologists feel professionally obliged to question why they are psychologists, and why they believe and practice their branch of psychology. "What fear is it, that prevents psychologists taking stock of the questions raised by their own personal lives, and asking: what has our science to say to this?" (Frosh, 1989, p256).

Finally, unlike psychology which has become fragmented into self-sealed fragments, psychoanalysis has broadly retained Freud's enthusiasm to integrate psychoanalysis with other sciences, humanities and the arts. **The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, Psychoanalysis and Contemporary Science, The Psychoanalytic Study of Society, The Journal of Psychoanalytic Anthropology** and the varied publications of the Psyche Press and The Psychohistory Press, are but a few examples of the eclecticism and creativity of psychoanalysis. It has been suggested that this eclecticism is stimulated because " .. psychoanalysis as a theory of the symbolic function is a theory of the mind of man ... [It] postulates what features the mind of man must possess to be capable of creating these symbolic forms" (Edelson, 1977, p2). There is a strong affinity between such imaginative acts as working through a transference neurosis or making sense of a dream, and writing a poem. Both acts are explorations of symbolic forms and functions.

FREUD'S BASIC INSIGHTS.

Freud's basic insights are (1) the unconscious (2) sexuality and the libido (3) repression and (4) transference processes.

1. The unconscious. It is useful to bring together Freud's first and last systematic expositions. In **Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis**, he describes what occurs when unconscious mental processes are transformed into neurotic symptoms. He writes: " .. a vehement effort must have been exercised to prevent the mental process in question from penetrating into

consciousness and as a result it has remained unconscious; being unconscious it had the power to construct a symptom. The same vehement effort is again at work during analytic treatment, opposing the attempt to bring the unconscious into consciousness" (Freud, 1922/1973, p173). In his later exposition he writes of the " .. mental processes or mental material which have no ... easy access to consciousness, but which must be inferred, discovered and translated into conscious form. It is for such material that we reserve the name of the unconscious proper" (Freud, 1949, p20). We live by transforming powerful, drives, feelings and wishes that are at once biological and emotional into our conscious thoughts, feelings and behaviour. We are normally unaware of the origins of the emotions which shape our lives.

2. Sexuality and the libido. In 1905, Freud published **Three essays on the theory of sexuality**. They were rejected violently then, and still arouse hostile scepticism. In the essays Freud, once and for all, destroyed the myth of childhood innocence by recognising that the erotic lives of children shape adult personalities, relationships and moral attitudes. Freud defined "sexuality" more widely than is commonly thought. For example, " .. sexuality is divorced from its too close connection with the genitals and is regarded as a more comprehensive bodily function, having pleasure as its goal ... [and] the sexual impulses are regarded as including all of those merely affectionate and friendly impulses to which usage applies the exceedingly ambiguous word love" (Freud, 1925/1986, p38).

Children struggle with incompatible and socially unacceptable wishes and urges. Their lives are complicated by their tangled relationships with parents, other adults and their siblings. The reality of powerlessness and dependence is opposed by the striving for independence. The growth of one's own feeling of autonomous identity occurs within the identifications with others that come and go through childhood, at an individual or a collective level. Love oscillates with hate, approach with withdrawal in children's relationships with adults who are sometimes frustrating, fearsome, lovable and loved, accepting and rejecting - and often all of these together. Winnicott (1986) saw the struggle to achieve a sense of "feeling real" as the most significant developmental task. Feeling real is a developmental task in which bodily, emotional and socio-cultural elements interact, not always happily for the individual. The social significance of the interactions between the libidinous, psycho-sexual drives or needs, was most openly treated by Reich, whose **The mass psychology of Fascism** (Reich, 1975) disturbingly explored the interaction of individual biological

needs and the economic and social conditions of life, which (according to Reich) explains the infantile origins and persistence into adulthood of such collective disturbances as militarism, aggressive display, the repression of women and the racist persecution of scape-goats.

3. Repression. Repression and the return of the repressed, are another aspect of the unstable equilibria between our libidinal wishes and urges and our personal relationships. Human beings are not born domesticated. Like other mammals we are beguiled and bullied into domestication, mainly during our early infancy. Domestication ensures that only a small part of our energies and drives can be acted out. The greater part is repressed, banished from our waking, deciding and acting lives. If it is possible, the repressed energies and drives are transformed into culturally and socially acceptable behaviour and relationships. Often they cannot be. But repressed aggression or love do not evaporate if they are unacceptable to ourselves or to our fellows. The unacceptable repressed has a sinister way of returning in a disguised form, to bedevil our relationships, and our ways of thinking and feeling about events and situations. Long repressed loves and hatreds, sexual excitements and frustrations, infantile feelings of dependency, and anxieties about rejection or abandonment all return to permeate our present lives with an inexplicable and unexpected emotional colouring. Our lives are distorted and driven in directions, and made to adopt forms, that we do not consciously intend. Indeed, we often consciously and obsessively reject them.

4. Transference. The transference is the impulse to repeat early emotional attachments and rejections by transferring them to inappropriate groups or individuals - even to strangers. Much emotional energy is used in the unconscious and rarely satisfied search for a phantasy mothering or fathering one, for an idealized saviour or protector, or a sibling, or for a group or individual on whom one can void one's repressed yet still lively aggression or sexuality. Van Wyk and Voice (1990) in their discussion of the Afrikaner make the interesting point that " .. the father is not necessarily an indicator of the development of personal conscience, but of a power above the law, of omnipotence and of lawlessness" (p24). But the phantasy father can also be wild and savage and get away with it - unlike his "children". The Afrikaners can, by identifying with the omnipotent father, be as fierce and repressive towards the rejected yet envied African non-Afrikaners: the **naturmensch**, the **beaux sauvages**, who are simultaneously repulsive and attractive, the recipients of Afrikaners' own transferred "primitive" emotional turbulence.

Writing of the significance of transference in psychoanalytic therapy, Symington's observations apply to everyday life. He writes that " .. every patient approaches an analyst with particular emotional expectations, and with the hope that the analyst will be able to respond to him or her in a way that was more satisfactory than the parents" (Symington, 1986, p111). In our social life we approach people, or withdraw from them, we initiate and develop relationships according to our unconscious emotional expectations. Even when we consciously plan our relationships, we are rarely fully aware of the roles we play in the dramas of everyday life. Nor are we sensitive to the roles that other people are playing. Other people are often unaware of the private dramas that we - and we alone - know that we are participating in. It is fortunate when we can see through the emotional masks that other people wear. Often we force (as it were) the masks on other people's faces. But always, every individual wears a mask that conceals, to a greater or lesser extent, his or her private self. Freud imaginatively showed in his early papers on technique (Freud, 1912/1924, 1914/1924a) how a major problem of our relationships is to make emotional sense of the strange effects that are created by the mysterious interactions of mask-and-private self and the transferred aggressive and loving, negative and erotic, emotions that we may surrender or we may displace onto targets that are personally or collectively acceptable.

The Freudian notion of transference and counter-transference is subversive and " .. delivers a subversive message in so far as it calls into question what each of us, as individual actors, have as our commonsense understanding of what it's like to spend a day in the world" (Turkle, 1987, p75). We inhabit a world populated by lively ghosts as well as real people. We are often the ghost of another because of his or her individual or collective phantasy. Africans in South Africa, Blacks in the USA, Afro-British and Asian-British are **forced** by the persecutory phantasies of domination and angry-fearful whites to act the roles of the dominated, passionate and dangerous child-figure in everyday life. It is a wonder that most subjects of these phantasies succeed in establishing a rational ego and in finding ways to resist the enforced roles.

Children struggle with incompatible and unacceptable urges and wishes. They have tangled relationships with adults. The reality of dependence, powerlessness and the need to establish a meaningful and emotional comfortable sense of autonomy is a problem of development. In establishing autonomous identity, emotions and relationships interact as

confusingly for the child as they do later for the adult.

FREUD'S PSYCHOBIOLOGISM.

Explanations in psychology that bring together biological and environmental influences are many. The radicalism of Freud's psychobiologism is in " .. **what** it regards as biological structure, **which** environmental factors it recognises as formative, and **how** it relates structural and environmental influences to each other" (Fenichel, 1982, p5). Freud uniquely traced a causal chain between the biological development of individuals and attitudes, social and political behaviour and experience. At its most basic, Freud teaches that all human beings live by trying to satisfy their urges and wishes and to reach goals. They are also forced to repress or to sublimate their urges and wishes and to seek substitute goals. The ability to reach goals depends partly upon the urgency of the urges and desires, partly upon emotional and intellectual capacities, and partly upon what is offered by the social, cultural and environmental worlds.

Freud usually used the German word **Trieb**. This cannot be adequately translated by "instinct". The closest rendering seems to be "impulse", that is, " .. an impelling force; a sudden inclination to act, without conscious thought; a motive or tendency coming from within" (Bettelheim, 1983, pp104-5). Perhaps our word "drive" is closest, as when we say that someone was driven by fear or greed or lust or curiousity. But sexuality, as we have seen, includes more than the lustful gratification of sexual acts: it includes the drive or impulse to satisfaction that contains both sexuality (narrowly defined) and all the wider impulses of loving, of feeling excited by another, of feeling comforted by another. Some cultures often compel individuals to hide from themselves that we have **tactile** impulses, needs and satisfactions. These are most directly expressed and strongly experienced in infancy, but they persist into adulthood where they are often frustrated or distorted. There is, therefore, a constant tension between the undomesticated primary drives, and the reality-testing and controlling aspects of personality. Freud's originality was to show that human individuality is a function of interacting, competing and jostling processes that are rarely, if ever, at rest.

The domestication of human biological impulses is a developmental task that is never complete.

An early step in trying to understand human relationships must be to investigate the patterns of prohibitions and opportunities that confront infants in any social group, and to assess the range of individual responses to them during the erratic processes of socialization. One of the mysteries of development is to understand " .. the ways in which a person's needs have a bearing on his relationships with the object world and vice versa, and in thus gaining insight into the mutual influence of outer and inner stimuli" (Hartmann, 1964, pp73-4). Psychoanalysis opposes the views that overemphasise the genetic patterning of human development, and those that overemphasise the environmental influences. We need to know the specific ways that groups inhibit or encourage the drives and wishes of the growing infant-child-adolescent-adult. How do individual infants find emotionally satisfying solutions to the problems of dependency, ambivalence and the anxieties that are forced upon them by the relationships in their world? Solutions must be found if the individual is to grow into maturity, because " .. stable reality relations cannot be established so long as primitive anxieties have not been mastered" (Glover, 1956, p229). Nor, as long as symbolic or realistic solutions have not been found for the ambivalences and deprivations of infancy.

Freud's concern with (1) the precarious balances between the impulsive and the reality-testing ego; (2) the individual's striving for integrity and society's imposed frustrations; (3) individual autonomy and social membership; (4) dependence and independence; (5) loving and hating, provide the theoretical basis for the liberation psychology of Fanon. Fanon refuted passionately the myth of the " .. so- called dependency complex of colonized peoples" (Fanon, 1986, p83). Even where it appears that (to use Fanon's terminology) white masks are successfully concealing black skins, the imposed mask can be ripped off. Psychoanalytic psychotherapy is intimately concerned with helping clients to rip off the masks that conceal the skins that they should be helped and encouraged to enjoy and find pride in. But "dependency" is a consequence of many other relationships such as males-females and adults-children.

ANTI-RACISM IN FREUD.

Freud's psychobiologism is implicitly an anti-racist psychology. Freud's two hypotheses of the primary drives refer to all humankind. He does not maintain the parody of Darwin's evolutionary ideas that the struggle to progress from savagery to civilization has been overcome. No group has rushed to a civilized condition ahead of the others. Humanity consists of

some six billion essentially similar women and men, who were once essentially similar babies, then infants, children and adolescents. This is radical, indeed! We are neither the pawns of a blind fate in the guise of an all-dominating economic and social system. Nor are we driven hither and thither by our uncontrollable desires and passions, as though ego, ego-ideal and superego processes were impotent.

Frosh's (1989, 1989a) discussion of racism and psychoanalysis is misleading. He maintains that " .. racism resides as a possibility in any approach that takes the individual as the unquestioned subject of its discourse [because] of the failure to recognise the power of the social world" (Frosh, 1989, p213). But, Freud was always sensitive to social and cultural influences. In **Group Psychology and the analysis of the Ego,** Freud wrote that " .. in the individual's mental life someone else is invariably involved, as a model as an object, as a helper, as an opponent; and so from the very first, individual psychology ... is at the same time social psychology as well" (Freud, 1932/1985, p95). Freud's social psychology is an interactionist psychology. It shows the intricacy and many forms of the interactions throughout life between individuals' needs, urges and goals with their society.

At this point many expositions of psychoanalysis would refer to the Oedipus complex. Whether it be literally interpreted, it reminds us that societies are both bound and split by their prohibitions of certain biological relationships and by their toleration of others. "Repression and culture, intrapsychical institution and social institution, coincide in this paradigmatic case" (Ricoeur, 1970, p191). The emotional problem of racism is a dramatic magnification of the turbulent emotions, at once attraction and repulsion, of the object of incestuous love.

This approach raises many questions about the psychodynamics of racism. What are the characteristic experiences and relationships within families that encourage the growth and persistence of racist perceptions and feelings? What seem to discourage or neutralise them? Are there characteristic dreams and phantasies that racist and unracist individuals have about other individuals or groups? What are the economic, political, social and cultural circumstances that encourage (or discourage) groups to acquire hostile phantasies, and to transform them into social policy despite their economic and political irrationality? What could be more damaging economically, and irrational, than **apartheid** that has wasted the gifts of millions of Africans for generations? A neglected question is: How do

individuals who are the target of collective or individual hostility defend their integrity and need for autonomy?

The Freudian emphasis upon individual and collective self-examination and self-awareness, on the exploration of unconscious motivations and on the mysteries of transference and counter-transference, is a powerful component of anti- racist understanding. Why, we are made to ask by psychoanalysis, do we cling to the primitive values, practices and relationships of our family, our culture and our society and to that phantasy of existence, our "race"? Why are we so ready to resist those influences that might draw us away from infantile dependence and wariness of strangers? Why are there individual differences in the readiness to grow up into adulthood? Why are some individuals so firmly mothercentric, fathercentric, familycentric, ethnocentric ... ? Why do some individuals **need** to hate, destroy or exploit other individuals?

"The sense of loss around which racism often crystallizes is not an historical but a psychological one ... one version [therefore] of the Freudian message to the polity ... is that we need to establish a devisceralized Reason in the seat of government ... [that distinguishes] between feeling on the one hand as primitive phantasy and on the other as the activation of moral resources" (Richards, 1989a, p171). This suggests a psychoanalytic paradox: " .. perhaps political interests [and collective phantasies, such as racism] are first reflected into the private sphere, then internalized as character structure, and only subsequently displaced again into the public sphere" (Wolfenstein, 1989, pxviii).

It has been maintained that "racism is not just anti-semitic or anti-black; it is anti-world, anti-desire, anti-modernism itself" (Frosh, 1989a, p248). But how and why? These are cosmic anxieties to which Freud devoted the last (and by no means least creative) years of his life. His radicalism was to compel thinkers to seek the direction towards tentative solutions within our human nature, and not to rush into the fogs of religions and philosophies which obscure the barely-explored power and sensitivities of that nature. Freud reminded us that humankind's collective passion for mindless self-destruction is not confined to anti-semites or anti-black racists. Semites and blacks are human, too. No group is exempt from the malaise caused by the frustrations of the imperfect civilizing process. No human group can escape for long from the necessity of civilization.

THE PROBLEM OF FREEDOM.

A theme implicit in much of Freud's, Ferenczi's and Reich's writing is their concern about the individual and collective influences that inhibit freedom of thought. Freud's psychobiological perspective is consistent with the reality of freedom. "The capacity to will freely proportionally as the ratio of emotional knowledge to intellectual knowledge increases and decreases as the ratio is reversed" (Symington, 1990, p100). Humankind's biological inheritance and the individual's libido, do not bind individuals to specific and predetermined patterns of behaviour and experience.

Stanton, for example, has traced the unexpected similarities of psychoanalytic practice and anarchism in their convergence on "mutualism" and cooperation, and their attack upon authority per se. Stanton opens the very question of what should be the "power" of the analyst, following Ferenczi's later positions that psychoanalysis is not a secret, a technique that only a "master" can manipulate, but is a cooperative act, where dialogue is essential. Protest is creative in psychoanalysis, because it is, essentially, about changing images, feelings, relationships to something new and emotionally more rewarding. There is no monopoly of theory nor of emotional wisdom. Even the "master" is human and may have problems to share. It is anti-Oedipus, because the Oedipus complex is one despotism that bringing up children should [but can it? L.B.] spare them? (Stanton, 1990).

Critics of Freud, however, have argued that his psychobiological perspective is reactionary and deterministic, because he overemphasises individual libido and experience and so minimises the collective and the cultural. The former position has been examined. The latter begs the very question of how the individual and the socio- cultural interact. The threats to freedom are, in reality, both internal to individuals and external. Often the two obstacles to freedom interact. The strength of psychoanalysis is that it has always been " .. the last stronghold of the interior of the individual, the ultimate respecter of the privacy of the self" (Rangell, 1988, p337). Society and culture all too easily destroy freedom by depersonalising people and forcing them into a state of learned-helplessness. Freedom is an interaction between individual and socio-cultural influences. Psychoanalysis supports the view that the " .. individual is real to himself not by reason of the contacts he shares with others, but because he reaches those contacts through a channel which he alone can know. His true self is the self that is isolated from his fellows and contributes the fruit of isolated meditation to the common good which,

collectively, they seek to bring into being" (Laski, 1937, p58).

The ultimate source, therefore, of freedom is the individual's sensitive awareness of the strengths and limitations of his/her psyche and how it uses, circumvents and is constrained by society, culture and relationships.

The psychoanalyst who is concerned about freedom should bear in mind that Freud searched for a theory that showed the way out of " .. a deterministically driven world in which sociopolitical and psychological forces interlocked to rob the individual and society of freedom. Psychoanalysis opened up a path to freedom through a deepened understanding of how these forces developed and worked" (McGrath, 1986, p23). Freud saw parallels between the enforced subordination of children within the family and the forces at the disposal of socio-political systems and the hierarchical relationships within them. A major struggle in growing up is how to "feel real", alive and autonomous in a world that is predictable, supportive and genuinely participatory. Freedom has its emotional roots within families where " .. children can grow as individuals, and each **gradually add** a capacity to identify with the parents and then with wider groupings" (Winnicott, 1986, p248). But furthermore the family must be one in which envy, hatred and destructiveness are at a minimum because there is a widely accepted and acceptable mutual trust of individual idiosyncracies.

Freedom is cognitive **and** emotional. It is " .. freedom to know our own thoughts, and that means knowing the unwelcome as well as the welcome, anxious thoughts, those felt as 'bad' or 'mad', as well as constructive thoughts ... and being able to examine their validity in terms of external or internal realities" (Segal, 1989, p63).

Freedom is blocked or discouraged by both internal and external authorities. These authorities may be realistic or they may be motivated by the individual's own phantasies and censorship. Our internal super-ego makes us fear to oppose external authority. We then are afraid to ask questions because we may be led to that final, most dangerous question: "Why should we believe that the world is as we are told to believe it is?" Parental taboos and prohibitions, ideas of virtue and wickedness are also internalised. The sentiment and intensity of sinfulness is internalised. We adopt parental styles of self-punishment and their projections of punishment onto scapegoat targets, often in a distorted and exaggerated form. Questioning is hated by many insecure individuals because it leads

to destroying individual and collective illusions. Thinking, too, may disturbingly upset our childhood omnipotence of thought, bringing us sharply against the unpleasant reality that we are **not** omnipotent, even as adults.

Symington (1990, passim) suggests that freedom occurs when individuals respond actively to their internal and external worlds and do not, merely, passively react to them. This, then, is an unrecognised aspect of the radical Freud. Psychoanalysts cannot evade a **quasi**, or perhaps more accurately, a **crypto**, political role. They cannot avoid asking how the society in which they are working and living, facilitates or discourages the freedom of individuals to respond actively. Psychoanalysts cannot shut their ears to the emotional echoes in themselves of how their clients (and the rest of the world), are constrained to deal with the social and cultural inconsistencies and injustices by which their fullest freedom is limited.

THE ESSENTIAL RADICALISM.

Freud was no easy optimist, but his theory "was undeniably radical" (Fromm, 1982, p 134). Fromm bases his assessment on four broad principles:

1. Repression is both central and radical. It points strikingly to the dualistic nature of what shapes human behaviour and experience. We are born into tensions between our needs, urges and wants and social constraints and possibilities that are only resolved by death. Neither extreme individualism nor extreme environmentalism explain human behaviour and experience - nor go far towards changing them. Hobbes and Marx are antitheses of psychodynamic error! It is little wonder that psychoanalysis has been attacked from the extremes of the political left and right.

2. The unconscious is the mental life of the infant, and in adulthood our infantile emotions and phantasies persist. Human development, individual and collective, is an endless struggle between the infantile and the mature within the psyche. Even **soi-disant** leaders, with power, authority or influence, are infants beneath their adult skins and their cloaks of authority. Freud was implicitly (and often explicitly), anti-authoritarian. His writings are permeated with subtle or brash exposures of the infantile and unconscious motivations of those who need to impose their wills, to act out their phantasies in social and political life and to try to evade their

fears and anxieties by manic defences. Freud offered humanity an innoculation against accepting at face-value the rationalisations of those whose unsatisfactory relationships, anxieties and frustrations drive them to seek security in the ambiguous relationships of power and authority. Only an immature and anxious parent **needs** children to control and to keep powerless.

3. Human life is stamped by rationalisations rather than rationality. But rationality does, nevertheless, exist, and it does sometimes influence our decisions. But our conscious more often than we dare acknowledge is complicated by dimly-heard echoes of long-vanished infantile phantasies and relationships. We humans have an almost inexhaustible willingness to bluff ourselves that we are rational, objective and sensitive to reality. Freud reminds us to ask ourselves: What **is** the reality that we perceive and for which we make our rational/irrational decisions?

4. Freud's use of the unconscious was revolutionary: " .. it could have led people to open their eyes to the reality of the structure of the society they live in and hence to the wish to change it" (Fromm, 1982, p134). It did more in that it led people to question why they often refuse to open their eyes and obstinately (because fearfully) refuse to contemplate the possibilities of change.

Freud's writings have contributed to the undermining of the conservative and hierarchical values that dominated Europe in the early twentieth century. These values, alas, are not confined to Europe. Nor have they become negligible as the century comes to an end. Freud criticised, openly and by implication, the hypocrisy of sexual morality and relationships, the authoritarian and anti-scientific basis of religion, the issue of totems and taboos that hold society together by rejecting its non-members, the terrible readiness of groups to destroy other groups, and the repressive, destructive relationships that women and children had to endure - and still endure.

At the very least, Freud exposed the infantile, aggressive and unworthy emotions that direct our far from rational world. Further: "Marx, Freud and the movements of sexual liberation, in particular the women's movement, have opened up questions which should not be recited as truths or dogmas, but which should be pursued and developed. Our civilization needs it. We cannot afford to allow the vibrations of death to continue to drown out the vibrations of life" (Irigaray, 1991, p78). Or, as Freud himself wrote: **where Id was shall Ego be.**

But above all, Freud was one of the great humanists who was passionately troubled by the conflicts between human passion and human reason. He was as concerned with human freedom as we are, and as anxious as us to understand and to diminish the obstacles to freedom that originate in the psychological process. In brief: " .. the expression of freedom lies in a person's activity of thinking his own thoughts. A person who is able to think his own thoughts is free. When someone cannot think his own thoughts he is not free" (Symington, 1990, p96).

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Psychology in society (PINS), 1991, 15, 24-29

British psychoanalysis and politics

Robert M Young
Free Association Books
London

The first thought this title brings to mind is that it is inappropriate, since British psychoanalysis is ostensibly apolitical, but this is quickly followed by the certain knowledge that to be "apolitical" is to tolerate the status quo. British psychoanalysis is centrist in the sense that most of its practitioners are neither socialists nor ultra-conservatives as voters, upper middle class economically and socially, and their clientele are the same. These descriptions are true, if only because there is practically no psychoanalysis or psychotherapy available on the National Health Service, so they are, for the most part, available only to people who can pay, on average, twenty pounds per session. There are some "low fee" clinics, and a few places in some National Health Service clinics, but these are likely to be group therapy or short-term.

The other thing to be said about British psychoanalysis is that it is not one thing. Only members of the British Psycho-analytical Society can call themselves psychoanalysts. There are about four hundred members, a fair number of whom live abroad. There are only about a dozen new candidates per year in training. It is said that because the American non-medical psychotherapists successfully sued the medical psychoanalysts for being "in restraint of trade", that is, in effect, operating a form of monopoly, there are plans afoot to broaden entry to the International Psychoanalytic Association.

Some countries have, by one means or another, several societies and tolerate pluralism in this way, for example, France, Argentina, Brazil. In

the 1940s Britain contained its schism into followers of Anna Freud, followers of Melanie Klein and people ("Independents") who wished to avoid this form of doctrinal-cum-personal loyalty. They did this by setting up an intramural compromise embodied in tripartite representation on committees and, in effect, three streams in training. The Freudian group is significantly smaller than the others but includes the current President of the International Psychoanalytic Association, Joseph Sandler (a South African emigre). The Kleinians are growing in numbers and influence, but the size of the group is rate-limited by their reluctance to nominate training analysts. The Independents are the majority and do not have this inhibition, so are likely to grow more rapidly. I share the widely-held opinion that the "historic compromise" which has maintained the apparent unity of the British Psycho-analytical Society has become as much a hindrance as a help. There are signs that the self-preoccupation of the society has produced some sclerosis and a lot of blinkering with respect to the rest of the world. On the other hand, a lot of important theoretical and clinical work has been done during the decades of inward-lookingness. The time has come to attempt to relate the work to a vision of culture and politics.

Partly in reaction to the elitism of the British Psycho-analytical Society, a number of other training organisations have grown up. It must be said that most of them are, to a considerable degree, deferential to the psychoanalysts. For example, psychoanalysts are (often justifiably) much-preferred as training therapists and supervisors, but as long as other organisations kowtow in this way, they will also tend to remain deferential in other ways. The most respected alternative training is the Tavistock Clinic, whose Chairman, Anton Oberholtzer, is also a psychoanalyst (and a South African emigre), but unless you are a member of staff of the clinic, you must train as a child psychotherapist before becoming eligible for their adult training. The most respectable adult training (though not necessarily the best) is the British Association of Psychotherapists (which also offers a child training and a Jungian one. There are other child trainings and Jungian ones, but I am confining my attention to psychoanalytic organisations.) Other highly-regarded trainings are the London Centre for Psychotherapy, the Guild of Psychotherapists (both eclectic), the Lincoln Centre and Clinic (mainly Kleinian). Other trainings have less secure reputations, but each has its striking features and strong supporters. The Association for Group and Individual Psychotherapy includes an experiential group in the training. The Arbours Association requires work in a residential crisis center. The Philadelphia association has a broad

curriculum which includes philosophical issues. The Institute for Psychotherapy and Social Studies has wide social and political concerns. The Westminster Pastoral Foundation has close ties with religious traditions.

At the moment there is a ferment in the world of British psychoanalysis and psychotherapy. Partly as a consequence of concerns raised by the excesses of Ron Hubbard's Scientology and latterly because of issues raised by European integration, including common professional standards, there is a standing conference working out the definition of psychotherapy with a view toward an eventual register. (The standing conference has a number of other sections, e.g. humanistic, behavioural, child therapies, but I am concerned with the psychoanalytic ones.) The deliberations of this body are very political, indeed, but it has managed to keep going with a surprising amount of cooperation and mutual tolerance. Not surprisingly, some of the more elite bodies have made some moves to outflank or undermine the standing conference, but for the present the centre has held and good will is prevailing, even though there are rumblings about treachery and betrayal from time to time. Material issues about accreditation and livelihood are in the air, while quite legitimate concerns about standards can easily get mixed up with questionable matters. For example, if a training organisation does not require its trainees or training cases to attend for three times per week, should its graduates be allowed to call themselves psychotherapists? It may be that the organisation which cater more for minorities or the less wealthy are clustered at the "low" end of the pecking order of prestige, number of sessions per week of trainees and training cases. Standards, class, race, economics and the hegemony of the psychoanalysts are all mixed up in these debates, and there are no easy or obvious ways of untangling them.

Psychoanalytic and psychotherapy trainings are expensive and take a long time. Blacks, Asians and working class people are much less likely to embark upon them or to be patients in therapy. There are efforts being made to understand the low take-up rate of psychotherapy among Blacks and Asians in the West London areas around Acton and Southhall, where the proportion of non-Caucasian therapists is high, while the use of therapy by them is low. There are important matters of family traditions, world views and alienation from helping professions which are almost exclusively white. There are also a small number of centres catering for special groups, for example, NAFSIYAT Therapy Centre for Blacks and Indians preferring non-Caucasian therapists and the Women's Therapy

Centre for feminists and women preferring female therapists.

If one stands back and looks at the culture of British psychoanalysis, several other political features stand out. By far the majority of practitioners are in London, and most are in one postal district: NW3 - Hampstead. Outside London there is very little, although there are serious efforts to change this, and groups are growing in Edinburgh, Bristol, Cambridge, Oxford, Yorkshire - all centres of academic excellence. Some others - Liverpool, Birmingham, Sheffield - are much less well-served, and the rest of the country is something of a desert as far as provision of psychotherapy is concerned.
Psychoanalysis in its pure form is practically nowhere to be seen in most parts of the country.

This partly reflects the fact that the country's cultural life is centred on London, but it is also true that therapists feel the need for collegial support - supervision, clinical meetings, referral networks. Both the Institute of Psycho-analysis and the Tavistock clinic are engaged in serious outreach programmes, but the distribution of therapists through the country is still dreadful. There is a strong bias against psychoanalytic thinking in British psychiatry, so the number of posts for psychotherapists in the National Health Service is small, while most psychiatrists who practice therapy have had little or no training which a psychotherapist would credit.

Looking at the broader psychoanalytic culture one sees some more promising signs. British universities are notoriously narrow in their views of psychology. Human nature hardly gets a look in. Sensation, perception, learning theory, artificial intelligence, brain and behaviour research, animal behaviour, - these are the staple diet offered to students who turn up at universities seeking insight into humanity. But some of them are, at last, opening their doors to psychodynamic thinking. There are significant initiatives at Cambridge, Warwick, Essex, Middlesex Polytechnic and the Polytechnic of East London. But by far the most interesting development is the Centre for Psychoanalytic Studies at the University of Kent at Canterbury. It offers an MA in Psychoanalytic Studies (attracting 300 applicants for 15-20 places), a doctoral programme and plans for integration with a clinical training. The teaching programme is a broad one, including philosophical, political and cultural aspects usually ignored by the London trainings. It is highly-regarded and is already having an influence in Britain and abroad. Above all, it is keen to make connections.

There is also a new organisation concerned to create a network of people engaged in psychoanalytic teaching and research called THERIP (The Higher Education Research and Information Network in Psychoanalysis), also non -sectarian, which sponsors lectures and workshops. Recent series have included "Psychoanalysis and Threatre", problems of teaching and research seminars on racism. There is an annual Register in which members spell out their interest, and there are plans to expand it to include research reports.

Another center of non-sectarian activities is the Freud Museum (the London house to which Freud moved when he fled Vienna in 1938) which has sought to promote a wide range of points of view. Alas, its director was given notice when he recently mounted an international conference with a large Lacanian contingent.

Free Association Books has also sought to enliven the culture of psychoanalysis by creating a space for wider and deeper investigations. The quarterly journal, **Free Associations**, has as its subtitle: Psychoanalysis, Groups, Politics, Culture and has opened its pages to writings on, for example, interrogation methods in South Africa, radical psychoanalysis in Central and South America, analyses of works of art, plays, novels, etc. The publishers also co-sponsor (with the Polytechnic of East London) an annual conference on "Psychoanalysis and the Public Sphere". These conferences play a catalytic role by soliciting papers on a wide range of cultural and political topics and by providing a forum for their discussion and eventual publication. The 1990 conference included papers on working as a black analyst and on working with resistance fighters in South Africa. Two volumes of essays related to the themes of the conference have appeared: **Capitalism and Infancy** and **Crises of the Self**, both edited by Barry Richards. Further collections are planned on **The Social Construction of Inferiority** and **Psychoanalysis of Popular Culture**.

Most psychoanalytic writings have been concerned with individuals. Ventures into the social and political realms have been prone to two sorts of reductionism: attempting to read the social off the intrapsychic or attempting to reduce the mental to the socio-economic. Some writings published by Free Association Books attempt to move beyond these simple one-to-one correlations. For example, the collected writings of Isabel Menzies-Lyth provide case studies of institutions in which the fine texture of the activities in, for example, nursing or the fire service, are

carefully interpreted psychoanalytically. Similarly, where psychobiography tends towards appalling oversimplication, Victor Wolfenstein's biography of the American Black Muslim, Malcolm X (**The Victims of Democracy**), provides a lovely integration of careful social history with a profound understanding of the inner worlds of black radicals, including the contradictions of Malcolm's struggles. Paul Hoggett, in **Partisans in an Uncertain World**, provides a psychoanalytic interpretation of the plight of leftists in the face of the hegemony of the Right in most metropolitan countries.

Attempts to integrate psychoanalysis and progressive politics need to proceed on a number of fronts - training, education, publications, availability of therapy, penetration into existing institutions. There has been progress on some of these fronts, much less so on the last two. There is little reason to expect that the National Health Service, beleaguered in so many ways, will soon improve its provision of therapy. Existing institutions are also relatively refractory, but there is a ferment which will eventually tell.

I think that no political movement which does not take full account of the lights and shadows of human nature - in their full complexity and including their shameful and distressing aspects - has any hope of enduring. Some that thought they could prevail by pure force or pure commitment and party discipline have found themselves undermined from within by the return of the suppressed and the repressed. This has shown itself to be true of '68 visionaries, Maoists, Stalinists, dictatorships of the Right and any number of other heartless ideologies. In the light of this profound truth, the task of psychoanalysing politics is no effete luxury. It is the prerequisite of a decent and humane world.

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Family murder, violence and the South African psyche

Eric Harper and Mark Tomlinson
Cape Town

"A primary group of this kind is a number of individuals who have put one and the same object in the place of their ego ideal and have consequently identified themselves with one another in their ego." (Freud S, 1921, Being in love and hypnosis, in **Group Psychology**).

On June 17, the Grobler family of Jeffrey's Bay were watching television. Mr Petrus Grobler (29) answered the telephone only to be informed that he had lost an important building contract. He went through to the lounge, told his wife and two sons to say goodbye - they kissed, following which he killed the three of them with a shotgun. He then attempted suicide himself. He said "his family meant everything to him".

What began in 1983 as a relatively isolated phenomenon, with around ten people being involved, has increased with such dramatic rapidity that around sixty people died as a result of family murder in 1987, while around twenty died in 1988. The fact that it is virtually an unheard of phenomenon overseas and the fact that over 80% of all family murders are committed by Afrikaans speaking white South Africans, has necessitated that serious investigations into causal factors be undertaken. The aim of this paper will be to outline the psychodynamic factors which make this phenomenon such a uniquely South African one. In using a psychodynamic approach we hope to avoid reproducing yet another "over socialised conception of humans" (Wrong, in Bocock, 1983). We hope to

provide the reader with a psychodynamic understanding of family dynamics within the South African context.

METHODOLOGY.

Most of the existing studies on family murder (van Arkel, 1988; Pretorius, 1987; Luttig, 1985) have been predominantly of a descriptive nature with a measure of explanation that locates the phenomenon socially, culturally and politically. Their efforts at explanation have been based to a large extent on what can be termed common sense notions and theories about family murders. (To the best of our knowledge, no work exists which situates family murders in a sound psychodynamic framework). Pretorius (1987) argues that the cause of family murders is a mistaken sense of responsibility while Du Toit (1988) sees the acceptance of beskikkingsreg (1) as the major factor. Finally, van Arkel (1988) believes that Christianity which plays a major role within a Christian culture, alongside the death of Christ, is seen as a solution to problems (Pretorius,1987 p39). In this regard, the view of death which the person holds is important. The fact that many people believe that, following death, they will be reunited with loved ones, in a place free of pain and sadness which is indicative of their life on earth, makes the option of death more favourable. None of these theories provide a sound psychodynamic explanation as to the underlying causal mechanisms operative in a family murder.

In any investigation of a phenomenon such as family murders the problem of analytically fusing the often contradictory notions of intrapsychic factors, family dynamics and social forces is an immense one. We wish to argue that a re-reading of what is subversive and dialectical in Freud and Jung, in particular an understanding of the collective "unconscious (2) as structured in the most radical way like language", can be seen as a bridge between intrapsychic dynamics and the process of family functioning (Muller & Richardson, 1982, p2). The interface between intrapsychic dynamics and family systems are these structural laws by which experiences are transformed into "living myths" (what Lacan refers to as metonymy, metaphor and mathemes).

Our methodological approach is that "... theory is not a literal translation or reflection of reality, but its symptom, its metaphorical account. The myth is not pure fantasy, however, but has a narrative symbolic logic that accounts for a real structure of relations ..... Between reality and the psychoanalytic myth, the realtion is not one of opposition, but one of

analytic dialogue: the myth comes to grips with something in reality that it does not fully comprehend but which it gives an answer, a symbolic reply ... The myth is structurally truthful and psychoanalytically effective, not just in function of but in proportion to its capacity for narrative expropriation." (Felman, 1987, pp151-153).

To understand family murders we need to read the event as "overdetermined" (3) and exaggerated, narrated as both "text" and "case study" (Jay, 1984, p90). Case study engages the reader in the interrelation of both intrapsychic and interpersonal complexes. The language, symbols, mythologies, archetypes and images of the text enters the reader into the narrative and dialogue the text provides. A guide and illumination from "within" and on the text's own terms - "letting the phenomena speak for itself".

In a psychodynamic approach using a structuralist Freudian and Jungian reading of "the interpretation of the unconscious" the question is asked whether Freud and Jung can once again exist as strange but workable bedfellows. The relation between Freud and Jung's work has been the subject of a longstanding controversy, and is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss (see for example, Glover, 1950; Eissler, 1971; Kaufmann, 1980; Storr, 1983). However, we shall adapt the stance that as a "structural interpretative science" (4), what the work of Freud and Jung can contribute should be stressed and not overlooked due to "bad faith". As Bettelheim provocatively remarks, " .. one may hope that the various psychoanalytical movements come to realise that they have more in common than differences. As with Freud and Jung, differences originate more often in the vagaries of complicated personal relations and ambivalence than in genuine theoretical disagreements, although it is these that are stressed, in order to hide the all too human personal biases that are behind them." (in Carotenuto, p.xxxix).

TEXT.

In the present South African context, the traditional and "normal" boundaries between family members, have either strengthened or blurred/disintegrated. With increased social upheaval and violence many white families experience a heightened sense of paranoia and fear, and as a result, the boundaries between the family unit and society at large are strengthened. Accompanying this process is a withdrawal and isolation from the wider social reality and a blurring or disintegration of the

boundaries between and amongst the families's subgroups as a result of continuous dependence on, and enmeshment with, one another. Consequently, a likely scenario is that of the white parent who begins to conceive of his/her family as simply being an extension of him/herself and the subsequent family murder in this context is, in a symbolic sense, an extended suicide. No meaningful, cognitive separation exists between murderer and murdered.

As has already been stated, the original forces in the family's initial closing in on itself are the wider societal forces. The resulting "closed" nature of the family system however, by no means precluded it from further external influence/interaction. To elaborate the textual process of how a national/cultural level becomes translated at a personal level, an archetypal/mythical analysis is useful.

At the onset, it must be stated that a distinction will be made between myths which assist in explaning the choice of a family murder as a viable option to what is seen as an oppressive situation, and those myths which, while not explaining the actual murder, go a long way in setting up the context within which a family murder becomes a possibility.

A regards the latter, the Teutonic myth of Wotan is of most use. Wotan was known as the god of storm and frenzy, predominated in the middle ages, but thought to have been outgrown. It next "came to life" in the Hitler Youth Movement, and Jung used it to exlain the rapid development of National Socialism in Germany, prior to the Second World War. Jung argued that the disturbances in the German consciousness could not be ascribed to the personal unconscious but were rather more deeply located in the Wotanic contamination of the father archetype (Progroff, 1953; Stevens, 1982). As a result of the rigidily patriarchal and Ehrfurcht (honour-fear) nature of German society (paralleled amongst many white South Africans) the dynamic aspects of this myth were repressed (Stevens, 1982, p122). An additional factor in the repression was the fact that Christendom considered the myth to be satanic and proceeded to split the Barbarian (Wotan) into upper and lower parts, domesticating the upper sphere to fit in with civilisation, while simultaneously repressing the lower part (Jung, CW 10). In this process of repression, because the forces of order are not intergrated, there is the potential for a dangerous accumulation of the forces of disorder. Symbols of this process are state violence and totalitarianism.

"As is always the case with repressed material, it does not disappear", and "The lower, darker half still awaits redemption and a second spell of domestication .... as the Christian view of the world loses its authority, the more menacingly will the 'blond beast' be heard prowling about in its underground prison, ready at any moment to burst out with devastating consequences." (Jung, CW10, para 17). The eruption of accumulated repressed material occurs in a violent and destructive manner with little of no reference to consciousness (Progroff, 1953).

In analysing the South African scenario - with the rigidly patriarchal and nationalistic nature of white society, the penetrative power of the NG Kerk, the State's policy of apartheid and privileged interest groups, enforcement of separate interest groups through ideology, security legislation, military action, hostility against neighbouring states and cross border raids etc - deep cutting parallels with Nazi Germany and Stalin's Gulag are evident. The deep rumbling of Wotan with its migratory soul, finds roots in the South African authoritarian soil which promotes the "heroic" pursuit and return to Uroboric state of being.

A Uroboric state of being is a state of non-differentiation and results in an impasse in which the "hero" is tied to the "Great Mother" but unable to acknowledge the bondage. The hero becomes arrested in a circular and repetitive process caught in an incestuous web of seduction and revulsion. This process repeats itself in the patriarchal structures of the Zeus-Hera type marriage (Saayman et al, 1988). It is a forced marriage achieved through disguise, rape and shame: "(Hera) took pity on him only when he adopted the disguise of a bedraggled cuckoo, and tenderely warmed him in her bosom. There he at once resumed his true shape and ravished her, so that she was shamed into marrying him" (Graves, 1955, p50).

The white South African male believes he has rights of ownership and control over others (woman, children, blacks, and so on) which he believes are part of the interlinking hierarchies of authority (family, school, university, work environment, army). The white South African male identifies himself as a superman connected to a chosen and superior race and as a superman/hero he is "unable to die" - unable to bear the "cross" of separation. In reaction to frustration of his omnipotent fantasies and manic delirium the individual is involved in violent projection and regression under the influence of his shadow. What Jung refers to as the "regressive restoration of the persona".

In this state of imbalance (loss of soul), contamination, blurring and merging of a constellation of archetypal images takes place whose aim it is to restore the pact with the "night-sun" - the divine mission to rule over the weak. In identifying with his persona his "social unconscious" (Fromm) becomes inconspicuous and submerged with the ideals the "race" professes to be guided by. With fanaticism and a fatalistic conformity the individual persona attempts to becomes part of the collective dogma.

The identification gives a precarious sense of permanence but needs to order reality so as to restore the Uroboric state of being. In this process of selective vision and "restoration of law and order" the individual is compelled to go on interferring with reality for each solution creates more problems to be solved. Like Adonis the individual is unable to heed the wisdom of counsel. He is destined to be at war with the beast within due to unacknowledged narcissistic symbiosis with the "Great Mother".

A family murder is in a bizarre sense an act of love, one of aggression turned inward, onto the self. Wotan, a manifestation of the patriarchal father, finds his kinship to be based on the old order of love. A situation in which Zeus and Hera, like their father Cronus before, devour and attempt to control that which expresses differentiation - that which breaks one into two and two into three. It is an attempt to restore the taboo against awareness, a taboo Psychi broke in casting light upon the hidden "beast", pricking the insulated reality with the inflamed desire to know and love. The taboo is a "masculine" rejection and denial of Psychi's quest - to learn how to understand Eros while retaining her individuality.

CONTENT AND PROCESS - A CASE STUDY.

Having presented the text it is now important to outline the content.

"The white royal road" is linked to the process which has masked the unconscious. The process, when unmasked, is seen to be based on the attempt at absolute method, that is, an ideology based on relations of domination and white interests. Any attempt at an "absolute method" is a process without a subject (5). This means that the subject can only be understood at the level of omission, the extent to which the white South African is not an expression of his/her own individual nature but of the nature of party policy. This is seen in the relations of production and other political and ideological relations.

This closed system could be referred to as the "white asylum" - what Adorno refers to as an "administered world". As with any capitalist system a degree of bureaucratic and institutional living occurs. When the dominant institutions entrench themselves, institutionalisation becomes the norm. This entrenchment manifests the deception that the whites depend solely on themselves for their power. The greater the attempt to eliminate all resistance, to establish this deception as the norm, the stronger the suggestion of the possibility of whites having unlimited power.

The more powerful the whites feel (in their terms, less limited) the more intolerable any limitation feels. The paradox is that in attempting to maintain an exclusive identity whites have had to define themselves against another, and have created a narcissistic illusion that identity can be structured through being the "desire of the other" (that place from which the other desires). The result is a "primary identification that structures the subject as a rival with himself" creating paranoid hostility (Lacan, 1977, p22). This projective defence aims to keep destructive impulses towards loved ones, peers and self repressed.

It is the attempt at absolute power which limits the individual, for he/she cannot distinguish his/her identity from "THE OTHER" (**6**). Put another way, the extent of this dependency on "THE OTHER" (taken to be the symbolic order) is the extent to which he/she experiences an incompleteness, the lack he/she feels compelled to fill. The whites, due to feeling incomplete have allied themselves with Nationalist ideology so as to attempt to gain and secure the belief in authority, protection and absolute power.

White South Africans have become that which negates them, that which they cannot cope with, for any attempt to limit basic human nature, is to deny the desire of the unconscious, and to be swallowed up by that desire. Frustration which results, is as a result of an over emphasis on nationalist "logos" - an arrogant, brutal and dominant form of "fathering", the male authoritative order. In terms of pathology, it is a collective neurosis - fixated to an obsessive compulsive need to control and force "order" (i.e the SA Defence Force is a magnified form of obsessive compulsive behaviour evident in the wider society).

The ideology of white domination is one crystallised around certain pillars. Three central pillars can be delineated: A triangular conflict.

1. Inferiority/superiority; active/passive - "Images of Fragmentation" - AMBIVALENCE;
2. Violence and male brutality - "Foreclosure" - PATHOLOGY;
3. Taboos and legislation - COMPLEX.

The constituent elements of this disorder can be seen in so-called white culture - WHITE PHALLUS (Calvinistic race theology, apartheid laws, rugby, paranoid fear of homosexuality, and so on). For example, rugby has a mode of signification unique to white South Africans. A month prior to the white election, South African society was beset by violent police action against protest groups. Despite this situation, white English-speaking "liberal" newspapers in Cape Town had more to say about the forthcoming rugby test with the entire front page devoted to rugby news. Why? Rugby has taken on a symbolic mythical meaning. Demystified rugby is the phallic display of insecure white males who are afraid of all that they associate with being female, in particular intimacy. It is a form of sexual acting out to compensate for impotency, castration, fear. An internalised guilt of patricide and an overly erotic identification with the dead father (7). As long as South Africa can beat the world's best, they are still the strongest.

The other constituent element of the "white phallus" is white violence towards black people and the manifestation of that violence. The white laager, in attempting to ensure a voiceless, unrepresented cheap black labour force have broken down, fragmented, disintegrated and annihilated primary subsistence and emotional facets of black life.

One reaction to this is the tyre-necklace (a circle) which is a slow burning away of forces that the laager (closed circle) have co-opted. Another reaction is "black on black" violence (ideologically referred to as "tribal conflict"). This class conflict is the desperate attempt to gain status and a voice of representation. Symbolically an attempt to have their cry acknowledged due to the fact that for the majority of black people their cry has been down-played as less than human and one not worth responding to. To avoid swallowing the loss, (symbolised by the empty mouth), some blacks take on the words and roles ascribed by the status quo, whilst others identify their entire existence with the words of the struggle (8). "Amandla" becomes THE WORD.

In the struggle of the blacks who wishes to break the bond of "master - slave" the attempt is to create a society which is ungovernable. This

disorder in South Africa has created a society of "mirrors" - illusion/reality, intera/extera, projection/incorporation - which become indistinguishable images. To armour himself/herself against the images of fragmentation ("castration, mutilation, dismemberment, dislocation, evisceration, devouring, bursting open of the body", Benvenuto & Kennedy, 1986, p57) the whites attempt to build a fortress around the introjection, identification and idealisation of the "ideal".

To keep this lack at bay a chain of signifying symbols are developed to displace the tension/conflict elsewhere. When all else fails, (the links of the signifying chain begin to break), there is the last resort of psychosis and suicide. "Turning to psychosis, one may see a 'foreclosure' (in Freud Verwerfung), or a complete failure to recognise symbolic castration and the name of-the-father, which results in profound disturbances in the symbolic order" (Benvenuto & Kennedy, 1986, p135).

THE WHITE SOUTH AFRICAN OEDIPUS COMPLEX.

"Contemporaneously with this 'devotion' of the ego to the object, which is no longer to be distinguished from a sublimated devotion to an abstract idea, the functions allotted to the ego ideal entirely cease to operate. The criticism exercised by that agency is silent, everything that the object does and asks for is right and blameless. Conscience has no application to anything that is done for the sake of the object; in the blindness of love remorselessness is carried to the pitch of crime. The whole situation can be completely summarized in a formula: THE OBJECT HAS BEEN PUT IN THE PLACE OF THE EGO IDEAL." (Freud, 1921, Being in love and Hypnosis, in **Group Psychology**).

A tentative hypothesis for the above could be that at the time of so-called Oedipal separation, the loss which occurs is not filled by his/her actual father but by the BIG FATHER (state). Society enters the individual as s/he enters the world of symbolic speech, the pre-structured relations. What the father does is to merely act as a catalyst for the logos of state. The violent way authority (ideology) replaces the child's emotions with the ethics of the state (BIG FATHER), leaves the child's emotional nature immature and empty - in a state of repetition (DESTRUCTIVE DRIVE - return of the repressed).

This "new structuring" is not an abrupt happening but a merging of the symbolic roles of mother and father. The WHITE MOTHERS OF THE

NATION are absorbed in dependency relationships with their children, characterised by their own ambivalence to gender symbols. (In a society in which "female traits" are classified as negative and opposite to "male traits", in which macho-ism and "female passivity" are highly esteemed, mothering becomes structured by pre-existing white patriarchal social constraints).

The woman/mother's ambivalence results in a rejection of that which is seen as "female" (weak) and valuing of that which is seen as "white patriarchal" (powerful). Males come to be those who have access to and represent the important social resources, whilst females construct their identity in terms of the ability to identify with the needs of others (in particular males). Women's sexuality becomes identified with the satisfaction of male sexual needs. So saying, the actual interaction of THE MOTHERS OF THE NATION cannot escape the SYMBOLIC STRUCTURES which help define those interactions. What Chodorow would refer to as the internalisation of social relations that govern parenting, in particular what society teaches to be "good enough parenting".

The child's internal representations (Imaginary order) are confused further with his/her interaction with a powerless caring significant other, the female black domestic. The definition of her role as servant gives her a limited and empty voice as a person. She finds herself, as does the child, helpless victim to the child's feelings of omnipotence, frustration and terror.

The negative and inferior role of females, (as delineated by the symbolic order), undermines the care and support the significant other provides. In being unable to contain destructive phantasies the mother/parent - child boundary becomes confused. Feelings of intimacy become feared and the BIG FATHER comes to be seen as the heroic, all-powerful saviour, to lift the child into adulthood out of the so-called emotional mess. Yet the NAME OF THE FATHER (in its true form of castration) is never expressed.

It is naive, however, to write off the whites as monsters as the process manifests itself in a subtle manner. Generally speaking, whites may be considered a collective type, with their emotional being impoverished, and worse still, not in control of their life, but controlled by that part of the unconscious which constitutes the "gaze of the other" (ideology).

Whilst this may be the case, even in the most authoritarian of people or institutions (eg. the army), basic humanness can exist - they are at times kind, caring and loving people. Thus the unconscious process of the whites manifests itself in the form of a split identity, one of humanness and one of introjection of the Big Father with all its racist and fascist implications. There exists a tension between brutal authoritarianism and what small degree of humanity is retained. This lack of "balance" is evident in human relationships which tend towards control and patronisation.

The unholy mix of "human nature" and "state nature", with "state nature" being the dominant, causes ideology (state policy) to be experienced as natural, as part of human nature. Ideology imprints itself upon human development making itself indistinguishable from those libidinal elements that are "instinctive" (9). These "instinctive" drives would normally be attached to an imaginary order which express the desire of "great refusal" in separating from jouissance. The BIG FATHER and MOTHER OF THE NATION, upholds a mirror image of completeness (omnipotence) to the child who gives up her/his desire anticipation of completeness.

The person who is emotionally impoverished in this manner cannot (does not want to) imagine anything other than this symbolic order, to which s/he has given his/her desire. Anything contrary is either ignored of else transformed into this "consistent world picture". The tension associated with this process is a fear of that which is unknown (reality) and experienced as an empty void. It is the projections onto others and actual situations ie black protests, which s/he cannot transform into his/her world picture which heightens this already existing tension/emptiness.

In the family murder, the individual lacks resources to accommodate and assimilate this tension/emptiness. Put another way, it is the "tension of reality", which cannot be wished into the symbolic order. This tension ,experienced as a mixture of ambiguous emotions, is felt as an attack to the core (lack of core). The illusion of absolute power folds in on itself and as a defence devours itself.

The act of killing the family reflects the wish that that which s/he loves and desires must remain intact. Loyalty unto death. The family murder is suicide before disillusionment - infantile rage (terror) that this white South African bourgeois ideal is not omnipotent.

CONCLUSION.

"We know in fact what ravages a falsified filiation can produce, going as far as the dissociation of the subject's personality, when the constraint of his entourage is used to sustain the lie" (Lacan, 1977, p67).

Apartheid/racism is sick, it brutalises, perverts, distorts and traumatises. We are at present witness to the obscenities and vicious explosions of this disturbance. What we witness and what is exposed does no more than reveal that which is already there - fissures and division which already exist. How much the violence is "tribal", a result of enforced government separation and conscious manipulation of perhaps "tenuous" divisions, the hidden third hand, and how much is the expression of years of brutal oppression, we do not know.

The present text of South Africa is the Promethean will-to-power, one of fire and rebirth. "Pandora's dilemma, the floods, to profane the remains of our ancestors ... " are some of the painful paradoxes that the (damaged) white psyche need to work through so as to find "symbols of transformation" which avoid the violent metaphor of the family murder and its inter-relatedness to the violence at large.

Notes.

1. The Afrikaans term "beskikkingsreg" will be used in this discussion as there is no adequate English translation of the word. Broadly, it means the acceptance of the right to decide on the lives of others.

2. "Collective unconscious" means for us that "there is just one unconscious which is indistinguishable in individuals and in groups in the way it works. There are collective unconscious elements in individuals, especially in the superego. And there are individual unconscious processes at work in group leaders." (Bocock, 1983, p129). Whether or not the collective unconscious can be related to an "archaic heritage" or a "reservoir of unknown inborn, primordial, a priori experiences of mankind, beyond the conceivable known and dualism of rationality/irrationality" is an anthropological, evolutionist and metaphysical question, that is, Kant's categories, Bergson's pure duration, Feuerbach's eclectic humanism, Husserl's absolute in infinity, infinite telos, and so on. We are not prepared to

embrace this question but instead focus on those aspects which lead to a social theory. For a different reading of the collective unconscious and social theory see Saayman, Faber and Saayman (1988).

3. "What is necessary is that it should 'fuse' (fusionner) with other contradictions in a unity which provokes radical change. This unity of fused contradictions reveals its own nature, which is that contradiction is inseparable from its conditions of existence and from the moments, or instances, it governs. Determining and determined by the various levels and moments of the social formation, contradiction is therefore 'overdetermined'." (Kelly, 1982, p127).

4. Steele (1982) in advocating hermeneutics as a science of interpretation emphasised Jung's use of textual analyses and Freud's use of case studies.

5. For a more detailed discussion with reference to this concept of "absolute method" see:
(a) Marx, K **The poverty of philosophy**, p200, in Marx, K & Engels, F (1976) **Collected Works.** London: Lawrence & Wishart.
(b) Althusser, L (1982) **Montesquieu, Rousseau, Marx.** London: Verso, pp182-186.
(c) Adorno, T W (1982) **Against epistemology.** Oxford: Blackwell, pp9-17.

6. Identity is structured and the psyche organised through the medium of white nationalistic cultural categories - a total symbolic network of systems and sub-systems.

7. The dead father is the colonialist tradition that the "boers" inherit (and erect as totems) from the British (i.e Glen Grey Act becomes the 1913 Land Act).

8. To avoid "swallowing the loss" (symbolised by the empty mouth) the baby howls and cries and by so doing "makes things appear". This process of making sounds results in the breast-filled mouth being replaced by the word-filled mouth. What happens when the baby cries and nothing fills its mouth, nothing appears? (Harper & Ntisme, 1990).

9. The "Affective, passionate elements which modifies the subjects relation to reality" becomes more or less exclusively attached to white ideology, reorganising his/her perceptions in which the "ego" is captivated and alienated "by this reality". "An obsessive, over-estimated internal

representation is formed around the object which justifies the subjects inner state." (Green, 1986, p223).

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Sate policy and juvenile crime in South Africa, 1911-1939

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Recent writing by psychologists and social workers is curiously ahistorical. That historical analysis which does exist, apart from the work by Louw (1), replicates on the whole versions of history and theoretical approaches which do not contribute to uncovering for psychologists and social workers the historical roots of their practices. These shape the terrain on which psychologists and social workers operate to this very day. It is important that psychologists and social workers understand their own history theoretically if new ways of transforming the field in South Africa are to be developed.

This article will try to cast light on one aspect of the history of state policy and social welfare in South Africa. It argues that racially differential means for dealing with black and white juvenile delinquents were developed in the twenties and thirties through the development of institutional and non-institutional approaches. These represented the differentially repressive and ideological means by which social relations in South Africa were regulated: for blacks largely through the prisons, repatriation to the rural areas and apprenticeships to white farmers, for Europeans largely through the family and education. Both signified direct intervention by the state in labour control and discipline on the one hand, and labour reproduction on the other. In the case of Europeans, the shift in the 1920s to the use of probation, maintenance grants known as "mother's pensions" and industrial schools formed part of the wider state

strategy to intervene in the "poor white" and working class family. As much as these were concessions to the white working class, and rights won by women, their development also saw the expansion of agencies involved in direct regulation and state surveillance of civil society (2). In the case of blacks, the absence of welfare facilities and the reliance on coercive techniques and procedures such as imprisonment, apprenticeship and repatriation to the rural areas was directly tied to the state's amenability in meeting the labour needs of agrarian and mining capital.

The development of a racially differential welfare system on the Witwatersrand was indirectly related to the development of the mining industry. Wolpe's work first linked the lack of development of welfare facilities for blacks to the low wages for blacks in urban area and the migrant labour system developed by the mining industry (3). Wages were kept low, and workers controlled through the compound system, on the grounds that subsistence and welfare needs would be augmented by the subsistence economy in the reserves. The effective "absolutism" imposed by the mining industry, through an accommodating state, over all aspects of South African society extended in the years after Union and during the 1920s into both the influential agricultural sector and secondary industry, bringing about a rigid state control over the entire working class population (4). Stadler has, in addition, related paltry welfare rights for Africans to a social policy defined by the Stallard Commission of 1922 which effectively excluded Africans from membership of civil society by a conception of social rights of different racial groups. In this view the rights of Africans in urban areas were linked only to the labour services they performed (5). Whereas mining capital and the state thus washed their hands of Africans, white workers gained substantial welfare concessions and rights. This was as a consequence of a number of different issues. First, their position in the economy was that of fully-proletarianised and not migrant workers. The cost of their reproduction was thus higher than that of black migrant workers. Second, they enjoyed political rights such as the franchise. Third, the social struggles conducted by them and culminating in the Rand Revolt of 1922 had a significant impact on state policy. Finally, various sectors within the ruling class including capital, the state and the churches had an interest in a stabilised white working class (6).

The meagre welfare facilities for blacks developed during the 1920s and 1930s on the Witwatersrand, following on the expansion of manufacturing industry and the growth of a non-migrant African working class, were

largely the result of missionary and liberal interventions through the Joint Councils formed in 1921. These initiatives were stimulated by the growth of African militance in the urban areas in the post-World War One years, and the desire to channel this radicalism into de-politicised activities and forms of organisation. While not questioning the forces underlying the system of labour coercion itself, liberals and social workers in the Joint Councils and South African Institute of Race Relations formed in 1929 sought to ameliorate the harsh conditions under which Africans were compelled to live in urban areas. They frequently found themselves in conflict with the state over the terms of the segregationist policy to be pursued, and the provision or not of welfare services in urban areas. The gradual development of welfare facilities for black and white youth between 1917 and 1932 reflected these trends. While there was, on the one side, a massive increase in the scope and nature of welfare for white youth, this was not the case for African children. A review of the differential ways of dealing with black and white youth defined as delinquent in the twenties and thirties will reveal these trends.

WHITE YOUTH.

There was a decisive shift in methods of "disposal" of European children appearing before the courts during the 1920s. The provisions of the Children's Protection Act (1913) and the Hostels Act no.46 of 1920 (an amendment of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act no.31 of 1917 - see Chapter Four) provided for a variety of custodial and non-custodial alternatives, other than reformatories. Under the Children's Protection Act minors under the age of 16 could be referred either to government industrial schools, "certified" institutions (homes, orphanages and refuges run privately for the reclamation of children in danger of falling into crime), non-certified institutions such as industrial schools, and private persons or they could be apprenticed, boarded out, or placed in the custody of a parent or guardian receiving a government grant. They could also be sent to reformatories or certified hostels under the Criminal Procedure Act no.31 of 1917 and in conjunction with the Prisons and Reformatories Act. A large majority of juveniles were also dealt with by non-institutional methods such as fines, warnings, suspended sentences, whippings, and so on (7).

Their use was considerably advanced after the Nationalist-Labour Pact government with its "civilised" labour policy took office in 1924 (8). The commitment to organised white labour assisted the further extension of

welfare services to the white working class and "poor whites". The services of child welfare organisations, probation officers and social workers, which had expanded considerably after Union, were employed more extensively than had previously been the case (**9**).

Between 1924 and 1934, important steps were taken in the co-ordination of welfare, and the professionalisation of social work in South Africa. The South African National Council for Child Welfare was formed in 1924 as a permanent national body to co-ordinate the work of existing welfare organisations. Although there was "a multiplicity of charitable organisations many of these organisations doing social and charitable work on the the Rand" (**10**), very few of their workers were paid or trained. The majority were voluntary social workers. In 1926 separate premises were made available for a children's court at Auckland Park, and a children's magistrate was appointed. By 1927 four state-appointed probation officers attended the children's court: H. Norman, Ella Clarry, J. Millar and C. Olivier. As the volume and complexity of work expanded, so the need began to be felt for greater co-ordination and rationalisation of services. The formation of the South African National Council for Child Welfare in 1924 provided a forum through which common strategies could be expressed and developed. The Great Depression of the late twenties and early thirties gave a further boost to welfare work. The **Carnegie Report on the Poor White Problem** and the development of University Departments of Sociology and Social Work stimulated the greater use of "more modern methods" and "training (of) social workers both theoretically and...also in practical work" (**11**).

One of the consequences of the growth of welfare and social work was that institutionalisation was no longer seen as an effective way of re-building the white working class family. Regulation **within,** rather than removal **from** the community was becoming constructed as the dominant strategy for regulation of white delinquency (**12**).

While the infrastructure of welfare services geared towards the white working class was being set in place, the poor within the white community itself was making greater demands on the state for relief. The Influenza Epidemics of 1918 and 1919 combined with the recession of the early twenties and growing unemployment of these years greatly increased the numbers of children eligible for committal to industrial schools under the "destitution" clause of the Children's Protection Act. Many parents availed themselves of this clause, and discharged the burden of unwanted or

neglected children onto the state. Extension of welfare thus did not simply take the form of spreading a network of state control over the white working class; it was, in some cases, actively sought by the poor (13).

The shift to the use of non-custodial sanctions was first seen in the 1920 Hostels Act, which provided for an institution less rigidly custodial than a reformatory, and in the amendment to the Children's Protection Act in 1921. The latter provided for the committal of a "waif and stray" to the care of its mother, grandmother or near relative. Government maintenance grants allowed for this development. These "mother's pensions" worked as a form of poor relief, with industrial schools being used as alternatives. As can be seen from Table 3, there was a substantial increase in the numbers of children looked after privately and by mothers between 1923 and 1925. By the early 1930s, such committals formed an important dimension of the work of children's courts, alongside committals to private institutions and industrial schools.

TABLE 3
WHITE CHILDREN UNDER THE CHILDREN'S PROTECTION ACT

Year ended	Indust. schools	Cert.* Instit.	Private	Mothers	Appren-ticed
31.12.20	725	998	737	Nil	627
31.12.21	870	1412	816	269	711
31.12.22	973	1860	963	919	771
31.12.23	1068	2136	1071	1645	847
31.12 24	1224	2758	1317	1998	832
31.12.25	1332	2925	1490	2287	837
	6192	**12089**	**6394**	**7118**	**4625**

Total Number of Children falling under Children's Protection Act, 1920-1925, excluding numbers Boarded out (total: 3237) and Protected Infants.
* In terms of the Childrens Protection Act of 1913 a certified institution was an institution certified as an institution to which children could be committed under the Act. An uncertified institution was thus not a recognised one for the purposes of dealing with children "in need of care".

The Table also shows the number of methods the state had of disposing with destitute white children: the industrial school was only one method, along with apprenticeship, and of lesser importance than the non-institutional method. Excluding certified institutions, it is clear that there was a significant increase in state expenditure on and care of destitute white children. Thus the industrial school itself was assimilated into a wider network of welfare facilities.

State expenditure on white welfare rose in the period of heightened crisis before and after the Rand Revolt of 1922 which precipitated the Nationalist-Labour Pact government in 1924. In 1920 the total expenditure on the maintenance of children with mothers and private persons, in institutions and industrial schools was £92,992 and increased to the large figure of £188,960 in 1925, while the number of children under the Acts for the respective years rose from 5,444 to 10,777. The biggest increase in expenditure was in respect of maintenance grants for children in institutions and with private persons other than with mothers. It increased from £32,600 in 1920 to £81,909 in 1925, whereas the number of children in respect of which such expenditure was incurred rose from 1,735 in 1920 to 4,415 in 1925 (**14**). By 1934 only 24.28% of white juveniles appearing before the courts were institutionalised; the remainder were in some form of community care. 64.82% were under supervision in their own homes, while 10.90% were in foster care (**15**).

Imprisonment and probation work with mother's pensions stood at opposite ends of the spectrum of available alternatives in the field of penality for juveniles. A range of intermediary institutions using different degrees of external and internal discipline existed between these two poles. All however, constituted distinctive means of regulation and surveillance by the state. For Europeans, the preferred sanction from the 1920s onwards, was clearly non-institutional, within the community and within the family. It was clearly related to a process of maintaining a stable white working class family in the face of economic hardship. As van Schalkwijk expressed it in 1934, non-institutional treatment was equated with "family care" and the family, "the home (is) the unit on which the state is based" (**16**).

BLACK YOUTH.

Both the custodial and the non-custodial options for destitute, "pre-delinquent" children were much more limited for black children and youth

than for white: they were sent more often to prison than whites, and less often than whites to state-supported welfare institutions. At the end of 1929, certified institutions and auxiliary homes numbered 66 in the country at large. Of these, only 13 provided for "non-european" children, while 6 of the 41 non-certified institutions were for "non-europeans" and 1 for all races (17).

The history of maintenance grants is an index of the greater importance to the state of the stabilisation of the white working class family, the impact of the post-War recession and 1929-1932 depression, and the signficance in the history of child welfare of a conception of rights applying differentially to people variously defined racially. Between 1913 and 1917 maintenance grants were laid down at the rate of £2 and £1.10 per month for European children in inland and coastal provinces respectively, and 15/- per month for Africans and "coloureds". In 1917, new rates were prepared. From January 1919 the rates of £2 and £1 per month were laid down respectively for European and coloured children in certified and other institutions and with private persons. These were increased until, in April 1921, the magistrates, Child Welfare Societies and certified and non-certified institutions were informed that in view of the serious position of the Union's finances, the Department had decided to reduce the existing rates of maintenance by 5/- per month. In July 1923 parents were enjoined to make some contribution towards the cost of maintaining their children in institutions. Many grants were stopped; maintenance grants were further reduced. By 1927 they had hit an all-time low. Simons thus correctly described the situation in 1931 as one in which the most important welfare provisions of the Children's Protection Act were "largely inoperative in the case of black and coloured juveniles" (18).

That child welfare for blacks was closely tied to state policy of allocating labour to the agricultural sector is demonstrated in the use that was made of specific provisions in the Children's Protection Act. A significant proportion of black, and especially "coloured" juvenile offenders were apprenticed to white farmers (19). The Western Cape, in particular, had a long history of indenturing black children to white farmers under Master and Servant laws. This practice was continued when Porter Reformatory was established in 1882, and formed part of the sentence of offenders. Both the Prisons and Reformatories Act (1911) and the Children's Protection Act (1913) incorporated this labour coercive technique derived from an earlier period in South African agrarian history into their methods of dealing with destitute youth and juvenile offenders. In

practice, it was predominantly applied to "coloured" youth. By the end of 1929, the total number so apprenticed was 1 012. Of these only 33 were Europeans (20). In a paper read to a Child Welfare Conference in 1924, a social worker, one Miss M Elliot, outlined the position as follows:

"In dealing with the coloured children, this difficulty (of placing uncontrollable children: L.C.) is almost greater, as little or no provision is made in institutions for them, and 'places' outside have to be found. The maintenance grant given is inadequate to provide a home life for them. Some of them have to be left where they are under the supervision of kindly and friendly persons. Others are apprenticed by the Probation Officer to farmers or to private persons, either living in the country or towns. This method answers all right if the child fits into the 'place' which has been found for it" (21).

Regulations entitled apprentices to 3/- per month up to the age of 10 years; 1/- per month yearly increasing until the amount of 6/- was reached; then 7/6 per month for one year, and 2/6 per month yearly increase thereafter until the age of 18 was reached. An eighth of the monthly payment was to be given to the apprentice for pocket-money, the rest put into a Savings Bank. It is small wonder then that **The Select Committee into Porter Reformatory** revealed in 1921 that the local "coloured" community looked upon the system as one of providing "cheap labour" for white farmers. By 1939 the system was still in force and, as the Principal of the Tokai Reformatories, W Marais, nervously reported:

" .. is used by coloured leaders as an example of the oppression of the coloured. Such a leader even provided protection to one of the pupils who absconded from his employer. This spirit of opposition is also spreading to the pupils and it is obvious that the pupils who hear about this agitation won't be willing to stay with employers" (22).

Apprenticeship was also a favourite sanction in the courts of the Witwatersrand. Liberal attention became concentrated on conditions in which black children lived on the Rand in the aftermath of the 1918 and 1920 strikes and anti-pass law campaign. A a minor scandal blew up over the apprenticeship of black children in 1921 when it emerged that the courts had been sentencing black youth predominantly to corporal punishment and apprenticeship. The Magistrate of Johannesburg and a labour recruiting agency for the Heidelberg-Standerton Farmers' Union were discovered at that moment to be in the process of arranging the

indenture of black juvenile offenders to white farmers.

When the Secretary for the Native Affairs Department raised the question of facilities with the Union Education Department, its unsurprising response, on 11th March 1921, was that: " .. it would seem an inversion of the proper order to concentrate efforts on provision for their needs while hundreds of European children are growing up in similar conditions and cannot be rescued owing to lack of accommodation at existing institutions" (23). In the absence of social, economic and institutional alternatives, and in line with the Stallard doctrine that Africans were "temporary sojourners" in urban areas, magistrates (in addition to whipping, apprenticing and sentencing a small percentage to reformatories), were also resorting to repatriating black juvenile offenders to the rural areas (24). This practice began to be challenged by the Joint Councils, who argued that the solution to black juvenile delinquency lay in the wider sphere of the recognition of the permanence of blacks in urban areas. What was needed, it maintained, was compulsory education for black children up to the age of 14 years; the establishment of a Juvenile Affairs Board and Juvenile Employment Bureaux; the establishment of an Agricultural School for blacks in the Transvaal; the formation of a Native Children's Aid Society; the appointment of a European Probation Officer and a Juvenile Court for black juvenile offenders (25).

The appointment of a black social worker to the courts in 1923 signified a grudging recognition that existing measures were strained to breaking-point, and also provided an opportunity by liberals to attempt to regulate relations within the urban black community. In this work, Charlotte Maxeke, a stalwart of the Joint Councils and a leading figure in the Bantu Womens League, provided invaluable assistance: "her intimate knowledge of many of the Natives charged, enabled the magistrate to dispose of the cases in a manner both in the interests of the delinquent, and to the advantage of the state" (26). Her efforts, however valuable in pressing for recognition of the immense social problems on the Rand, only scratched the surface of the problems. In the case of very young children without a previous record of crime, for example, both of whose parents were dead and who seemingly had no friends or relatives, the problem of finding accommodation was often insuperable. Missionary schools could not function at one and the same time as orphanages, schools and refuges.

Probation work had, by this stage, become skewed in a way that later defined the segregated way probation and welfare was to develop. In 1916

H Norman was appointed to the Johannesburg courts as probation officer. In the recessionary post-war years the number of juveniles appearing before the courts expanded, but they remained largely under-staffed and under-paid (**27**). This was despite the fact that juvenile work at courts had become so important that by 1935, 87,4% of cases dealt with by the Johannesburg Probation Staff consisted of minors. In the entire country, there were only 11 probation officers; of these, only one was a woman, Miss Ella Clarry (**28**), Norman's assistant since the days of the Lads' Clubs. Five of the 11 officers were stationed in Johannesburg, while three were in Cape Town, two at Durban and one at Pretoria. In addition, there were a number of voluntary officials. The pressure of work was enormous. It was work, however, geared to alleviating conditions in the white rather than the black working class. "Probation officers", it was noted in 1932, "are so heavily burdened with work relating to European cases as to be unable to attend to non-Europeans" (**29**). From 1923 to 1930 Charlotte Maxeke was the only paid, black social worker appointed by the Native Affairs Department and based in Johannesburg.

In 1930, Charlotte Maxeke was discharged, the relinquishing of her services a sign of both cost-cutting exercises in the context of the Great Depression as well as the steadily hardening segregationist programme of non-recognition of the right of Africans to be in urban areas. Her departure brought the problems which, in the context of rapid and dramatic black urbanisation and impoverishment in Johannesburg, were by now acute, to a head. Numbers appearing before the courts had swollen with the tide of economic destitution that deposited juvenile offenders there. In 1926, for example, a total of 778 black males appeared before them, as opposed to 95 white (**30**). Not all of these could be sent to prison or to missionaries, the latter being the only rather limited form of non-institutional provision existent in the urban areas for black children.

Recognising this, C Olivier, Probation Officer for Johannesburg, wrote to the Magistrate of the Juvenile Court at Auckland Park, pleading for a replacement for Charlotte Maxeke on the grounds that community solutions were needed to resolve social problems amongst blacks on the Rand, and that Maxeke's work was indispensable. During the first eight months of 1930, he pointed out, 263 African males and 42 females under the age of 18 had come before the court. During the preceding 12 months the numbers were even higher, at 375 and 93 respectively. In the majority of cases neither corporal punishment nor committal to a reformatory was a satisfactory answer (**31**). Only an African social worker, he argued, had

the necessary knowledge of the black community to make suitable recommendations. Such a welfare worker could also exercise closer supervision and provide better assistance than a white welfare worker. This approach was supported by the African National Congress and the Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union. On 17 June, delegates from the two organisations met Major H S Cooke, Native Commissioner for the Witwatersrand, with a view to securing the appointment of welfare officers at all police stations and in court. It would be their task, they argued, to provide every assistance the prisoner might need (32).

In 1931 there was a minor crisis. The number of cases appearing before the magistrate again increased drastically (33). A "very high percentage" of these cases were dealt with not in terms of the Children's Protection Act, but according to criminal procedure (34). The Magistrate, frustrated with the inadequacy of existing measures in preventing recidivism, remarked that:

"It would appear that the administering of cuts to juveniles as a deterrent is more or less futile, particularly as regards the Native. The fear of a caning is a better deterrent than the actual infliction. Boys who have been caned are constantly being brought back to the court for minor offences such as touting on railway premises, contravention of Municipal By-laws and other minor offences. Some of these boys have been caned from 1 - 4 times .... It is useless fining them as they very seldom have money to pay a fine and if an alternative of imprisonment is given, there is no place to detain them. There are no native hostels, they cannot be sent to reformatories (in all cases) .... The same remarks apply to Native girls .... We have tried apprenticing, sending them out to farms, postponed or suspended sentences, returning them to their parents under committal orders, returning them to the districts from which they came. All these expedients have proved useless as these youngsters either run away from the employers or disappear from their homes or return here in less than no time" (35).

This magistrate did not, however, see the appointment of a probation officer as an answer, since this would have implied a commitment to dealing with urban social problems in their context. Instead, he argued that, since numbers were so enormous and the staff so small, such an officer would be unable to provide the necessary individual attention. The remedy, as far as he was concerned, was to have the detention house declared a gaol under the Prisons and Reformatories Act. This would

enable him to sentence larger numbers to terms of imprisonment. This was the short-term punitive solution. The long-term alternative was endorsing "surplus" blacks out of the urban areas.

The magistrate proved to be more powerful than the probation officer, a "native policy" committed to territorial and political segregation stronger than one which sought recognition of the large African proletariat in the urban areas, and the depression and commitment to white "upliftment" more pressing than extension of welfare facilities to blacks. In 1932 the **Report of the Carnegie Commission of Inquiry into Poor Whites** recommended that a state bureau for Social Welfare be created. As a result of the work of the Poor White Conference called in 1934 by the Dutch Reformed Churches, a Union Department of Social Welfare was created on 1st October, 1937. One consequence was that no black probation officer was appointed for a period of 6 years. When such an officer was finally appointed, the requirements were phrased in the Stallard-ite language of the 1920s, and embodied the direction taken by the new South African Party in the Hertzog "Native" Acts which removed Africans in the Cape from the common voters roll, reinforced territorial segregation through the Land Act and tightened influx control. What was needed was a person with "a sound knowledge of the pass laws and conditions on the Reef" (36). The process of repatriation, and using the courts as a means of policing a black proletariat on sufferance in the urban areas, was continued as the primary purpose of the juvenile court. The post of probation officer was firmly linked to "native policy". As the Director of Native Labour expressed it: "Such an officer might be of invaluable assistance in what I consider should be a policy of endeavouring to discourage detribalisation and settlement in urban areas, and for that reason alone I think he should be a sympathetic official with some understanding of the native mind" (37). By 1938 this task could not be adequately performed by the new appointee, one E A Kernick, who had only a working knowledge of Xhosa. It was accordingly decided, on the prompting of the South African Institute of Race Relations through its Director J D Rheinallt Jones, who had found Mrs Maxeke in dire financial straits, to re-employ her in a temporary capacity at £12 per month: her own destitution was a mark of the course of state welfare in excluding Africans from civil society.

Liberal intervention in welfare work did not end here. At the same time that Charlotte Maxeke was given such short shrift, the view was growing amongst welfare workers, missionaries and the Union Department of

Social Welfare, that Africans should be responsible for the "work of rehabilitation of their own people". In 1940 the Jan Hofmeyr School of Social Work for Non-Europeans was founded in inner Johannesburg by Ray Phillips, an active liberal and missionary of the American Board Mission. It was a direct consequence of the recommendations of the Conference on Native Juvenile Delinquency held in Johannesburg in 1938 for the training of black social workers. A committee appointed by the Young Mens Christian Association began a training school which grew into the Jan Hofmeyr School, and was headed by Dr Ray Phillips from 1940 to 1957 (**38**). More widely, it was made possible by the changed conditions wrought by war, the growth of manufacturing industry, the continuing deterioration of the reserves and the rapid urbanisation of blacks, all of which briefly strengthened the hand pressing for recognition and stabilisation of a settled urban African working class.

The juvenile court, in the case of African youth, as demonstrated above, acted as a repressive arm of the state in its expulsion of black youth from the urban centres, and their allocation as labourers to the agricultural sectors. In sentencing young black boys and men to apprenticeship it played a part in re-enforcing labour coercive techniques in agriculture. Apprenticeship was the method of control used most extensively in the Transkeian Territories (**39**). By 1934, however, the failure of this method led magistrates increasingly to call for a reformatory in these areas (**40**), even though it was not provided for several years.

The state attempted to use tribal authorities in the rural areas as an adjunct to the courts in urban areas. The growth of juvenile crime in Durban in the early 1930s had led to experimentation with repatriation under the care of approved chiefs and headmen (**41**).

Native Commissioners were required to obtain and keep a list of all chiefs, headmen and other "responsible natives" who would be prepared to accept juveniles on committal. The Department of Education would pay a grant of 5/- per month to the custodian of a committed child by way of maintenance. To ensure proper supervision the guardian was required to report quarterly to the Native Commissioner who would prepare a report. The proposed scheme, which was based on the principle of tribalism, proved so popular with the Native Affairs Department, that extensive investigations were made into the suitability of chiefs in other parts of the country for this purpose. It eventually proved impracticable. Some areas, where people lived on farms, where there were no chiefs in the area or

where chiefs were "generally unsuitable", as in large parts of the Transvaal, Orange Free State and some parts of the Cape Province, chiefs simply could not be used in the desired way. Together with doubts about the abilities of chiefs to control the "sophisticated urban juvenile delinquent", these were sufficient grounds for the abandonment of the scheme (42).

CONCLUSION.

The reformatory and industrial school were but one form of institutional sanction used by the state against black and white, and especially male juvenile offenders between 1911 and 1934. The range of sanctions employed, at different times and over time, was related less to the aim of reforming offenders than to the relation of the state to white and black labour. Juvenile and children's courts sentenced black male children to imprisonment, apprenticeship, caning, fines and repatriation to the rural areas. By contrast, white children were exposed to a wider range of welfare provisions. Whereas the concern with the white working class and "poor white" child was re-education and re-socialisation within a reconstituted and stabilised working class family, the concern with the black child was discipline and control. Whereas the role of the children's court vis a vis European children appears to have been mainly ideological, in displacing the locus of control from itself to civil society through the construct of the family, especially after the Pact government's "civilised policy" from 1924 onwards, the role of the juvenile court was central to the state apparatus of helping to exclude blacks from civil society and instead, to police and de-stabilise, through repression, a settled, urban working class. It was kept weak and insecure, jostled from rural to urban and from the urban to the rural areas. For the black child, the reformatory existed alongside the prison, as a form of control over movement and labour; for the European, the industrial school and reformatory existed alongside the school, for the re-allocation and re-socialisation of the children of the urban unemployed.

These developments were a direct consequence of the impact of a labour-repressive, migrant labour-based economy developed under the hegemony of mining capital, the segregationist political solution advanced by the state, and the racial conception of rights that, as a consequence, dominated thinking on social policy in urban areas. Alternative strategies were increasingly advocated by liberal bodies such as the Joint Councils from 1921 onwards, which sought extension of probation services for blacks in urban areas. Until 1930 these were assured of limited state support, in the form of recognition of the services of a black social worker.

As the Depression began to cut into budgets, the limits of this support were felt. The first to be axed were those whose services, in terms of state policy, were inessential.

The process of diversification, differentiation, categorisation, classification and surveillance which marked the development of new forms of social regulation in the metropolitan countries, under determinate social conditions, in a slightly earlier period, 1890-1914 (**43**), were repeated in South Africa, scarcely a decade later. They were, though, given a particular character by the political and economic form taken by South Africa's industrial revolution, based predominantly on a black migrant labour force and a fully-proletarianised white working class. Their welfare needs were accordingly framed within a social policy structured by recognition of a white but not a black working class, and stamped by a racial conception of welfare rights. Whereas the courts were used in the period of primitive accumulation during the English industrial revolution to batter a newly-proletarianised peasantry into shape, they were used in South Africa in the first part of the twentieth century to frustrate the growth of a permanent black working class and to allocate and tie labour to different sectors of the economy.

NOTES.

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6. Davies, **White labour.** (pp 55-65).

7. T.A.D., U.E.D., vol. 1153, File E50/26, Notes from L. van Schalkwijk to the Secretary of Education, 5 March 1935 on the Reformatory Services Act.

8. By 1925 there were, for example, 7 industrial schools in existence. T.A.D., Department of Social Welfare (V.W.N.), vol. 869, File sw 176/24 vol. 1; E201/2, Under-Secretary for Education to Secretary for Union Education Department, "Re: Maintenance Grants under Children's Protection Acts", 21 January 1927.

9. See Malherbe, E (ed) (1934) **Handbook on Education and Social Work in South Africa.** Pretoria, (pp33-79).

10. Ibid., p39.

11. Ibid., p35.

12. Hall, S & Schwartz, B, op. cit., pp7-32.

13. See also Chapter Four, Constructing and managing the "Child in need of care": The ideology and practice of the Children's Aid Society, 1902-1927, in Chisholm, L (1989) Reformatories and Industrial Schools in South Africa: A study in class, colour and gender, 1882-1939. Unpublished PhD thesis, University of the Witwatersrand; Chisholm, L (1990) Class, colour and gender in Child Welfare in South Africa, 1902-1918. **South African Historical Journal, 23**, 100-121.

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15. **Report of the Interdepartmental Committee on Destitute, Neglected, Maladjusted and Delinquent Children and Young Persons, 1934-1937**, U.G. 38, 1937, p8.

16. **Report of the Provincial Committee of Inquiry into Social and Charitable Work on the Witwatersrand**, 1934, T.P. 5-34, p16.

17. T.A.D., Transvaal Education Department (T.E.D.), Annual Report for 1929, pp77-78.

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19. C.A.D., A2380, N.I.C.R.O., Parris, H "The Apprenticeship of Juvenile Inmates of Prisons and Reformatories", South African Prisoners' Aid Association, Minutes of Triennial Congress, 1920; see also **Report of the Interdepartmental Committee on Destitute, Neglected, Maladjusted and Delinquent Children and Young Persons, 1934-1937**, U.G. 38, 1937 - "Apprenticeship to farmers is used very extensively in the case of coloured children in the Cape and the Committee is of opinion that this system is a useful one .... (except) .... when a Cape coloured child is sent to live amongst natives on a Transvaal farm" (p53).

20. T.A.D., T.E.D., Annual Report for 1929, p36.

21. C.A.D., A2380, N.I.C.R.O., Elliot, M (1924) Child placing. 6th Child Welfare Conference, **Report of Proceedings**, (p26).

22. T.A.D., U.E.D., vol. 942, File e36, vol. 2, Principal Tokai Reformatories to Secretary of U.E.D., 1939.

23. T.A.D., U.E.D., vol. 942, Saayman, R B Secretary for Union Education Department to Secretary for Native Affairs Department, 11 March 1921. Another deputation from the Child Welfare Societies was sent to the Union Education Department in 1921, but the Secretary for Education insisted that financial stringency put their request out of the question.

24. T.A.D., U.E.D., Correspondence between Native Affairs Department and Secretary for Native Affairs, 4 August 1921 and 3 February 1922.

25. See for example, T.A.D., Department of Justice, vol. 171, File 1/320/12, Pretoria Joint Council of Natives and Europeans, "Conditions Prevailing amongst Native Juveniles in the Urban Areas of Pretoria", n.d.

26. T.A.D., Native Affairs Department (N.A.D.), vol 7601, File no 9/329: "Mrs Maxeke: Native Welfare Officer", C. Olivier, Probation Officer for Johannesburg to Magistrate of the Juvenile Court, Auckland Park, 16 September 1930.

27. T.A.D., V.W.N., vol. 860, File sw 176/24 vol. 1: Commissions and Committees, Delinquency, General, L van Schalkwijk, "Transfer of Probation Officer to the Union Education Department", n.d.

28. See Chisholm op. cit.

29. T.A.D., N.A.D., vol. 7601, File no. 9/329, Extract from an Inspection Report by Public Service Inspector to Director of Native Labour, June 1932.

30. T.A.D., Department of Justice, vol. 170, File: 1/320/12, Part 1, Secretary of Justice to Magistrate, Johannesburg, 16 September 1926.

31. T.A.D., N.A.D., vol. 7601, File No. 9/329: "Mrs Maxeke: Native Welfare Officer", Correspondence dated 16 September 1930.

32. T.A.D., N.A.D., vol. 7601, File No. 9/329.

33. 2 596 cases were dealt with, involving 3 040 individuals, or an increase of 1 372 cases. Of these there were 422 Africans under the age of 16, 432 between the ages of 17 and 18, and 416 between 19 and 21 years of age. See T.A.D., N.A.D., vol. 7601, File No. 9/328, Annual Report for 1931, Magistrate of the Juvenile Court.

34. **Report of the Interdepartmental Committee on Destitute, Neglected, Maladjusted and Delinquent Children and Young Persons, 1934-1937**, U.G. 38, 1937, p53.

35. T.A.D., Department of Native Affairs, vol. 7601, File no. 9/328, Annual Report for 1931, Magistrate of the Juvenile Court.

36. T.A.D., N.A.D., vol. 7601, Director of Native Labour, B W Martin to the Secretary for Native Affairs, 12 February 1936.

37. T.A.D., N.A.D., vol. 7601, B Martin to Secretary for Native Affairs, 25 February 1937. The strategy of "retribalisation" was "clear and growing" in the Native Affairs Department throughout the 1920s, see Dubow, S Segregation and "Native Administration" in South Africa 1920-1936, Unpublished DPhil thesis, University of Oxford, (p219).

38. U.W., C.P.S.A., Ray Phillips Papers, Box No: 1444 - 1446 (File 2); see also C.P.S.A., Rheinallt Jones Collection, G6/5.

39. T.A.D., N.A.D., vol. 7642, File No. 7/331.

40. T.A.D., N.A.D., vol. 7642, File no. 7/331.

41. T.A.D., N.A.D., vol. 7642, File No. 8/331.

42. T.A.D., Department of Justice, vol. 171, File no. 1/320/12, Part 4.

43. Garland, D (1985) **Punishment and Welfare: A history of penal strategies.** Gower; see also Katz, M (1986) **In the shadow of the poorhouse: A social history of Welfare in America.** New York.

Psychology in society (PINS), 1991, 15, 67-70

Debate

PINS, that trashy trashing journal.

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I am disturbed by some odd happenings in **Psychology in society (PINS) 12**, 1989. For example, on page 3, Ronnie Miller trashes Cole; on page 52, Kevin Solomons trashes Dave Edwards; and on page 56, Kedi Letlaka trashes Shula Marks.

There is a clear dividing line between an attack on someone's point of view, however harsh the attack may be, and an attack on the person holding that viewpoint. When assassination masquerades as science, the community from which this comes - in this case, South Africa's small group of progressive psychologists - is in trouble.

The case of reasoned debate is not served by the heavy artillery barrage that Solomons directs at Edwards, whom he accuses of arrogance, intellectual triviality (through sarcastic gratitude for Edwards's "epistemological gem"), personal animus against psychodynamics, and lack of "credibility". Then, inverting the language usage of the Wicked Son in the Jewish Passover ceremony, he pointedly excludes Edwards from the company of "we therapists". The heat of Solomons's rejoinder is extraordinary, and the damage he inflicts (or wishes to inflict) on Edwards infringes on the person, not the viewpoint.

What Letlaka-Rennert does to Shula Marks is no more palatable. She suggests that because Marks is a white South African-born historian, she

stands to her readers in the same liberal-colonial relationship in which Mabel Palmer stood to her ward Lily Moya, which in turn (in her view) reflects the research dominance of the academic left as a new form of colonialism (I assume this is a variant of the "White hands" critique). Marks's idealisation of Lily ("a failed product of missionary education" who made poor use of the opportunities given to her) is further evidence of Marks's own failed liberalism. Letlaka Rennert does not directly answer the question she asks toward the end of the review, namely why Marks found it important to write the book, but implies that it is the product of a form of crypto-colonialism. Again, this review goes beyond the issues involved, and attaches needlessly derogatory labels to Marks: is whiteness a sin that carries with it the risk of this kind of obloquy?

Miller's dismissal of the work by Michael Cole and his associates at the Laboratory of Comparative Human Cognition (LCHC) also moves across the border between fair criticism and personal assault. He writes that the LCHC suggestion that " .. all cultures have to be considered equally effective in producing ways of dealing with the problems of survival" (p3) opens the door to a cultural relativism which no third world country except South Africa, with its apartheid policies, would think of adopting. This passage does not make the iniquitous suggestion that Cole and other cultural relativists might be seen as endorsing apartheid policies, but it comes close. He goes on to ridicule this relativist view - which has a long and distinguished history in studies of human abilities of moderating racist views and undermining deficit models of "Native" ability - by noting that it has a hollow ring for the world's hungry and oppressed, " .. quite apart from the awesome spectacle that some cultures appear to be considerably more effective in the ways they have produced to exterminate the species" (p3).

However, still on page 3 from which Miller cites, Cole and his colleagues (Laboratory of Comparative Human Cognition, 1982) write: "Throughout human history, cultural groups in contact have also been competition for resources ... Key resources in such struggles have been culturally elaborated tools (ranging from the bow and arrow to the neutron bomb ...) for operating on the environment (p710). So much for Miller's "awesome spectacle", a phrase suggesting that technological differentiation among cultures has been ignored by the LCHC group. On the contrary, Cole and his co-workers go on to argue that it is tempting to index the developmental level of the world's peoples by the extent of their technological development. But by abstracting activities from their cultural

context, " .. the door is left open to serve abuses of the scientific method in favour of ethnocentric claims about the true nature of reality" (LCHC, 1982 p710).

Why in the course of an argument against cultural relativism is it necessary to heap ridicule on Cole in phrases such as "the conclusions follow with the impeccable logic that informs all tautologies", "this deliberate indulgence in ignorance", or "a perverse mimicry of the natural sciences"? I do not agree with Miller's argument that cultural relativism necessarily upholds a form of mental determinism and therefore an immutability of mental processes, but that is not the issue. The issue is that in the first two pages of his paper, he suggests to South African psychologists who wish to be progressive that to read Cole, or have intellectual intercourse with other cultural relativists (and by implication, other cross-cultural psychologists) is ignorant, tautologous, perverse, and plays into the hands of an apartheid regime. In trashing Cole, Miller's paper stands as an unfortunate block between South African psychologists and field of psychological enquiry that may be wrong, but is certainly very important to the goal Miller sets in his paper, which is to understand what it means to be human.

Knowledge is power. Foucault asks, "What rules of right are implemented by the relations of power in the production of discourses of truth?", and answers, "We are subjected to the production of truth through power and we cannot exercise power except through the production of truth .... It is truth that makes the laws, that produces the true discourse which, at least partially, decides, transmits and itself extends upon the effects of power. In the end, we are judged, condemned, classified, determined in our undertakings, destined to a certain mode of living or dying, as a function of the true discourses which are the bearers of these specific effects of power" (1980, pp93-94).

In a society on the brink of transformation, in which a search by the "white hands", the "academic left", "progressive psychologists", or whatever else one would like to call them, is under way for a democratisation of knowledge, for a redistribution of resources, for a sharing of knowledge and power in our society for the greatest good and justice, we need to remember that governments, all governments, function by the truths rendered to them by an intellectual elite. At this time, because of the urgency of the intellectual search, reputations can be made and shattered overnight. For the readers of **Psychology in society (PINS)** and its

contributors, the search for truth is not only intellectual, but also in the service of social restructuring. Blood is an enemy of truth, and the more assassinations, the more reputations that lie in ruins, the greater the likelihood that truth will be replaced by its survivor, fashionable opinion: that is the price extracted by purges.

I hope that the editorial collectives who oversee the review process by which **Psychology in society (PINS)** is published will be able to admit criticism of other positions, however fierce it may be, but draw the line there, not allowing this journal to become an intellectual garbage disposal unit into which individuals and reputations are fed to emerge as sludge. The line between criticism and the sludge-maker is difficult to define, but one of the questions authors and editors could ask is about arrogance. A tone that is haughty, dismissive, and wounding is more likely to be arrogant than critical, and arrogance is a poison to truth.

A second criterion emerges from the issue of credibility that Kevin Solomons raises in his rebuttal to Edwards. Credibility has two meanings: the first is one's own credibility among one's co-workers, the extent to which one is accepted and trusted by the people whose votes get one elected to desirable offices. The other kind of credibility is about giving a service, and refers to the respect and trust that the recipients of the service feel toward the person giving it. Here, credibility derives from everyday qualities like keeping appointments, returning telephone calls, being available when needed, and compassion.

I think that if the kind of credibility raised by an article is the latter, it deserves publication; if it is the former, arrogance is not far behind, and the sludge-maker will soon demand its victims.

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Psychology in society (PINS), 1991, 15, 71-78

Men and rape

Book review

Vogelman, L (1990) **The sexual face of violence: Rapists on rape.** Johannesburg: Ravan Press.

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Lloyd Vogelman provides the local reader with an overview of mainstream approaches to rape (feminist, psychological, sociological) in an inexpensive, 214 page paperback. In eight chapters, he examines interactions between social structures and processes and conventional ideas about gendered behaviour (sex roles is the term Vogelman uses). These structures and ideas, which he discusses as rape promoting factors, maintain and perpetuate the subordination of women to men. He briefly addresses links between economic exploitation, racial oppression, social violence and masculinity, in South Africa. Using material from interviews (of 29 Johannesburg men, in three groups comprising rapists, violent and non-violent men) and surveying the literature on rape, he exposes and explodes many common myths about rape (e.g. that perpetrators are usually strangers; that rape occurs in public places; that only women who deserve it or are looking for it are raped). Obtaining his sample from court records (acquitted rapists or those who had served a sentence), and by word of mouth, he did a semi-structured interview with each of these men. Vogelman reveals that these men often planned the sexual assaults, are quite self-congratulatory about their deeds, show little or no concern about the women involved (whom they often blame or hold equally responsible) and do not expect to be charged or convicted for criminal

behaviour. Several interviewees had devised cunning strategies to ensure that, if reported, no charges would be laid or upheld in a court: in other words, they understood the ways in which the law protects rapists. Vogelman's findings are not different from those reported for research on rapists in other parts of the world: on the whole these men had the usual range of excuses and justifications for their behaviour. But this is useful to know in itself, and since no other research concerning rapists has been reported in South Africa, Vogelman's local research on working class men is both important and timely, particularly as it is presented in a broadly feminist perspective on male violence. While this is a significant contribution, I do have some reservations about this study, however, and will argue these below.

An examination of the literature which has emanated from progressive left and liberal academics in South Africa over the past ten years, reveals a growing number of feminist papers and books. These deal with the patchwork of forms that the exploitation and oppression of women take in the patriarchal social formations of Southern Africa (Bozzoli, 1983). Some of the best-known researchers in this field presented the range of issues and debates concerning women's subordination at the Conference on Women and Gender in Southern Africa held in Durban early this year (e.g. Bozzoli, 1991; Bradford, 1991; Cock, 1991; Posel, 1991; among others). Furthermore, a recent general introduction to social psychology in South Africa (Foster and Louw-Potgieter, 1991) also discusses feminist issues.

Before premature rejoicing, however, the picture demands more attentive examination - after all, many feminist issues appeared on the political agenda of Eastern bloc countries 80 years ago, and have been articulated vociferously in western Europe and North America for many decades. Yet not much has changed for women structurally in those social contexts. Depending on historical circumstances and the social context, it has been possible for some women to resist patriarchal power, bucking certain aspects of the social constraints on women, while still bowing to male authority in a range of other contexts (Posel, 1991). Similarly, some men are critical of patriarchy but still maintain their privileged positions. This is especially true in the arena of what Kate Millett called sexual politics in 1970. For example, some women resist marriage, preferring the freedom of single parenting or not having children, but are constrained in most societies by their lack of access to help with childcare, or to abortion as a backup form of reproductive control. And, more significantly for this

review, male violence against women has not declined in the USA, nor have the legal processes instituted against rapists become more successful in spite of feminist challenges. (The reader is referred to Meintjes (1991) for a further discussion of this point).

In South Africa, women have been discussing sexual violence for at least 20 years; these discussions have spread from middle class circles into far wider circles of women (Russell, 1991). But male violence against women has not been addressed in any tangible way in terms of changes in men's attitudes, in legal processes or the successful prosecution of rapists or in the form of significant lobbying. On the whole, the majority of those occupying positions of power in South Africa today are still male in every political grouping. It is said that there are difficulties finding women prepared to enter the sphere of public politics - this dominantly masculine, vociferously competitive, arena. Part of the reason for this lies in sexual politics: the microsocial events of everyday interactions between men and women where male authority is so very difficult to dislodge. Largely related to the expectations and preferences of men, most women in South Africa would still rather see themselves mainly as wives and mothers, providing support and ensuring domestic comfort for men and children. Women struggle to maintain themselves, their children and grandchildren, often unassisted materially let alone emotionally by the men in their lives, bowed under the yoke of the double shift. Women do not appear to expect to be able to (allowed to?) contribute much change to the political arena, to make demands centred on the lives of women, let alone demand changes in an arena of private life such as sexual relating. The dominant agendas of 1991 as reflected in the media today centre on concern about violence but these do not relate centrally to sexual violence and to the fact that it is specifically **men** playing out the power struggles of patriarchy in the violent behaviours of vigilantes, comrades, gangs, etc.

While the issue of male subordination of women lies somewhere on the South African political agenda of the 1990s, it is lost in the fine-print (the parts which often change and disappear). Gender violence has received no attention on the formal platforms of 1991. Whether the political conscientisation which has been taking place among South African women since 1970 is going to make a difference to the future remains to be seen. The point here is that effective change demands that **men recognize the role they play in the subordination and exploitation of women and take more responsibility for their behaviour.** Also, **women need to be unconcerned about men's reactions to their demands for change in men's**

attitudes and behaviour.

Issues of reproductive responsibility, childcare, the care of the elderly, domestic violence as well as sexual violence, all of which which play significant roles in the continuing male domination of women, must be addressed. Changes in the structure of "the new South Africa" will not mean much for women unless these issues are vigorously confronted. The degree to which concerns of women are addressed at all, and the levels at which changes are implemented, will have a direct bearing on the daily lives of women, i.e. over half the population, and will be a benchmark in gauging the success of the South African revolution.

Women's issues can be taken up as tokens in token policy changes and legislation, or they can be addressed at a more sweeping and profound level which make demands on us all. This would require something from everyone - to review our ideas and attitudes, our use of language, and every aspect of everyday and conventional social practice (including our research methods), to sharpen our consciousness of the subtle ideological pressures within our own minds, and to put our hearts into new committments. These committments have to do with human rights and should include a healthy suspicion of power and violence and any form of collusion with them when they are closely associated with any group. The recognition and tolerance of difference cannot be used to justify subordination and exploitation. Any idea presented where group membership is used to provide justification for the exploitation and abuse of anyone, men or women, must be challenged (e.g. when exploitative behaviour is justified as "natural", or "traditional", or "caused by" apartheid or poverty).

What needs to be highlighted is the extent to which the range of male violence and male coercion of women is common in all socioeconomic strata and groups. This kind of comment, though present, is undermined in Vogelman's book by subtexts of which I think he is unaware. While his study raises feminist issues clearly and bravely, this hidden factor serves to maintain two illusions: one which separates the men he studied from other men in South Africa (which serves ultimately to preserve the status quo), and another which actually supports the agenda of male domination, through male bonding.

Many view rape and sexual abuse as a phenomenon of individual pathology unrelated to societal factors such as male domination and

unquestioned adult power over children and need to be exposed to a socially contextualised viewpoint. However, sexual violence concerns the relationships of **all** men to **all** women; although not all men are rapists, all women fear rape and every woman is a potential victim of male violence. The fear of rape is a very good example of male control of all women, as Vogelman makes clear.

He describes and analyses attitudes towards and ideas about women, rape and sexual relating held among "coloured" men from the working class area known as Riverlea in Johannesburg. He attempts to provide a depth of understanding of sexual violence from the perspective of the rapist within the South African context. This he does in a way which the intelligent reader is expected to extrapolate to the wider range of male behaviour towards women. However, Vogelman does not spell this link out in a way which will make it so real that the readers will pause to consider their own behaviour and experience. This is a facet of the subtext which undermines the value of the book.

Vogelman writes from the explicit viewpoint that rape is a socially produced phenomenon related to the unchallenged domination of women by men. To contextualise the discussion, he draws on the wellknown ideas of writers such as Susan Brownmiller (1975) and Diana Russell (1975). While there has been a tremendous amount of research in this area of gender-based violence in the last 10 years, much of it applicable to the South African context, this work has changed subtly. Initiated by feminist outrage in the late 1960s in the USA, more recent research has not been explicitly feminist, although still informed by the broadly psychosocial perspective shared by Vogelman. Feminist frameworks have been coopted and do not challenge the reader in the way the earlier work did; in fact the "feminist perspective" is now part of most everyday discourse about sexual violence, and is used by many researchers with little or no understanding of the fundamental challenges of feminist thought to everyday social life. Almost all research in this area published since 1980 falls into a view which factors issues such as masculine socialization, power and sexual politics into the broader explanation. However, the radical feminism which triggered the initial research on rape has become diluted in most current research into milder accounts of sex role socialization - socially learned behaviours added onto an unquestioned, fundamentally biological, view which assumes a "natural" basis to male aggression and predation, along with the notion that the learning process has gone awry for some men. The central point, that gendered subjectivity is woven

within the fabric of the individual's social context, and shapes behaviour in myriads of ways, is lost. In Vogelman's account, the "deviant development" of male violence is implicitly attributed to racism and capitalism and the effects of these socio-political structures on certain men. The reality of the continued existence of rape and sexual assault, along with male domination of women, in socialist and other societies is not confronted.

On page 14 Vogelman comments that when some of the "control" groups of men (not known to be rapists, but selected as comparison groups, some of whom had committed other crimes of violence and some of whom had not) told him they had raped women, he felt shocked. Vogelman's surprise is inconsistent with the feminist framework he has used and with his discussions in Chapters 2, 3 and 4, where he is explicit about the links between conventional male sexual attitudes and practices and rape. Why be surprised about behaviour which is consistent with being a man in contemporary South Africa? If he had taken a different slant in his interviews, and had carefully explored the definitions of rape used by these men, it would really have been surprising if (in the broadest sense of the term) there had been any nonrapists in the sample.

In another review of this book, Sterling (1990) raised questions about Vogelman's apparent collusion with the men he interviewed. She points out that he records how many of these men enjoyed the interview and felt good afterward, and suggests that this was a dubious consequence of the research. Sterling does not mention the male bonding processes crucial to patriarchy and sexual violence. It is obvious that the rapist interviewees derived psychological support (and implicitly understood approval through tolerance) for their behaviour through Vogelman's research. Of course I am not suggesting that Vogelman was aware of this, and it is this kind of issue which makes research so very difficult in sensitive areas: male researchers are probably needed to get such any empirical data together. At the same time, one wonders how the material would have differed had it been collected by a woman researcher. In some senses the male bonding process shaped the interview, the language used, the sequences of questions asked and how the information was explored further. I do not mean that I think the accounts given were fictional (perceived demand effects) but rather that the detail or emphasis (and the subtext) may have differed. The production of a narrative about a social event is an interactive social process in itself - the account is produced by both interviewer and interviewee in the social space understood to exist between them (including social attributes such as gender). Vogelman, as a

man, entered a particular worldview presented by the self-confessed rapists and other men. He is troubled about the women who were assaulted and about using the language used by these men which objectifes and diminishes the human rights of women (page 19), but he was unable to resist falling into the shared discourse of male power, and tells us he did so deliberately, to develop trust. The effects of reading some of the excerpts of the interviews are rather similar to reading pornography and the events seem singularly unidimensional. If we had access to the women's accounts of these same rape situations, and to interview material collected by a woman researcher, to compare with the men's accounts, we would have had a more comprehensive picture, but also a more paradoxical one exposing some of the women's resistance or insubordination to these situations.

For girls and women, symbolic rape and sexual assault are part of everyday life, as is subordination to male authority and exploitation in a range of contexts. Although honest and well intentioned, Vogelman's book cannot be divorced from this wider social context as reflected in the subtexts. While dressed in the garb of feminist and psychosocial argument, the book presents rape from the perspective of the rapist, and sets out to do so. Of course this is useful but what bothers me is that part of what we cannot help being prey to, in Vogelman's book, is an unsettlingly male voyeuristic experience. Although on one level he analyses and explains the violence and is clearly critical of the rapists' behaviour, simultaneously, on another level, sections of the book function paradoxically as a subtle celebration of male bonding, and successful male domination. Women come away from this book feeling chilled, fearful, despondent and in the grip of patriarchal power (victims only) rather than being facilitated into active resistence. Such conflicts of interest between conventional methodology and political aims dog most current research on gender violence. Ignoring the consequences of the presentation of such knowledge in this way undermines its value.

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Psychology in society (PINS), 1991, 15, 79-81

A psychotherapist speaks

Book review

Herman, N (1987) **Why psychotherapy?** London: Free Association Books, ISBN 0 946960 72 0 pbk.

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Why psychotherapy? is a highly personal view of the role of psychotherapy and its process at both the individual and the social level. The personal nature of the text affects not only the content of the book but its structure and its mode of expression. While the documentation of Herman's therapeutic philosophy is interesting, the eulogistic style of expression is often intrusive and irritating. Although the book is divided into clear chapters, its structure is determined more by the conversational style of the text.

Reading the book is a little like having a conversation with an elderly person reminiscing about their past experience; as a listener one experiences a range of emotions from fascination with the tale to mild boredom. However one is always the listener; there is no debate.

The book opens with an introduction in which Herman documents her personal journey from family practitioner with the National Health Service to Kleinian psychotherapist. Her decision to change her focus within the helping profession was made when she realised that a number of her patients frequently reappeared in her surgery complaining of minor ailments which responded to conversation rather than medication. Reluctant to prescribe psychotropic drugs to deal with these psychosomatic problems and recognising her lack of skill to do anything

else, she decided to train as a psychotherapist. Her experiences as a training analyst are recorded in her earlier work, **My Kleinian home** (Herman, 1985).

Throughout her book Herman challenges psychiatric orthodoxy for lacking the courage to address the root causes of psychic ill-health. As an example she quotes the poverty of psychiatric history taking. Referring to this process she writes: "Where the end in view is seen as labels hung hastily on a superficial reading of mere outer signs this, by default, becomes a tomb in which all hope for genuine growth and true development is laid to rest, a miscarriage in the course of which honest opportunity has been shabbily subverted " (p15).

Psychiatry's major failure has been its inability to embody a unifying theoretical approach to the substance of the discipline. The bulk of Herman's book comprises an alternative and includes a presentation of aspects of the work of Freud, Klein and Bion. The chapter on Freud entitled "Towards a method" concerns the earliest period of Freud's psychological work when, together with Breuer, he investigated the psychological disturbances that lay at the root of apparent physiological malfunction. The substance of the chapter is very thin and the continual use of exaggerated metaphorical comparison gives the text an annoyingly sentimental tone. I quote as an example: "Is not our first experience of the majestic work of Freud that of the poet's upon 'first looking into Chapman's Homer'? (sic) ... There we will take a cursory look at the fledging in its nest which would later grow a mighty wing span: psychoanalysis" (p56). By contrast with the threadbare treatment of Freud's work, Klein's theory of the early stages of ego development are thoroughly dealt with. The eulogistic tone continues but there is a better balance between content and adoration.

Herman describes Klein's documentation of the intrapsychic conflicts experienced by the infant from the moment of birth. On the basis of observations she developed a therapeutic process in which she replaced free association with play and fantasy talk of children as a means of gaining access to their unconscious. According to Klein the infant is object-related from the start of life rather than auto-erotic as suggested by Freud. The loss of the warm safe world of the uterus at birth forces the child to seek a replacement. The breast of the mother rapidly becomes the needed object. The frustrations that result from the fact of the mother's unavailability and the threat that this poses to the infant's sense of

omnipotence, result in a swing from sublime pleasure to destructive fantasies.

The failure to travel this passage of conflict intact results in the subsequent relational difficulties experienced by most of us. Herman is her best when she deals with the dilemma of human relationships as in her chapter entitled "Work and love". She writes with inspiration, compassion and understanding of the struggle many people experience in forming close relationships. Those who have failed to resolve the crisis of separation from mother will relive the pain of that experience whenever an intimate relationship presents itself. Whether the fear is of submersion and loss of self or of damage to the other because of the intensity of destructive impulses, the result is the same: an inability to relate intimately while maintaining separateness. In answer to the question, **why psychotherapy?**, Herman suggests that integration of the split-off parts to form a healthy whole capable of forming appropriate relationships is the reason.

Her attempts to extend the realm of psychodynamic interpretation to the social world are less successful. She argues that work provides the individual with the opportunity to make reparation for darker aspects of life and the impulses of destruction.

This has been a difficult book to review in part because it is never clear who the imagined reader is. Psychotherapists will find it heartening in parts, and extremely tedious in others. Interested but uninformed others may find the sketchy theoretical background rather too thin to allow them access to the passionate claims on behalf of psychotherapy.

And unfortunately the sceptical reader will have many of her suspicions about the lack of rigour of psychodynamic psychotherapy confirmed. Should you feel your faith in the therapeutic process slipping read the chapter "Work and love". The personal voice of Nini Herman is inspiring.

Psychology in society (PINS), 1991, 15, 82-85

Working with people outside the limelight

Book review
Lea, S & Foster, D (eds) (1990) **Perspectives on mental handicap in South Africa.** Durban: Butterworths, ISBN 0 409 10919 3.

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Estimates of prevalence suggest that there are 150 000 - 250 000 South Africans with moderate or severe mental handicap. A further 1 million or so might be described as mildly mentally handicapped. Each of these people is linked with a family and community which also has to come to terms with the social, emotional, physical and financial implications of mental handicap.

If only because of the numbers of people involved, mental handicap must thus be seen as a major mental health issue in South Africa. The inequity/iniquity in the treatment of people with mental handicap, especially those not classified white, should also surely be of concern to progressive mental health workers. Yet, despite the upsurge of involvement in social issues during the eighties, for most mental health workers, mental handicap has remained invisible. A book devoted to the topic and written from a progressive perspective is therefore long overdue.

It is fitting that the book is dedicated to a pioneering worker in the field. Vera Grover has spent the major part of her very productive life working with and on behalf of people with mental handicap and her influence continues to be felt, not least on her younger colleagues, many of whom

have contributed to the book. Appropriately enough, Grover is herself a contributor and the central thrust of her work is well represented by her chapter, which deals with psycho-educational aspects of mental handicap.

The editors state that the book is an attempt to document mental health and medical practices with regard to mental handicap in South Africa. They argue that such documentation is necessary for three reasons. Firstly, better understanding of the fragmented existing service provision is necessary for ensuring more efficient and effective service provision. Secondly, the book may encourage greater attention to the neglected field of mental handicap in professional training. Thirdly, examination of existing practices can provide the basis for formulating - perhaps, re-formulating - an adequate theoretical framework.

The book consists of twelve chapters written by a range of contributors, both academic and those practically engaged in work with mental handicap. It includes numerous figures and tables illustrating and amplifying the contributions. A useful glossary, mainly of medical and legal terminology, is provided, as well as author/name and subject indices. A comparative table setting out the various classificatory systems based on IQ and used in South Africa, might have reduced the confusion arising from the different figures quoted by different contributors (e.g. Lea & Foster, p10; Davidson & Dickman, p139; Grover, p174).

The book is an interesting blend of the theoretical and the practical; of history and policy; of psychology, sociology, education and medicine; of politics and the law. Its intended audience appears to be diverse. The book speaks to academics (including students), but also to practitioners in the field. It provides an introduction for those for whom mental handicap is an entirely new concern. Yet there is much to challenge those already familiar with the field.

The book deals with a diverse set of concerns and, inevitably, succeeds better in some than in others. There are, firstly, a number of contributions which focus on **changes in legal and service provisions** for mental handicap in South Africa. These historical accounts are useful, even at a descriptive level, as a basis for understanding other aspects of the field. In particular, they offer unique insights into the ways in which mental handicap has been and is understood.

Secondly, critical surveys of service provision emphasise the **uneven and**

inadequate nature of service provision, particularly, but not exclusively, across "racial" categories. There is extensive documentation of the nightmare of fragmented service provision, which, in mental handicap, as in other fields, has vastly retarded and made more expensive and difficult any rational service provision. In this regard, a problem alluded to by various contributors is the lack of definite information on prevalence, against which to judge existing provision and plan for the future. Exemplifying the problem is the fact that rates mentioned in the book result in discrepancies as large as 100 000 in estimates of the prevalence of moderate and severe mental handicap.

Thirdly, there are contributions which reflect critically on **approaches to assessment and intervention** in the case of people with mental handicap. Questions of assessment and appropriate intervention are difficult, in any context; the lucid accounts provided here will be particularly useful at the level of initial (and not so initial) professional training. Of particular value is the fact that general issues, derived from the international literature, are clearly and succinctly conveyed, yet with careful and critical examination of their relevance and application within the South African context.

Fourthly, the question of **alternative/appropriate models for future service provision** is raised. Some contributors provide detailed descriptions of particular local services of an exemplary kind, while others (including the editors in their "Afterword") refer to the issue of future service provision, although generally in passing or in concluding comments. It would have been useful, however, to have a chapter dealing comprehensively with the various proposals and the issues they raise, taking account of existing services, critiques of these services and the likely availability of funding for services in future. There is currently a scramble to define new and different structures for future education, health and social services. Greater attention to the topic in this book might have helped to ensure that services for persons with mental handicap are not yet again last on the list of priorities - and that they are defined by those most intimately involved: persons with mental handicap themselves and their families, together with those working in the field.

A number of themes run through and link the various concerns outlined above. One involves long overdue comment on the **effects of apartheid and racism** in the field of mental handicap and is to be welcomed. It is refreshing to note that criticism is not directed only at government structures and policies. There is, for example, acknowledgement by its

Director that the National Council for Mental Health, acting as ".. an important front organisation for the government... acted out government policy" (p86), that the influence of the Broederbond on the Council was considerable and that there was implicit and explicit racism in its policies and pronouncements. Such frankness is reassuring and makes more noticeable the odd reference, even in this book, to cultural difference as some justification for the continuation of racially segregated and different services (p275).

Two further themes are closely related. One refers to the various and changing **conceptions of mental handicap**, internationally, but particularly as reflected in South Africa; here there is particular reference to social constructionist conceptions of mental handicap. The other theme raises the issue of the **rights** of people with mental handicap - an important issue in the context of developing a culture of human rights in South Africa. The two themes are important and difficult, both for novices and for those with extensive experience in the field. For novices, including those in training, the themes may induce a sense of confusion about how to view mental handicap and could encourage the feeling that it is best to keep clear of the minefield. Practitioners, on the other hand, could feel that the value of much of their work is being called in question - and, nogal, by relative outsiders.

But there is an alternative response. In challenging established wisdoms, the two themes should instead be seen as offering a valuable opportunity for re-evaluation - and potentially opening the way to a new creativity. Certainly, there is a tension, an apparent contradiction, between the individual (clinical) and social perspectives. But a resolution may be found in the recognition, from both perspectives, that mental handicap is indeed in major ways socially constructed - but not (or not always) entirely so. In trying to understand or acting in relation to mental handicap, both perspectives should therefore be kept in mind.

In summary, this is an important book, which deserves to be widely read and not only by specialists. In focussing attention on the neglected field of mental handicap in South Africa, it calls on mental health workers to re-examine their attitude to working with people outside the limelight. It also suggests that, far from being dull and boring, mental handicap is a field which offers the possibility of grappling with stimulating and important issues - and doing useful work at the same time.

OUT SOON OUT SOON OUT SOON OUT SOON

PINS 16 will be out soon. Here is some of the contents of **PINS 16.**

PSYCHOLOGY IN SOCIETY NUMBER 16 1991

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CONTRIBUTIONS

Psychology in society (PINS) is a journal which aims to critically explore and present ideas on the nature of psychology in apartheid and capitalist society. There is a special emphasis on the theory and practice of psychology in the South African context.

The editorial collective welcomes contributions which will develop debate on psychology and psychological issues in South Africa. In addition to articles and book reviews, short discussions on previously published material or on issues of the moment will be encouraged. Authors are required to use non-sexist and non-racist conventions in their contributions. Articles should not normally exceed 6000 words in length. And book reviews, unless they are review articles, should not exceed 1500 words.

FORMAT

The APA or the Harvard system of referencing is preferred. The list of references, in alphabetical order and **not** numbered, should follow immediately after the end of the article. Footnotes should be kept to a minimum and where possible should appear at the end of the article before the reference list. Prospective contributors should initially send three copies of any piece, including a clear original. Authors are encouraged to submit their work, **once accepted for publication,** on an IBM compatible disc, together with **one** printed copy. These will not be returned.

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