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PSYCHOLOGY IN SOCIETY is a journal which aims to critically explore and present ideas on the nature of psychology in apartheid and capitalist society. There is a special emphasis on the theory and practice of psychology in the South African context.

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Editorial

This edition was compiled by the Cape Town editorial group. Its contents reflect papers which are attempts to respond to issues of recent and current concern in South Africa, as well as articles addressing particular theoretical and epistemological problems pertinent to the discipline itself. We feel that the journal should show a responsiveness to current issues in the country, as well as promoting debate on the restructuring of psychology at its various levels of operation. The latter should lead to a deeper consideration of how the discipline can move from its current de-contextualised Anglo-American theoretical and practical base, towards an enterprise firmly rooted in the context of a changing South Africa and in the service of liberation.

In order to accomplish such an aim we need to educate ourselves. We need to be aware of past and recent South African social and political history. We need to examine and expose the many ways in which psychology

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aids in the maintenance of the current racial capitalist formation through a predominantly technicist mode of operation. We need to be aware of the role of the state and industrial monopolies in promoting research of particular kinds. Finally we need to understand how through uncritical and de-politicised instruction, university education of psychology students reproduces a status quo orientation. We welcome contributions which examine areas such as these.

Furthermore the business of reconstructing psychology in South Africa will not be an easy task. It will not come about through simplistic rejections of our established theoretical and research heritage. It requires in fact its re-examination informed by the work of critical scholars (see Ivey in this issue), such that ideological, epistemologycal and methodological elements may be laid bare so as to promote the advancement of the discipline through the re-theorisation of its subject matter and modes of inquiry. Such a process would also allow for a more incisive critique of current South African psychology as well as a more thorough consideration of the manner in which the discipline can or can not address the theoretical and practical questions posed by ongoing struggles for social transformation.

With respect to practice, we would welcome contributions which examine current modes of functioning in the applied field. While industrial psychology has had some coverage in recent issues, we would like to see contributions from clinical and educational psychology which have received limited treatment to date. We would also encourage debate on professional training programs which currently reflect a predominantly Anglo-American and technicist orientation and largely serve the interests of an elite sector of our society. In this regard there is the need to impart to trainees a social consciousness and to promote a rethinking of training which shifts the class position of

the points of reception of psychological services.

The current issue of this journal contains discussions of some alternatives for training and practice in clinical and counselling psychology which in part reflect a response to the political crisis of 1985. They provide useful starting points for debate and it is to be hoped that this stimulus will generate on-going discussion through the pages of this journal. A further article documents central aspects of the 1985 crisis and outlines certain responses possible from psychologists.

An important contemporary issue concerns military conscription and preliminary research on some psychological aspects of this element of state practice are addressed in this number. Clearly the dilemma faced by white conscriptees deserves further examination.

The question of the ways in which the relevance of psychology can be construed particularly in the light of policies of African pragmatism is considered in a paper which invites response as to how the education of psychologists can be transformed with such policies in mind. Finally policies of Africanisation in psychology can present problems some of which are addressed in an article which examines the position of N C Manganyi.

It is hoped that this issue reflects a range of contemporary and more long term issues which a progressive South African psychology should attempt to come to terms with. We are aware that much of the material emanates from within the editorial group which is perhaps reflective of their involvement with the issues discussed as well as the embryonic position of Psychology in Society in the Cape Region. We trust that our next issue will reflect a wider cross-section of authors.

Article : # Elements of a Critical Psychology

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The project of a critical psychology is the attempt to establish a substantive alternate approach based on a critique of the ideologically distorted consciousness and experience of people whose false consciousness is a precondition for their systematic domination by an exploitative social formation.

Although critical social theory is an established tradition, critical psychology, although adopting the goals and philosophy of the latter, does not yet exist as a substantive alternative psychological paradigm. For this reason my paper may be best described as a propadeutic to a thorough formulation of the field as well as a manifesto for any psychology concerned with exposing the strategies and structures of interpersonal domination.

Although critical psychology cannot be a cerebral activity divorced from the concrete everyday deployment of domination in our society, it needs a coherent theoretical framework to provide it with a sound philosophic

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foundation. A number of authors whose work is undoubtedly critical (Heather, 1976; Jacoby, 1975; Lasch, 1977, 1980) have not articulated a rigorous philosophical framework and their contributions thus tend to lack systematic development, methodological rigour and applied relevance. For this reason my paper is concerned with neglected foundational issues rather than a specifically focused critique of our own apartheid society.

THE ORIGINS OF A CRITICAL THEORY OF LATE CAPITALIST SOCIETY

Critical psychology derives from an influential school of neo-Marxist thought called critical theory. Despite the complexity and conceptual density of critical theory its objective is simple to understand: the self-reflective critique of the ideological constraints on the individual and collective self-formative process in the interest of conscious self-determination. As Schroyer (1973) notes:

> "The critique of domination, or the reflective critique of socially unnecessary constraints on human freedom, is as old as the Western concept of reason .... In Plato's famous cave allegory the painful returning to the sun (i.e. beauty, truth) involved a recognition of the mystifications and domination of conventions (nomos) over man's potentialities .... With the socratic method Plato shows the basic concept of reason as a critique of conventional mystification which releases a changed praxis (action) in the individual's life." (p 15).

While the idea of critique is almost as old as the history of western philosophy, it was Karl Marx's materialist reformulation of Hegel's philosophy under the slogan "The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is, to change it.", that inaugurated the specific

critique of capitalist society from which critical social theory derives. Critical theory is thus a form of western Hegelian Marxist critique, centred at first around the Institute of Social Research established in 1923, and later around the work of the German social philosopher, Jurgen Habermas. The institute, with a predominantly Jewish membership, was forced into exile with the Nazi ascendancy. What initiated its formation was the fact that although the objective conditions for revolution existed in post-world war I Europe, a transition from capitalism to communism never occurred. What was missing was the subjective moment, the social-psychological preconditions for revolutionary consciousness, and the Frankfurt School devoted its multidisciplinary energies to an analysis of the bourgeois subjectivity that prevented the transition to a more rational form of social organisation. But critical theory's critique of late capitalist society is matched by its explicit denunciation of those crude interpretations of Marx that dismiss subjectivity as a mere epiphenomenon of social forces, see individual actions as economically determined, and which harbour the polyanna belief that capitalism's contradictions will unfold according to some invariant law of social evolution until a new communist order of milk and honey arises from the ashes of the old bourgeois order. Critical theory furthermore, denounces the tyranny of soviet "socialism" as exemplifying the worst excesses of ideological dogma and rejects the soviet claim to have established a truly communist society. For critical theory dialectical materialism is no icon but rather an indispensible tool of social analysis. Orthodox Marxism suffers from conceptual sclerosis and has congealed into an ahistorical doctrine devoid of explanatory power. The critical imagination cannot afford to be, in Schroyer's words "locked into a sterile faith, guarding the fire of Marx's theory." Much of Marx's

work is obsolete and simply cannot explain the complexity of contemporary capitalist society. But critical theory is expressly neo-Marxist precisely because, just as psychoanalysis cuts through the mystifying veil of surface appearance to illuminate the resistant unconscious meaning beneath, so does Marxist analysis expose the self-deception of bougeois ideology and illuminate the hidden resistant truth of domination at the heart of our cultural unconscious.

Having sketched a brief outline of the Frankfurt School's genesis, I turn to a description of critical theory's insights and concerns, and how these may be appropriated for the development of an allied critical psychology.

THE DEFINITION OF CRITICAL THEORY

A basic working definition is as follows; Critical theory is an inherently emancipatory discourse whose goal is attained by initiating a process of self-reflection in those subjects whose self-formative capacity is radically truncated by the constraints of ideological forms of consciousness. This compact definition is unpacked and clarified in the following premises.

(1) Each individual has the apriori need for the development and actualisation of his/her potential for individuated functioning in harmony with other members of the community, and has in potentia, the rational capacity to adjudicate these needs and the means to their realisation.

(2) Although every society has institutions of social control necessary to secure the stability of that social formation, many social formations embody domination, the enforced unequal distribution of resources and opportunities for individual and collective self-determination.

Domination serves certain hegemonic sectarian socio-economic interests at the expense of other individuals and groups. The traditional form of domination in capitalist societies has been the economic exploitation of the working class by the bourgeoisie. The South African situation is complicated by the marriage of racial and economic exploitation.

(4) Ideology is not an external force that compels the individual irrespective of his/her will. Rather, ideology provides a preformed constellation of values and beliefs that literally inform, through the process of socialisation, the person's understanding of self and others. Thompson (1984) says that "to study ideology is primarily to investigate, not a particular type of discourse linked to a particular type of society but rather the ways in which meaning (signification) serves to sustain relations of domination." (p 35).

(5) The hold of ideology over consciousness is never complete. The contradictions inherent in society leave an opening for development of dissenting consciousness and subversive action that may be furthered toward critical ends.

(6) Since ideology serves to constrain the self-formative process of the persons so affected the goal of an emancipatory science would be the initiation of self-reflection in the ideologically constrained persons. Critically informed self-reflection results in subjects attaining insight into their once ideologically obscured circumstances of domination. Such insight serves to dissolve the quasi-causal hold of ideology on human agency, thus freeing individuals <u>from</u> rigidified patterns of thought and action and freeing them <u>for</u> new rationally considered socio-political praxis. Ideology critique thus ideally

results in a restoration of the interrupted individual and collective self-formative process.

CRITICAL PSYCHOLOGY IN RELATION TO EMPIRICAL-ANALYTIC AND HERMENEUTICAL PSYCHOLOGY

But surely this import laid on ideology critique is just a shift in emphasis that can be accommodated within the ambit of orthodox psychology? The answer is no because critical science is guided by a completely different anthropologically rooted knowledge - interest that demands an autonomous form of inquiry. The notion of cognitive interests is an attempt by the critical theorist Jurgen Habermas (1968) to radicalise epistemology by seeing different knowledge forms as corresponding to certain fundamental apriori interest categories. These interests are underlying modes through which reality is constituted, disclosed and acted upon, and which have their genesis in the socio-cultural evolution of the human species. These cognitive interests which structure our experience stem from the anthropological fact that any form of social organisation presupposes that the members of any society, possessed of an intersubjective understanding through the communicative medium of shared language, work to produce their means of subsistence within a political framework of institutionalised norms and power relations. The means of social organisation are thus language, work and power. Stemming from the necessity of social organisation are these corresponding knowledge constitutive (cognitive) interests (see Table on the following page).

It is within the anthropologically rooted interest fields of the above that our knowledge of the world is structured. It is these interests that determine the systematic knowledge organisation and goals of the corresponding

SOCIAL ORGANISATION, COGNITIVE INTEREST STRUCTURES AND CORRESPONDING MODES OF SCIENTIFIC ENQUIRY

	WORK	LANGUAGE	POWER
Preconditions for Social Organisation	Instrumental reproduction of the material conditions of life	Communicative action aimed at shared meanings through the use of intersubjectively understood symbols	Institutionalised normative repression and regulation of human action in the interest social stability.
	TECHNICAL	PRACTICAL	EMANCIPATORY
Corresponding cognitive interests	Purposive-rational manipulation and control of objectified processes in order to meet material needs	Intersubjective understanding through dialogue to facilitate open communication between members of a speech community	Desire for emancipation from domination (surplus repression) and conditions of systematically distorted communciation (ideology)
	EMPIRICAL ANALYTIC SCIENCES	HISTORICAL-HERMENEUTIC SCIENCES	CRITICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES
Ensuing interest constituted knowledge forms	The production of nomological knowledge from controlled experimental observation thus permitting the deduction of empirical generalisations and technical control of material environment	The methodical interpretation or explication of the implicit meaning of human action in order to promote improved intersubjective understanding and communication	The systematic illumination and communication of ideologically obscured relations of domination to the repressed target subjects in order to promote critical self-reflection and liberation from systematically deformed communication

sciences: Empirical-analytic, Historical-Hermeneutic and Critical social sciences. Simply states, a summary of table one is that by virtue of our shared humanity and need for social organisation we are all guided by an interest in controlling our environment, securing intersubjective understanding through spoken language and in liberating ourselves from unnecessary political constraints on our freedom to choose and act in accord with our best individual and communal interests.

We are now in a psotion to see why neither of the competing research paradigms in contemporary psychology can claim to encompass an emancipatory interest. The answer is simply that they are founded on specifically different cognitive interests. Orthodox empirical psychology, it its search for law-like generalisations is extending the technical interest beyond the domain of objectified processes to include within its explanatory scope the symbolic realm of human meaning. By seeking general laws of human behaviour and then deductively explaining individual phenomena as instances of those laws, human behaviour can ideally be predicted and controlled by manipulation of the antecedent causal conditions. In opposition to empirical-analytic psychology is the hermeneutic approach, championed most vigorously by existential-phenomenology. The hermeneutic approach, with its emphasis on intentionality, ideographic meaning and existential anthropology, rejects empirical-analytic procedure and approach in favour of the methodical exegesis of the lived meaning of subjective experience. In seeking to understand rather than explain human phenomena hermeneutic science is clearly guided by the practical interest in improved intersubjective comprehension and communication by explicitly articulating the implicity (pre-reflective) meaning of the subject's lived history. Empirical-analytic psychology cannot incorporate an emancipatory interest because it perceives itself as

having the same research-guiding interest as the natural sciences - technical control. The interest in the technical manipulation of causal contingencies is necessarily antithetic to the emancipatory interest in the liberation of persons from the seemingly "natural" laws or causal constraints on their freedom through a process of critical self-reflection. But the subsumption of human behaviour under the empirical-analytic umbrella is not unwitting, it is no epistemological accident or category mistake. Rather, it is the logical consequence of our prevailing technocratic ideology which seeks to manipulate and foster our unreflective capitulation to irrational social relations of repressive authority. The nature of this ideology will be discussed shortly.

At first it would appear that hermeneutic psychology can serve as an emancipatory science since it reje ts the technocratic application of the natural scientirid framework of prediction and control to the field of intentional human phenomena and, furthermore, embraces the anthropological tenet of historically contingent self-formative freedom. This is not the case, however, Hermeneutic psychology seeks to articulate the implicit subjective meansings within the verbal communications that have, as their horizon, an unspoken historical situatedness in tradition-bound normative structures. This is the well known "hermeneutic circle" : A researcher's interpretative understanding of the meaning of a phenomenon is historically embedded within the linguistically-mediated traditional self-understanding of that culture, and is hence finite and context dependent. Because the researcher interprets from and within a pregiven set of values, presuppositions and symbols, s/he can do no more than explicate the implicit psychological meanings informed by that specific cultural tradition. But hermeneutic enquiry tends to ignore the fact that tradition embodies domination

and that linguistic meanings frequently obscure this domination. In positing subjective meaning as the ultimate court of interpretative appeal hermeneutic psychology does not see the ideological framing of subjective experience because this cannot be languaged by the subject. The explication of the intentional structures of subjective consciousness fails to reach the reality of distorted communication which simply cannot be appropriated by phenomenological procedure. Certain phenomenologists claim to explore the thematic latencies in their subjects' communications by focusing on the discrepancy or hiatus between what the subject <u>says</u> and what s/he <u>means</u>. But this attempt at engaging and disclosing latent meaning cannot go far enough because it is not informed by the critical social theory which locates the systematic self-misunderstanding of persons in the objective power structures of their social relations. Because phenomenology does not thematise power it cannot thematise domination; and because it cannot thematise domination it cannot speak of ideology and thus cannot be truly critical. It fails to consider the ideological framing of the individual experience it seeks to explicate, how this experience is shaped and truncated by social-psychological forces operating outside of immediate awareness. Its structure and function, determined as it is by the practical interest in elucidating shared meaning, does not address the focus of the emancipatory interest.

Critical psychology, however, is specifically informed by the emancipatory cognitive interest and is thereby distinguished from both the empirical-analytic and hermeneutic sciences. This is b-cause in spite of the fact that we are all potentially self-determining volitional agents our own personalities, experience and behaviour frequently confront us in the reified form of alien, thing-like processes beyond our rational control. Such repetitive and rigidified patterns of experience and conduct prevent authentic

self-realisation and stand opposed to our conscious intentions as external causal forces. The empirical-analytic investigation of these causes is thus appropriate at this point. However, a precondition for the influence of quasi-causal forces on the lives of human agents is the subjects' lack of insight into the conditions that delivers volition as a slave to external compulsion. The causal constraints on self-determination do not take the form of the causes operant in nature, they can be dissolved by insight into their origin. For this reason they are best described as quasi-causes. These quasi-causal regularities represent "the partial replacement of manifest compulsion through open force by inner compulsion through the affective force of unconscious mechanisms" (McCarthy p 86). Critical psychology proceeds from the premise that once the insight attendant upon critical reflection is attained the precondition for ideology's effective operation is no longer present and its constraining hold on self-determination is broken. The nomothetic search for causal regularities thus anticipates the moment of critical self-reflection when hermeneutic understanding assumes primacy over causal explanation, the moment when insight transforms causes into meanings and compulsion into free choice. Only when ideologically congealed experience resists the attempts of hermeneutic understanding do we call upon causal explanation, and then only in anticipation of the moment when causal analysis becomes superfluous. Unlike nomothetic psychology which rejects meaning and phenomenological psychology which rejects causation, critical psychology exists as a mixed discourse that combines statements of force (causation) with statements of meaning. Moreover, it does so not out of an eclectic interest in smoothing over the differences between divergent orientations, but rather because the intermediate object domain of ideologically deformed "second nature" demands an approach that

refuses the disjunction between causal explanation and hermeneutic understanding.

PSYCHOANALYSIS AND CRITICAL PSYCHOLOGY

Habermas considers psychoanalysis, purged of its "scientific self-misunderstanding", to be the exemplar of a critical science. Psychoanalysis, Habermas contends, "is relevant to us as the only tangible example of a science incorporating methodical self reflection" (Habermas p 214). It provides the prototypical structure for a self-reflective science and thus establishes guidelines for the development of critical social theory. According to Habermas the neurotic discrepancy between the patient's self-understanding and his/her behaviour, present in and as the phenomenon of repression, necessitates the complementary utilisation of causal explanation and interpretative understanding. The explanatory reconstruction of the patient's life history (based on general developmental laws) initiates a process of self-reflection and the (re)appropriation of lost portions of that history. Insight results in the coincidence of the therapist's explanation and the patient's self-understanding, thus freeing the patient (after the long and painful process of working through) from the power of neurotic causality. This renders superfluous the causal explanatory procedure originally deployed in illuminating the darkness of the patient's neuroses. By means of the analytic procedure external causes are transformed into meaningful reasons.

While the isomorphic relationship often posited between individual psychoanalysis and ideology critique is very problematic, it is nonetheless useful in showing :

> "... that this methodological pattern of dialectically mediating communicating understanding by causal explanation is, in fact, the model for a philosophical understanding of all those types of critical social science which have their relation to the practice of life, not in the realm of social engineering but in provoking public self-reflection and in emancipation of men as subjects." (Apel in Held, p 323).

Habermas' appropriation of Freudian psychoanalysis is primarily confined to the latter's methodological value insofar as psychoanalytic procedure, based on the promotion of self-insight, may be transposed from the psychotherapeutic context and extended to a sociotherapeutic critique of capitalist culture. But a second important tradition, more concerned with the substantive content of psychoanalysis than its methodological form, has a unique contribution to make to critical psychology. It is this psychoanalytic psychopathology of culture, initiated by the Frankfurt theorists and recently given new impetus by the incorporation of object relations psychoanalysis into culture critique, that provides a powerful conceptual framework for understanding the construction and destruction of subjectivity in late capitalist society. The focus of this second tradition is embodied in Adorno's statement: "The prebourgeois order does not yet know psychology, the oversocialized one knows it no longer." (1968, p 95). Capitalism, in other words, provided the socio-economic conditions for the emergence of the individual subject, a historically contingent form of personality organization dictated by capital's need for a population of relatively free producers and consumers whose activities and consciousness were no longer determined by the institutions and ideology of feudal authority. Psychology, the scientific study of the individual agent, was thus called into being by the capitalist mode of production. Ironically, the very system that produced the individual subject is the system that is now responsible for the erosion

and disintegration of the subjective freedom it itself created. To the extent that selfhood is being eroded by the increasing intervention of late capitalist bureaucratic administration in everyday life, the discipline of psychology, concerned as it is with the actions of the "autonomous" individual, becomes redundant as individual autonomy becomes an ideological fiction. Herbert Marcuse is perhaps the most important critical theorist to have investigated the ideological deformation of the individual personality within advanced capitalist society. Marcuse traces the historical decline of critical rationality and the dissolution of individuality that occurs when bourgeois man's capacity for self-consciousness and self-determination is negated. Marcuse calls this conformist, unreflective adaptation to existing forms of domination "one-dimensionality". One-dimensionality designates the emergence of a typical form of individual character structure that has lost the power of dissent, the capacity for self-critique and the imaginative ability to envision and actualize radical alternatives to existing oppressive social structures and forms of organization. The following table from Kellner (1984) contrasts the characteristics of authentic individuality with that of one-dimensional man :

AUTHENTIC INDIVIDUALITY	ONE-DIMENSIONAL MAN
(1) Heteronomy/social domination of thought and behaviour (a) servitude to social control; (b) conformity, false needs and consciousness.	(1) Autonomy/individual capacity to think, choose and act: (a) freedom from domination; (b) freedom for self-determination, choice, dissent and refusal.
(2) Mimesis: mechanical reproduction of conformist behaviour.	(2) Creative self-activity : growth and development
(3) Unreflective and non-critical acceptance of prevailing needs, ideas and feelings; no sense of one's own needs and potentialities.	(3) Reflection and critical awareness of needs, assumptions and one's unique selfhood.
(4) Powerlessness/conditioned behaviour.	(4) Power and will: ability for creative action.

According to Marcuse the commodification of culture, the embourgeoisement of the proletariat, the identification of reason with technocratic control and the usurpation of parental authority by extra-familial socializing agencies are all contributing factors in the creation of one-dimensional culture. The face of the nuclear family is of particular concern to Marcuse and serves to illustrate his reliance on traditional psychoanalytic theory. Contra Reich and many feminist critics of the family, Marcuse contended that paternal authority and domination, the hallmark of the bourgeois family, was not only the source of psychic repression but also the origin of deeply meaningful identification with parental figures. This identification, attendant upon the satisfactory resolution of the oedipal conflict, typically provides a healthy, secure nucleus of autonomous selfhood and agency. Late capitalism, however, has undermined the role of the family as locus of primary socialization. This role is now performed by state schooling, the mass media and other impersonal welfare state agencies. The disturbing result is that the nascent ego structure of the child is manipulated and its growth arrested by anonymous external forces that undercut the foundations of ego identity and the capacity to resist the prevailing ideology which is no longer diluted by the mediation of a private and personalized family space. Through this and other parallel processes the dissenting individual has become transformed into a wooden puppet whose every motion, need and satisfaction is manipulated by that invisible master, advanced capitalism. The autonomous subject has congealed into a crippled reflex of a crippled social order. Jocoby (1975) has developed this position in a polemical critique of neo- and post-freudian psychology, showing that the humanistic repression of classical psychoanalysis and the obsession of the former with psychological adaptation, wholeness and self-actualization is

ironical testimony to the fragmentation and destruction of the unitary self posited and peddled by the humanists. This fact is disguised and buried beneath the humanistic "jargon of authenticity" which locates the problem not within the objective conditions of capitalist culture, but in deficient subjective value systems, inauthentic roles etc. Humanistic psychology obscures the psychic violence perpetrated on the besieged individual by an oppressive society. It does so by inadvertently veiling the contradiction between psychic health and capitalist culture and is thus thoroughly ideological. Freud, on the contrary, unflinchingly thematized and articulated this contradiction, albeit in ahistorical terms. It is thus to Freud's seemingly conservative theory, argues Jacoby, that we must turn for our most radical insights because:

> "...regardless of their own politics, it has been Freud and his followers who, in their stubborn pursuit of the genesis and structure of the individual psyche, have testified to the power of society in and over the individual ... subjectivity is pursued till it issues into the social and historical events that preformed and deformed the subject." (p 79)

Jacoby says nothing that the Frankfurt theorists have not said before, but his incisive and polemical attempt to articulate radical psychology in Freudian categories and to make critical theory accessible to a psychological audience, is a valuable one indeed. But he neither deliniates nor explains the psychological processes whereby capitalist society comes to control psychological life. His uncritical embrace of the Frankfurt School's use of Freud, together with his unconditional rejection of attempts to revise certain conceptually inelegant psychoanalytic formulations, unfortunately makes his work rhetorically strong but conceptually weak.

A much more sophisticated and innovative attempt to explore capitalism's penetration of psychological life has been initiated by socialist historian,

Christopher Lasch (1977, 1980, 1984). While sharing Jacoby's concerns and convictions, Lasch recognizes the theoretical limitations of classical Freudo-Marxist analysis and skillfully employs the concepts of object relations psychoanalysis to overcome the lacunae of traditional Freudianism and illuminate the psychic mechanisms peculiar to the domination of advanced capitalism. Freud effectively identified neurosis as the most prominent psychological disorder at the turn of the century and successfully laid bare its dynamics in terms of the psychic repression issuing from the oedipal conflict endemic to the nuclear family. But, as Lasch cogently argues, the patterns of psychopathology accompanying advanced capitalism no longer conform to the symptoms of classical neurosis and its dynamic of sexual repression. Instead, he contends, contemporary society reproduces its cultural values and ways of organizing experience in a historically specific form of personality organization, the narcissistic personality:

> "New social forms require new forms of personality, new modes of socialisation, new ways of organising experience. The concept of narcissism provides us ... with a way of understanding the psychological impact of recent social changes ... It provides us, in other words, with a tolerably accurate portrait of the "liberated" personality of our time, with his charm, his pseudoawareness of his own condition, his promiscuous pansexuality ... his hypochondria, his protective shallowness, his avoidance of dependence, his inability to mourn, his dread of old age and death." (1980, p 50).

Sub-clinical manifestations of the narcissistic personality equip the individual for life in a social environment where bureaucratic intelligence, interpersonal exploitation, technological rationality, anaesthetized affect, introspective self-absorption and consumerist ethics are functional prerequisites for psychic survival in a capitalist wasteland culture.

The narcissistic personality is not the product of oedipal repression but rather of a more primitive psychic defence mechanism called splitting, which precedes the formation of a stable ego structure or embryonic self. While splitting - the process whereby the infant's world is split into dualities of good and bad objects and experiences - is a normal developmental phenomenon of infancy, capitalist society fosters its pathological persistence into adulthood. The implications are enormous and disturbing : capitalist society undercuts the development of an integrated self and instead produces a fragmented psyche which, beneath the brittle facade of illusory autonomy, competence and self-importance, is nothing more than a fragmented aggregate of unmet infantile needs interlaced by untempered fantasies of aggressive destruction and paranoid persecution.

The precise causal connections between capitalist social structure and narcissistic character are too complex to be examined here. Suffice it to say that the increasing bureaucratic rationalization and control of both domestic and market relations, the usurpation of parental roles by capitalist schooling, mass media and the advertising industry, the cult of commodity consumption, exploitative interpersonal relations and a non-political psychotherapeutic sensibility are all contributing factors (unique to advanced capitalism) which will reproduce narcissistic personality traits in each new generation of infants.

Lasch's integration of object relations psychoanalysis into a critique of capitalist society is provocative and exciting. He has established new critical vectors for a psychopathology of culture and has demonstrated that psychoanalysis, in spite of its own conservative self-understanding and focus on experiential inner space, provides the raw material for a radical social critique:

"Psychoanalysis best clarifies the connection between society and the individual, culture and personality, precisely when it confines itself to careful examination of individuals. It tells us most about society when it is least determined to do so." (1980, p 34)

Richards et al (1984) have extended, developed and revised Lasch's seminal ideas and the scene is now set for the emergence of a new generation of critical theory, deeply - though dialectically - indebted to psychoanalysis. Lasch has disclosed the narcissistic mutilation of selfhood in bourgeois culture. The tast of critical psychology is to uncover and subject such ideologically distorted character structures to a critique that not only initiates self-reflection but traces the personality deformation to its origin in those oppressive social relations whose irrationality demands the cloak of ideological concealment.

CRITICAL PSYCHOLOGY'S RELATIONSHIP WITH CRITICAL SOCIAL THEORY

An objection that readers may raise at this point is that I have failed to deliniate between critical psychology and critical social theory, indeed, at times I appear to conflate the two and use them interchangeably. In spite of their shared concerns and conceptual crossfertilization critical social theory and psychology can never be conflated or harmoniously integrated into an encompassing super theory that could grasp the totality of human existence. As Adorno (1967) has said:

"This defines the relation that should obtain between the sciences. Their departmentalisation cannot be corrected by the ideal of the polymath equally at home in sociology and psychology. The cry for the integration of the disciplines is an expression of helplessness, not progress ... The only totality the student of society can presume to know is the antagonistic whole, and if he is to attain totality at all, then only in and through contradiction."

Critical psychology is based on the rejection of the polar extremes of psychologism (the reduction of cultural phenomena to psychological categories) and sociologism (social determinism). To the extent that sociology exclusively embraces the study of supra-individual forces while dismissing spychic structure and agency it becomes sterile and devoid of meaning. But, on the other hand, to the extent that psychology tries to explain social phenomena by appealing simply to individual subjectivity it succumbs to the ideology of subjectivism which obscures the penetration of the individual by the social order. Psychology, in the words of Adorno, "makes a first principle out of a mediated product, the bourgeois individual". There can be no simple causal relation posited between a social macrosphere and the ontogenetic personality formation of the latter's members. A critical psychology would thus have to trace the hierarchy of mediations between oppressive social structures and disturbed subjective meanings without lapsing into reductionism or a functionalist social determinism. The task of critical psychology is to "trace the conduct of the soul in fetters", guided by the telos of emancipatory self-reflection. But unlike individual psychotherapy which typically locates the source of psychopathology in the individual's disturbed life history, critical psychology locates the source of the problem in the history of the society and the solution in public self-reflection and enlightened socio-political praxis. This has important ramifications for psychology's object domain and self-understanding. A psychologist's services are typically employed when there is individual deviation from established social norms of communication and action. But when the pathology is located, not primarily in the individual's deviation, but in the very ideologically framed norms that define the individual's transgression, the firm boundaries that prescribe the

domain of psychology's theory and practice become fluid and uncertain. Critical psychology's refusal to endorse orthodox psychology's ideological dichotomy between the individual and the social situates it in a dialectical relation to and between psychology and sociology, preserving rather than negating the inherent tension. But the critical psychologist is a socio-therapist before a psychotherapist precisely because a psychology which serves as an ideology critique cannot make the product of the mediated individual the first or even, for that matter, the last principle.

Needless to say, the hoary positivist concern with value-neutrality is not an issue here. Critical psychology cannot be value-neutral for it is necessarily guided by the eschatology of discourse free of interpersonal constraint or systematically distorted communication. Critical psychology anticipates the just life and the critical moment is precisely the tension between the present fact of domination and the future possibility of liberation. Value-freedom cannot be a consideration when freedom is our ultimate value. Critical psychology is a partisan of reason against dogma and dissemblance but this fact does certainly not commit it to a particular course of political action further than the promotion of enlightenment. Although critical psychology condemns the psychic mutilation of the individual by the capitalist system it cannot embrace a blueprint for the revolutionary transformation of society based on another ideology. The critical psychologist is not a revolutionary, his/her task is to free the individual for new possibilities of thought and political action - not to dictate what form that action should take. Critical psychology is partisan because truth cannot be tolerant, but nor can it be allowed to congeal into dogma of any sort.

CRITICAL PSYCHOLOGY IN SOUTH AFRICA

My final and perhaps most important point concerns the development of a critical psychology that will address itself to the specific historical circumstances of our own oppressive society. Whereas in more advanced industrial societies domination is primarily exercised through the technocratic ideology that posits technical control and cybernetic self-regulation as the highest goal, the South African situation is very different. Domination here is not subtly exercised through the pseudo-legitimacy of technocratic rationality, but primarily through the brute force of military and police action, banning, detention and racist legislation. The oppressed, moreover, do not have to be educated in the fact of their own repression, as is patently obvious by the events that initiated the declaration of a state of emergency. The concerns of first world critical theory are thus far removed from the immediate concerns of our own historical juncture. Different circumstances demand different strategies and a critical South African psychology requires an indigenous structure and content. The inception of such a psychology is obviously an urgent project and we as South African psychologists cannot decline the challenge.

CONCLUSION

This paper has been more suggestive than explanatory and has not articulated specific areas of research and application. Its objective, rather, was to introduce elements of a theory of a critical psychology and broadly outline the role it has to play in contemporary society. The contours of critical psychology are not as yet clearly defined and a lot of foundational work needs to be done. But if critical psychology is to achieve its

emancipatory objective it needs to penetrate those areas of society where ideology is a necessary precondition for the exercise of domination. Schools, industry, the mass media and the family - in fact any institution where interpersonal exploitation occurs behind a facade of legitimacy - is a target area for the research and communication of critical psychology.

> "What is to be done? We who are still half alive, living in the often fibrillating heartland of a senescent capitalism - can we do more than reflect the decay around and within us? Can we do more than sing our sad and bitter songs of illusion and defeat?" (Laing, 1967)

> "What we need to know is how it is possible for free beings to create their own slavery ... for only then can they create their own liberation." (Howard, D., 1977).

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Article: # The Notion of Relevant Psychology with Particular Reference to Africanist Pragmatic Initiatives

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INTRODUCTION

In recent years there has been a fair amount of discussion regarding the degree to which psychology can be described as relevant to the problems posed by its existence in apartheid capitalist South Africa. Elsewhere I have considered some of these issues in relation to clinical psychology (Dawes 1985). The purpose of the present piece is twofold. First it extends discussion to a broader consideration of what the term "relevant" may be said to have implied for both theoretical and applied psychology locally, in greater Africa and abroad. In so doing I note certain differences in its usage. In the second instance I attempt to examine some notions of relevance which have grown out of the colonial and post-independence periods in Africa as they pertain to the practice of psychology

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and more generally to the place and function of psychology in tertiary education. It is hoped that this will provide a space for debate concerning how psychology should develop in South Africa, in its university context. It seems crucial at this time for South African psychology departments to reflect on their role in becoming more responsive in terms of curricula and research to their African context and to the needs of the majority of the citizens. At the same time they need to reflect on the degree to which their endeavours act directly or otherwise in the interests of the apartheid state and industrial capital. It is with these thoughts in mind that the notion of relevant psychology is explored.

RELEVANCE AND PSYCHOLOGY - A SKETCH OF ALTERNATIVE CONSTRUCTIONS

In the first instance relevance may be seen as embodying the idea of service to society in the sense of working to solve problems of national or regional priority. Used thus the discipline is employed by statutory or community agencies and in such situations questions as to the ideological elements of the project do not necessarily emerge. Others may raise such questions, but to those involved, a practical problem needs solution. Burt's work (Kamin 1974) on the restructuring of British educational policy with the aid of psychological tests would be an example of such relevance. On the local front, the work of the National Institute of Personnel Research (N.I.P.R.) in developing various test batteries for industrial use would be another. A final example is the Human Sciences Research Council (H.S.R.C.) project on intergroup relations (H.S.R.C. 1985) which its managers see as highly relevant to the resolution of certain problems facing South Africa.

While not all such projects are necessarily mandated by government, they are often conducted by agencies which have the task of researching social and psychological issues seen as relevant to the society at the time. These might include projects geared towards more efficient human resource management in a given social formation, or may, as in the case of the H.S.R.C. report noted above, propose changes to the formation on the basis of their findings. This then is largely applied uncritical (in the Marxian sense) relevant research.

A further applied example of what might be termed a relevant and contextual psychology is similar to that alluded to in referring to the N.I.P.R. This is work carried out by that organisation and others within industry such as the Human Resources Laboratory of the Chamber of Mines, directly in the service of the industrial complex. Bulhan (1981) has produced a critique of this area of work from a socialist perspective. What he does not remark on however, is the manner in which such organisations incorporate the notion of relevance into their work.

Much of the current work in such organisations and in psychiatry (Swartz and Foster 1984) has latched on to the notions of culture and ethnicity. If white social scientists and industrialists can understand the "cultures" and folk ways of persons of colour in South Africa, then they can promote intergroup harmony, better working relationships and different managerial strategies (Moerdyk 1984). Surely this is relevant work? It is easy to reply "yes" to this question. It may lead to improved relationships, to improved productivity, and to a greater respect for those of different backgrounds. What it tends to obscure however is that such relevance is primarily in the service of current industrial formations (Nzimande 1984). By this I do not imply that persons of colour in certain instances (viz. black advancement programs)

do not benefit materially and even psychologically. No doubt this is the case. However relevance in the industrial application of research on cultural differences may be seen as primarily oriented to making the wheels of the white controlled industrial sector turn more smoothly, with black advancement as a spin-off reducing friction further. This is relevance in the service of captains of industry and not in the first instance for the development of the work force. A different sort of relevance would ask questions as to what would be of benefit to them. Strümpfer and Kellerman (1986) have begun to suggest this to their industrial psychologist colleagues, although they do not suggest a questioning of the industrial formation as it stands. Further suggestions of this type have been offered by Fullagar (1984).

A rather different area in which relevance may be considered is exemplified in the rise of the theoretical and applied schools of humanistic psychology during the 1960s and 1970s. While there are varieties of this tradition, they all tend to reflect a common concern born in the idealistic turmoil of the period of their emergence. It stresses the need for academic psychology to be relevant to the personal qualities of the person in opposition to the mechanistic qualities of behaviouristic approaches. Various spokespersons in this vogue such as Maslow (1970) and Bugental (1967) pointed to the alienation (in the existential sense) of modern humanity and called for a re-affirmation of and recognition of such things as self-actualisation and respect for the individual. They generated theories of personal functioning in the spirit of liberal humanism and a range of therapies to go with them. The key notions as Jacoby (1977) points out, stressed the development of psychologies and practices which were relevant to enabling the modern (albeit middle class) Westerner to discover hidden potentials and through a process of inner development,

transcend the limitations of their hum-drum existence. A new order could be founded on principles of mutual respect and sharing, but, and here lies the rub, individual advancement. This movement then could be seen as being of relevance primarily to individuals as is reflected in the constructs embodied in its psychology (Holland 1977).

For reasons of this sort it is not difficult to understand its embrace by a largely affluent community. It merely reinforced the ideological assumption of "benign" liberal capitalism, and its pragmatic initiatives in various forms of growth therapies add credence to this view. The adoption of various forms of this position as dominant in certain South African universities despite their less than liberal frameworks is in itself of interest in this regard.

It is probably fair to say that the development of community psychology in the United States carries with it a similar humanistic imperative and this movement also seems largely uncritical in any radical sense of the structural determinants of many of the problems which it attempts to address. This applied community oriented humanistic form does not necessarily borrow theoretical material directly from the humanistic psychology movement per se, and is content to employ strategies derived from a variety of psychologies - even behaviourism (Lazarus 1986). Nonetheless it may be seen as an exemplar of relevant practice within a liberal humanist framework. While it certainly gives rise to political pressuring and calls for a "better deal" for disadvantaged sections of the citizenry, it does this within an unchanged liberal capitalist framework.

The model of the person employed by both humanistic psychology and community psychology, remains the individual human subject set over an external world. The central thread which flows through both is a clearly

individualistic philosophy which prevents the problematisation of their pragmatic initiatives as potentially conservative. This is so despite their no doubt valid contributions to the upliftment of the communities they serve.

Having touched on relevance at a theoretical level in the brief consideration of humanistic psychology, it is necessary to follow this up with some comments on two historically parallel but very different movements which have arisen mainly on the continent of Europe and Britain. The first movement is exemplified in the work of philosopher Rom Harré (1976), who in questioning the adequacy of epistemological and methodological frameworks of positivist psychology, has stimulated work by the likes of Gould and Shotter (1977) and other psychologists of similar persuasion. The work of these authors in rejecting positivism as providing an adequate framework for the development of a psychology truly reflective of human capacities, has suggested shifts in theory and method in the direction of hermeneutical models of inquiry. This form of psychology attempts to address the person as an active rule-following agent and a knowing subject. This view rejects the naturalised conception of the person embodied in the predominantly positivist heritage of twentieth century psychology. Again while this framework may be criticised as being an overly rationalist view of the person, it attempts to provide a psychological framework more relevant to observed human capacities, and is reinforced by a deep critique of positivist epistemology as applicable to this subject.

The second movement is informed by work outside the more traditional forms of philosophy of science and social science which provide the background for the previous position. It is based on a range of largely Marxian studies developed in Europe as exemplified by Foucault (1970),

Sevé (1978), Althusser (1971) and others. While not a coherent group, psychologists of this persuasion are concerned to question the very basic assumptions of the discipline and how its knowledge and practices have developed. Ingleby (1981) and Henriques et al (1984) for example might be said to be doing relevant psychology in their deconstruction of the subject of psychological investigations. In so doing they expose this (unitary) subject as a product of deeply embedded ideological notions regarding the nature of "man" inherent in natural science and capitalist social formations. In this way, they show the manner in which the theory and practice of psychology unwittingly perpetuate a set of dominant and submissive social relations. The discipline does this through its uncritical acceptance of notions central to capitalist ideology, namely individuality, rationality, naturality and freedom within the bounds of biological and psychological limits. To be relevant for this group is to expose the interests which are served by uncritical psychological theory and practice, and to call for a reconceptualisation of the subject of psychology which takes account of the social/ideological discourses which structure the individual person, the psychologist as theorist, researcher and practitioner, and the knowledge which they produce.

Finally, the notion of relevance in the South African context has been construed by some as the need for psychologists to provide critiques of the dehumanising consequences of apartheid in the variety of ways in which they manifest themselves (Dawes 1985, Holdstock 1981, van der Spuy 1978, Lambley 1980, Foster and Sandler 1985). This work does not address itself in any developed sense to class issues and is founded on more of a liberal human rights perspective.

Clearly there is a need to develop a South African psychology which addresses working class issues. Generally it is easier to speak of such relevance at the level of practice and research such that the tools of the discipline may be employed in the service of working class organisations, which does not necessarily involve a newly theorised psychology. Relevance in these terms could take all sorts of forms from assessments of malnourished children through to assisting in the planning of political strategy. At the far left end of that spectrum it could involve guerilla activities in support of armed struggle based on the sort of theorisation offered by Fannon (1967). In South Africa, relevance to class issues may also become connected to Africanist issues as has been the case in post-independence Africa (Abdi 1975).

I have attempted to point to a range of notions of "relevance" and related terms as they apply to different conceptions of psychological theory and practice. It is important to recognise that these terms can refer to the conservative and radical ends of the spectrum. It is also important to note that to do psychology within a workerist or Africanist perspective requires as much care and theoretical sophistication as that which has accompanied the development of the discipline in the service of industrial capitalism. The tendency may be to reject out of hand the established psychologies of the twentieth century without a careful analysis of their contributions and methods. If we take the view seriously that the models of the person created in 20th century psychology are infused with the dominant socio-economic and scientific ideologies of the time (Henriques et al 1984, Danziger in Buss 1979), then we can perhaps agree that such theories have at least partly described the (largely American) middle class person. In other words our theories have described the person as he or she is at this point in history - a largely socially constructed being who reflects the ideological underpinnings of the social milieu in his or her psychological make-up. This implies a rejection of "homo-psychologicus" as a natural phenomenon for all time as a mystified

notion and substitutes a homo "psychologicus capitalensis".

Given the fact that most of the data are Euro-American based, the point is that these psychological "facts" describe the sort of person who inhabits many modern capitalist states, and the sort of (theoretically embedded) psychological mechanisms which guide their behaviour. A rejection of positivism and an ideological critique of the pitfalls of recent psychologies stands on its own as a necessary exercise. Nevertheless if one accepts the position outlined above (which is implied by ideological critique), I would argue that modern psychology has gone a long way towards describing the state of the (albeit mystified) contemporary capitalist individual which cannot be ignored by psychologists who wish to serve the pragmatic imperatives of the working community. This is because these forms of mentation are likely to exist deeply embedded in such communities, and as such may be likely to resist change. Certain areas of psychological and psychoanalytic theory may be brought to bear in understanding this process and it would thus be unwise to reject the entire edifice as reactionary in some simplistic manner.

Similarly certain methods of research that have been developed in the service of a more positivist conception of human nature need not be seen as irrevocably tied to such a project. They may be utilised both in the task of developing more progressive forms of theory, and in the service of research and pragmatic questions raised by democratic organisations. A rejection of the claims of positivist psychologies does not therefore necessitate a rejection of data gathering, statistical analysis and so forth. Such a move would lead to a considerable degree of impotence as a result of misguided thinking.

Relevance and its related terms must thus be understood from the point of view of research, practice, theory and politics and may take a

variety of forms. It is important to reflect on where one stands as a psychologist with respect to this complex kaleidoscope which has some bearing on doing psychology in Africa or anywhere else.

THE RELEVANCE OF PSYCHOLOGY IN AFRICA

Jahoda (1973) noted that by far the greatest involvement of Euro-American psychologists in Africa north of South Africa, was in cross-cultural research of one kind or another. Investigations included aspects of cognition and intellect as well as personality. He observed also that African people had come to observe this "invasion" of psychologists with appropriate suspicion. Here was yet another group of colonial exploiters of a population of curious souls on whom data could be collected to test hypotheses regarding cultural universals and specificities. While this might have been of benefit to psychological science, Jahoda agrees that its relevance to the people concerned was minimal.

In a more clearly materialist critique of this enterprise, Bulhan (1981) commented on the use of such work developed in South African industrial research organisations in Ghana, Zambia and Nigeria for purposes of worker selection in the European dominated industries of those countries. Bulhan's paper is a scathing critique of the lack of relevance of much of this work to the colonial subjects. He points also to the studies of Mannoni on the Malagasy people (Mannoni 1968) as an example of the utilisation of psychoanalytic theory as a justification for colonial control. Buhlan notes further that after independence the tone of psychological research began to shift to a more "sympathetic" neo-colonial position, such that some of the more outdated cross-cultural psychological myths began to be replaced. Nevertheless, in newly independent states such as Ghana and Nigeria sophisticated industrial test batteries have been

developed which function as in the colonial era, to maximise productivity in the mining and oil industries. What this indicates clearly is that independence does not necessarily imply the shift of applied psychological research towards its employment in working class interests. Indeed in the struggle to develop stable post-colonial economies the position of the working person may well be as oppressed with the assistance of psychological technology as it was in the colonial era.

Bulhan concludes his article by encouraging black African psychologists to be wary of their role as potential instruments of oppression. He does not however problematise the potentially conflicting interests of the individual African worker and the pragmatic initiatives of the developing state which requires industrial and other forms of development. If psychology can provide selection technologies for industry which improve the status of African economics, do they not then have a valid role, particularly if this process reduces poverty and so on for the mass of the populous? The democratic answer would seem to lie in the degree to which the working people have a high degree of control over the means of production and its design. While such a notion might seem overly idealistic it should remain a goal whose even partial realisation would place psychological technology more clearly in a position to be accepted or rejected by those who would be subject to its utilisation and design. Such a notion of course does not only apply in the African context.

I might be taken to task at this point for focussing overmuch on the applied arena where it might be easier to point self-righteous fingers. What about the "pure" cross-cultural research with which we began this section? Jahoda (1982) while recognising the exploitive history of much of this work, nevertheless sees it as an important and necessary branch

of psychology particularly in alliance with anthropology. Indeed a total rejection of comparison across cultures would imply a rejection of comparative endeavours within cultures, where the focus might be on sub-cultural variants of, for example, religious, class or ideological persuasion. Such an extreme seems absurd and appears to rule out the comparative study of any collectivity.

However such questions need to be considered by a cross cultural psychology that claims to be relevant not only to the advancement of science (without its mystified neutrality) but also to the community which directly or indirectly supports it. In coping with this dilemma a beginning can be made by asking a series of questions. Why is the research question framed the way it is? It is not sufficient answer - "to test hypothesis A or B". One needs to ask why A or B arise in the first place, for as indicated in the earlier section of this paper such questions are deeply socially structured even if they don't appear so. Why has the researcher chosen the categories he or she has as representative of "cultures"? As Sharp (1980) has shown this is a bedevilled term which apart from being subject to the production of misleading "knowledge", may be used to reinforce certain political positions. Who benefits from the research? Is it the researcher who adds another cross-cultural research scalp to an upwardly mobile curriculum vita? Is it the research population? In this latter regard proponents of pure science are clear that it does not have to benefit anyone directly,as it is "science" which benefits and therefore ultimately humanity which stands to gain.

Clearly this last notion is deeply embedded in the liberal academic tradition of the West including South Africa. Without debating the possibilities of purity in science here, it seems appropriate to question whether the African community can afford the luxury of research which does

not have as a clear intent the solution of problems particular to its community. I would suggest that we cannot afford such a luxury and furthermore that a democratically based scientific endeavour, should serve the interests of the broad mass of the population and this applies as well to cross-cultural work as to any other in psychology. In this suggestion I refer back to an earlier point in which I stressed the role of a critical academic focus as central to such projects.

The pure vs. applied science debate has been central in the emergence of post independence African tertiary institutions (Wandira in Van der Merwe and Welsh 1977, Yesefu 1973). Most African writers on this topic agree in their adoption of a policy of pragmatic Africanisation as the context for university research and teaching, while stressing the need for excellence in this endeavour (UNESCO 1962, Murphee in Van der Merwe and Welsh 1977). The central concerns of African research (usually state determined) are geared towards upliftment of the populous and national development. Such a policy would question, for example, cross-cultural work which does not have a clearly directed spin-off for the populous. Whether the state necessarily reflects such interests is always a moot point, and again suggests the importance of the critical academic as Yesefu (1973) agrees. The loss of the critical edge would lead to reduced effectiveness of the pragmatic Africanist imperative, and while such a critical stance may prove unpopular in terms of the perceived projects of popular movements, we should be wary of its suppression.

The policy of Africanisation may in itself present problems. It runs the risk of taking on board reified notions of culture (Sharp 1980) or negritude as it seeks to develop respect for African heritage. As in colonial times and currently in South Africa, social scientists, through their employment of particular categories of ethnicity or "race" run the

risk of their being unwittingly supportive of certain power constellations. Alexander (1984) makes this clear in his rejection of the notions of race and ethnicity as categories which do not serve working class interests. He argues that using such categories in social science research serves to split working class endeavours and thereby increases the hegemony of the ruling groups (e.g. the white apartheid state or the position of Inkatha). Just as white interest has been served by cultural reification through research, so might power struggles within the black community be similarly facilitated. A further instance of this problematic within psychiatry is highlighted by Swartz and Foster (1984) in their discussion of trans-cultural work which on occasion leads to the glorification of the "primitive" among other problems.

In short psychologists in Africa, as elsewhere, need to make choices as to the interests they serve noting as Alexander does that the liberal conception of academic purity, particularly in the social sciences, is a myth. This realisation need not however promote a return to the uncritical stance argued against earlier.

So what is the position of African psychology outside South Africa? This question can only be answered in a preliminary way at present as the data is not easy to come by. A future project aims to clarify the matter. Given the pragmatic initiative, it is not surprising that psychology has featured low on the list of priorities in the design of post independence universities. The sources consulted (UNESCO op.cit., Yesefu op.cit., Abdi 1975, Jahoda 1973, Wandira op.cit., Commonwealth Universities Yearbook 1985) provide an incomplete picture but one which shows considerable variation. All stress however the centrality of science and technology, education, public administration, medicine, and agriculture, to the pragmatic Africanisation program. All stress in addition the Africanisation

of curricula which can be seen as an appropriate reaction to the former British and Continental control of African tertiary education. An interesting example of this is the formal linkage of universities in former British territories to the universities of London, Edinburgh and Durham (amongst others) in the U.K. Central African counterparts were linked to institutions such as Lourdes. In both cases the syllabi and examinations were often identical to their parent universities (Yesefu op.cit.) Small wonder the moves toward relevance in the Africanised sense!

In terms of curricula, one should note finally that these appear influenced by the form of state within which the university exists. Thus Dar es Salaam in Tanzania has no psychology department (Gillette 1977) and the stress is on education for self-reliance which coincides with former President Nyerere's design for the state. It is interesting also that no student is admitted to the university until after a period of years in the world of work in which he or she has shown initiative in African socialism. Reactions to such a policy no doubt depend on one's political colours but are clearly reflective of the, in my view, laudable notion that university places should be reserved for those who have shown a clear commitment to the development of their country and not just those who can pay.

While Tanzania has no psychology, most Central African countries appear similar. Former British colonies in West, East and Southern Africa have such departments, staffed increasingly by native citizens rather than expatriots. However an examination of the degrees of senior staff reflects the fact that most have collected graduate qualifications in Britain or the U.S.A. This would suggest the strong influence of Euro-American psychology in their teaching and research. While I do

not have definitive African data on this matter as yet, an examination of the curricula and textbooks used in Zimbabwe and Zambia indicates no difference from any similar contemporary British or American institution. Thus we find the usual supermarket of personality theory, abnormal, personal, psychological testing, motivation and so on. The degree to which this material is contextualised for Africa I do not know. At least at the superordinate level of course labels and texts, it does not exist which may of course obscure what occurs within the courses.

So Jahoda's (1973) questions regarding the relevance of psychology for developing Africa remain alive. The degree to which African universities have addressed them remains to be assessed. What is clear however is that in poor post colonial countries the discipline seems to have low to non-existent priority. As Abdi (1979) writing from Ethiopia suggests, Africans have in general not perceived the need for systematic applications of psychology. Colonial universities (and their South African counterparts), have not taught a psychology relevant to the masses. "The concepts of psychology, its theories and methods as understood by Westerners are alien to the thinking of the African." (Abdi 1975, p 230). While one might quarrel with a certain implicit paternalism here, it seems likely that his words have a strong ring of truth. If psychology does not make much sense to us and has little usefulness in our context, why bother with it? Abdi does not dismiss the discipline out of hand however and again returns to questions of relevance and modifications of accepted methods, clearly believing that a transformed delivery of psychology may have its (as yet unclear) role to play.

The Africanist pragmatic initiative then seems to connect most closely with only some of the considerations of relevance outlined in the first section of the paper. It would probably be fair to suggest

that a psychology constructed in this way would not be overly concerned to develop debates of the sort conducted by Ingleby (1981) and Henriques et al (1984), but rather to work towards the application of psychological knowledge in the interests of national development. How such projects would be carried out and what theoretical underpinnings they would have would seem to depend to some degree on whether a materialist radical social philosophy is upheld or not, and thus whose interests would be served by the employment of the discipline. As was clear from Bulhan's (op.cit.) article, even under programs of pragmatic Africanisation varieties of option are possible.

South Africa is clearly a state with its own peculiarities as to population (e.g. modern technicist/rural subsistence) resources and linkages with the rest of the world. What a relevant psychology and psychological education might look like here need not be identical to that in any other African state.

South African universities can either attempt to hold out for the liberal academic traditions which stress highly developed research as a priority (as Cape Town has done - Saunders 1985), or they can begin to shift their ground and question the validity of attempting to gain/retain a position as world class institutions in the Euro-American tradition. As Dutkewitz (1985) has suggested in relation to science and engineering, South African researchers should be less concerned with chasing Nobel Prizes and exploring the frontiers of the universe, than getting their hands dirty with the less fame-producing but more essential process of doing work relevant to the vast problems posed by our own needs as a third world community. This is where he believes funds and educational priorities need to be directed.

Does a democratic South Africa need the same form of psychology which it has produced thus far with few exceptions? My own view is that it is in need of a radical overhaul - a change which will reflect the needs of the majority of its citizens. As indicated earlier this does not imply throwing out the baby with the ideological bath-water. It suggests a discipline which, while apartheid remains, is critical at both the educational, research and applied levels, of that system. It must begin to ask democratic organisations whether it has any role to play in the problems which they face (it may not). It must educate its students in such a way as to develop a critical awareness to the ideological content of the discipline, and begin to grapple with the question of what psychology needs to be taught and how at all levels of instruction. This will mean the sacrifice of certain internationally accepted fields of study in preference to those of local relevance. It means a difficult and unfamiliar choice for psychologists - are you on the side of an elite liberal academic tradition, or are you prepared through your work to identify with pragmatic Africanist initiatives?

Leaving these questions in the air, presupposes two things. First that my own position is not entirely clear, which is correct, and second that we cannot simply pronounce on how things should look at this stage. I invite interested others to join me in working towards models of a future South African psychology and by implication models for the education of psychologists in this country which address some of the problems which I have raised.

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Article :

The South African Crisis of 1985

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For anyone who wishes to take seriously the relationship between psychology and society in South Africa, it would be iniquitous to ignore the dramatic and tragic events which rocked this country during 1985. For some people these events signified the incipient and inevitable slide into civil war, for optimistic others, the harbinger of a long-awaited revolution. For some state officials, no doubt, the events would falsely signal no more than the half-expected responses due to the opening up of a 'reform' era. For a further few, unhappily, the situation would be interpreted, via a conspiracy theory of sorts, as the outcome of 'agitators', 'communists' or similar mysterious forces of darkness. One way or another the events of 1985 require some reflection and understanding.

It is sufficiently clear that '1985' is not yet over. Whether or not historians eventually will regard this as a new phase of history, the events

Psychology in Society, 1986, 5, 49 - 65.

of 1985 have shaken the South African social order and psyche in considerably more than a trivial fashion. For those who have viewed life through the lenses of a traditional psychology, it will no longer be easy to entertain the erroneous assumptions of an ahistoric stance. For 1985, if nothing else, should have shown us that social and historical contexts cannot be ignored in attempting to understand individuals' lives.

The aim of this modest look at the recent and ongoing crisis is not dominantly psychological. Instead it merely intends to provide a summary description of events and the beginnings of an understanding. Before turning to details we would do well to ask what is meant here by the term crisis. Drawing from Gramsci's notion of an organic crisis referring to a set of structural contradictions, a crisis here means a dysjunction between existing institutions and practices of the ruling classes and the changing circumstances of social reality. It means that existing institutions will be unable to maintain the present ordering of social relations as before. 'Symptoms' of these underlying dysjunctions are likely to appear at different sites of the social order, and perhaps at different times, but will all reflect major challenges to the present order and to ruling institutions.

SURFACE DESCRIPTION OF THE CRISIS

Since the declaration of a state of emergency on 21 July 1985 represented merely the formal state response to an already-existing crisis, 3 September 1984 may be a better starting date. On this date the tricameral constitution got under way, and in response to protests over housing rent increases, the first wave of South African Defence Force troops entered the Transvaal townships of Sharpeville, Sebokeng, Evaton and others. This pattern of

violent clashes between 'security' forces and township dwellers was to persist and spread to well over 100 townships and suburbs in wide areas of the country throughout 1985.

The characteristic events of the 1985 crisis are well known and are presented here in the form of summary statistics. While bland figures catch nothing of the tragedy of the many deaths, the agony of assaults, the suffering of the wounded nor the fear of the detained, they do give some idea of the sheer scope of the crisis.

Damage to property amounted to roughly R140 million according to official figures.[1] Attacks were largely directed to symbols of state and capitalist domination : government buildings, schools, police vehicles and police stations, beerhalls and bottlestores, shops and factories, buses and trucks, houses of policemen, councillors, members of the tricameral parliament and other perceived collaborators. The bus industry alone lost over R30 million in damages and lost revenue.[2] Guerilla activity and sabotage increased dramatically in 1985, with 136 recorded incidents, 34 percent of all incidents over the past ten years.[3]

The death toll since September 1984 has risen to well over a thousand people, roughly two-thirds killed by state forces.[4] The mass shootings at Langa, Mamelodi, Alexandra and in the notorious 'Trojan Horse' incident at Athlone will become part of the memorial history of the liberation movement.

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1. Minister of Law and Order, Cape Times, 7 February 1986.
2. Schlemmer, L. (1986). Unrest : the emerging significance. Indicator South Africa (Political Monitor), 3, 3-6.
3. Schlemmer (1986), p 6.
4. The South African Institute of Race Relations gives the number of deaths in 'unrest' between 1 September 1984 and 31 January 1986 as 1158 (Weekly Mail, 28 Feb to 6 March 1986). Official figures from the Minister of Law and Order said that 628 had been killed by security forces and 327 'by their own people', between 1 September 1984 and 24 January 1986 (Cape Times, 7 February 1986).

The pattern of 'security force repression in the dorps and townships took on a sadly repetitive form of everyday violence. Sjamboks, teargas, birdshot, buckshot, rubber bullets, live ammunition, shootings, roadblocks, sealing off areas, searches and arrests became the daily round. It has been estimated that roughly 25 000 people (excluding detainees) were arrested on 'unrest'- or politically related charges, many of them for public violence, attending unlawful gatherings, and Demonstration Act contraventions.[5] In terms of the laws of this country most forms of peaceful protest are rendered a crime, and this is reflected in the figures of arrests. Sentences for the convicted, particularly of public violence, were severe, including long prison sentences even for first offenders and corporal punishment for juveniles.

Almost 8 000 people were detained under emergency regulations in the Transvaal, Eastern Cape and Western Cape during the 226 days of the emergency (21 July 1985 - 7 March 1986).[6] Of these emergency detainees 2 106 were children under the age of 16 years.[7] This figure given by the Minister of Law and Order came after the same Minister last year denied that children were being held. An additional 1 684 people were detained under South African security legislation (Internal Security Act, 74 of 1982), and a further 1 953 under similar laws in the bantustans, mainly the Transkei.[8] There were widespread allegations of abuse and torture of both emergency and security law detainees, and of police brutality in general.[9] Numerous

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5. Detainees' Parents Support Committee (1986). Review of 1985. Bramley.
6. Cape Times, 9 March 1986 reported police figures of total emergency detainees as 7 996.
7. Minister of Law and Order as reported in the Cape Times, 12 February 1986.
8. DPSC (1986). Review of 1985. Bramley, p 1.
9. See the following: Foster, D. and Sandler, D.(1985) A Study of Detention and Torture in South Africa. Institute of Criminology, University of Cape Town; CPSC & DESCOM (1985) Democratic Movement Under Attack : a report on the State of Emergency July - September 1985. Bramley; Amnesty International (1986). South Africa : Briefing. London : AI Publications.

temporary inderdicts were handed down by the courts restraining the police from further assaults upon detainees.[10]

Meetings, gatherings, individuals and organisations were banned.[11] Under various provisions a wide range of gatherings were banned including carol services, fun runs, concerts, conferences, indoor political meetings and commemorations. Funerals, virtually the only legitimate form of large-scale gathering possible, increasingly took the shape of huge political rallies until they too fell under severe restrictions.[12] However, funeral restrictions themselves became a site of resistance as bans were challenged and restrictions ignored.

During 1985 a total of 56 persons faced treason charges in eight different trials.[13] A number of political activists disappeared or were assassinated. The year also saw unprecendented attempts to curb the press. Under emergency provisions press freedom was severely limited but on 2 November 1985 further curbs were placed on the media, effectively preventing any recording (sound or visual) or 'unrest' situations, and demanding police accreditation of all journalists in emergency areas.[14]

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10. See the Human Rights Index of the South African Journal on Human Rights, 1985, 3, 304-307.

11. On 28 August the Congress of South African Students (COSAS), a leading UDF affiliate, was banned. In its six years of existence COSAS had become the largest high school students' organisation in the country, mobilising thousands of students through its 42 branches nationwide. In the Western Cape, all meetings of 102 organisations were banned for the duration of the state of emergency.

12. As examples, a press-estimated crowd of about 30 000 attended the funeral of Unionist Andries Raditsela who died in detention, while workers country-wide held lunch hour prayer meetings and two-hour work stoppages. (Cape Times, 15 May 1985). At the funeral of Mathew Goniwe and 3 other Eastern Cape community leaders in Cradock on the very afternoon of the declaration of the state of emergency, the estimated attendance was 30 000 (The Argus, 20 July 1985). The murderers of these four men have not yet been traced.

13. DPSC (1985) Review of 1985. Bramley. Of these treason trials 4 were completed in 1985 during which 8 persons were convicted and 16 acquitted (12 of them in the yet uncompleted Pietermaritzburg UDF trial).

14. Cape Times, 4 November 1985.

The label of 'unrest' which has come to signify politically-related incidents of the past year is not really the most appropriate term. It captures nothing of the organised nature of resistance, and suggests too much of an unrestrained and random aggression. It would be more appropriate to characterise events in terms of a more systematic cycle, or spiral, of resistance and repression. A close examination of 'unrest' incidents shows that most do not constitute events of random violence. On the contrary, actions have been directed in the main at particular symbols of oppression and exploitation. Resistance has occurred on a number of fronts and may be described as follows.

Resistance : Since 1976, black education has been a key site of resistance. The grievances are too well known to discuss here.[15] Official figures for 1985 claim that 907 black schools and 674 275 pupils under the Department of Education and Training (this represents 38 percent of the African school-going population) were affected by school boycotts. The increasing militancy of black youth has been one of the characteristic features of increased resistance to the state in general. Specific educational demands gave way during 1985 to broader political demands. It may be noted that before its banning, roughly one out of every five emergency detainees was a COSAS member. It was also notable during 1985 that scholars showed an increasing propensity to link their demands with those in other areas such as consumer boycotts and trade unions.

The new constitution also has been a site of organised resistance. Formation of the United Democratic Front (UDF) in 1983 was in substantial part effected in resistance to constitutional proposals. Sustained protests

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15. See : Kane-Berman, J. (1978). Soweto : Black Revolt, White Reaction, Ravan; Kallaway, P. (ed) (1984) Apartheid and Education, Ravan.

and the poor polling returns in the 1984 tricameral parliament elections testify to the success of resistance to the new constitution.

Further resistance on a large scale has been directed against the repressive apparatus itself. During 1985 this situation came to resemble in many areas the front-line of a war zone, with running pitched battles between riot-police and civilians. The inequality of this war is reflected in official statistics of casualties (between 1 September 1984 and 24 January 1986) : 25 security force members killed and 534 injured, while civilians killed by police action totalled 628 with a further 2 229 injured.[16] Resistance has also been directed at other areas of the repressive apparatus; protests and campaigns against detention, bannings and political prisoners (the 'free Mandela' campaign, for instance) have been both consistent and widespread.

A feature of 1985 resistance was the wide use of consumer boycotts, starting in late July, most successfully in the Eastern Cape. While directed largely at white capital, boycotts were coupled with explicitly national political demands including release of all detainees and political prisoners, removal of police and troops from townships, and lifting the state of emergency. Organisations displayed different perceptions of the role of boycotts. Some saw it as a form of protest action designed to get big business to put pressure on the state for meeting of political demands. Others saw it as a direct challenge to the capitalist economy. Consumer boycotts were frequently linked however to local demands and tactics varied regionally. Starting in the Eastern Cape, consumer boycotts spread rapidly to the

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16. Minister of Law and Order as reported in the Cape Times, 7 February 1986. These figures exclude those deaths and injuries due to so-called "faction fights", and those "killed by their own people" in the Minister's words.

Transvaal and Western Cape. Boycott leaders were frequently detained leading to a cycle of further protests and campaigns for release.[17]

The state-imposed system of community councils, as well as councillors' actions, have offered further grounds for resistance. Councillors are seen as part of the machinery of state oppression. Furthermore councillors are often seen to be associated with vigilante groups as well as the police, thus responsible for initiation of violent repression. There is no doubt that the local government system has been a source of considerable tension and violence, particularly in small towns.[18]

Resistance to economic exploitation also showed a substantial increase in this period of crisis. Work stayaways in Vaal triangle townships in September 1984 in opposition to rent increases marked the start of the crisis. This was followed in the Transvaal, early November 1984, by the largest and most successful work stayaway, involving an estimated half-a-million workers, in the 35 years that the stayaway strike has been used as a political strategy.[19] In Port Elizabeth on 16-18 March 1985 almost the entire African workforce stayed at home. Demands focused on petrol and paraffin price increases, GST increases, busfare increases and massive retrenchment in the area.[20] Furthermore there was a sharp increase during 1985 in the official figures for overall number of strikes, involving almost quarter-of-a-million workers.[21]

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17. Obery, I. and Jochelson, K. (1985). Two sides of the same bloody coin. Work in Progress, 39, 9-30. Also see: 1985 - the year of the consumer boycott. Indicator South Africa (Political Monitor), 1986, 3 (3), 8-9.

18. Seekings, J. (1986). Probing the links : vigilantes and the state. Work in Progress, 40, 26-29.

19. See Prof. E. Webster's assessment in this regard, Cape Times, 9 Nov. 1984.

20. Pillay, D. (1985). Community organisations and unions in conflict : the Port Elizabeth stayaways. Work in Progress, 37, 4-13.

21. Cape Times, 13 April 1985.

The launch of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) occurred in December 1985. Involving 33 unions representing roughly 450 000 workers, COSATU is the largest ever trade union federation in the history of South Africa. While the full strategic significance of this federation will only be assessed at a future date, the overtly political demands at the launch suggest a powerful force of both political and economic resistance.[22]

Since a crisis period is characterised by a dysjunction between outdated institutions/organisations and current demands, one would expect to see development of new organisations in a time of organic crisis. This is what has occurred. Recent years have seen the foundation of important new political alignments in the National Forum and the United Democratic Front. One of the features of 1985 was the astonishing gains in popular support and in credibility of these movements, in particular the UDF. On other terrains, new alignments and associations have mushroomed. The launch of COSATU has been mentioned. In the educational arena, latter stages of 1985 saw the formation of the Soweto Parents' Crisis Committee (SPCC), the Western Cape Teachers' Union (WECTU) and many Parents' Action Committees. Even in white areas some movement was seen; for example the formation in the Western Cape of Edasa (Education for an aware South Africa). A significant aspect of the 1985 crisis in education in contrast to earlier periods 1976-77, and 1980, was the degree of support for new demands shown by both teachers and parents. In the earlier periods, scholars were virtually on their own. Another important feature of 1985 was the substantial development in grassroots organisations, and in the sustained resistance, found in small towns

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22. See Carrim, Y. (1986). Working class politics to the fore. Work in Progress, 37, 4-13.

in the Eastern and Western Cape, CRADORA (Cradock Residents Association) being one example.[23]

While some of the new organisations may be transitory, as anyone who attempts to follow the changing South African organisational acronyms would know, there is also a decided air of vibrancy, movement and progression, and a degree of popular participation unknown previously in South Africa. It is also quite apparent that the gains in popular support for organisations linked to the broad liberation movement has been considerable. Ground level support for ANC symbols at massed funerals throughout the country in 1985 gives some idea of the changed mood.

Repression : If resistance is one side of the cycle, then repression on the part of the state is the other. There are countless examples of spirals in which repressive actions (for example, police shootings, or detention of popular figures) in turn produce angry resistance, protest meetings, marches, stonings, attacks on government property and the like. In the Western Cape for example, the very declaration of the state of emergency immediately produced the response of galvanising large meetings, protests, school and consumer boycotts. State response to this situation in turn led to police shootings and deaths in Guguletu, which led to further funerals and protest actions. The state's claim that the state of emergency led to decrease in unrest, violence or fatalities simply cannot be sustained. The later entry of the Western Cape (late July and August 1985) into the crisis spiral can be accounted for, as we have seen, to a large degree as a response to repressive tactics. Furthermore death rates were highest in August 1985

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23. See: Cradock : building a tradition of resistance. Work in Progress, 1985, 38, 4-8; Little to be thankful for : Bongweni township, Colesburg. Work in Progress, 1985, 39, 31-32; Moss, G. (1986) Fort Beaufort under emergency rule. Work in Progress, 40, 18-25.; Unrest in smaller towns and villages. The Black Sash, 1985, 28 (3), 28-32.

and January 1986, that is, well after the declaration of emergency. In addition, the noted increased support from older citizens for the new resistance organisations must in part be due to the unprecendented levels of open brutality on the part of forces of "law and order".

The "reform" programme has had little impact on the majority of citizens of the country. The removal of laws symbolic of apartheid, such as the Mixed Marriages and Immorality Acts passed almost without notice during the year dominated by repression on an unparallelled scale. The range of repressive forms are well known, have already been discussed and may simply be listed again here. They include the use of political trials covering a wide range of charges, five separate forms of detention without access to due process of law, riot control using a range of weapons, wide powers of arrest and control under emergency laws and indemnity of forces against prosecution for any acts carried out in "good faith", a further range of security laws enabling banning of meetings, persons and organisations, the use of roadblocks and house-to-house searches, and heavy curbs on the media. Further "everyday" acts of repression include influx control laws, removals, censorship of political literature, and use of municipal by-laws to prevent distribution of pamphlets. It is impossible to gain accurate figures of the number of people subjected to the full range of repressive apparatus, but it must have been many millions during 1985. Millions of others would have experienced indirectly or symbolically the same forces.

The question remains about the efficacy of the state's repressive machinery in successfully quelling the resistance. In order to answer it, a deeper understanding of the crisis is required.

DEEPER UNDERSTANDING OF THE CRISIS[24]

According to Bundy's probing analysis, the 1985 crisis grew out of, and can only be understood in terms of a treble-layered crisis which had developed through the 1970s. Succinctly, these refer to an economic crisis, a geo-political and military crisis, and a crisis of the resurgence of mass-based black resistance.

Viewed historically in broad sweeps, the earlier mass-resistance politics of the 1950s, then still protected to a degree in law, had been forced underground by the early 1960s with the banning of the ANC and PAC in 1960 and subsequent sabotage trials. Most activists were driven into exile and the routing of black political opposition was almost complete.

The period between mid 1962 through to 1973-74 was the high point of relatively unchallenged white rule. It was a period characterised by sustained booming economic growth, low inflation, weak labour organisation, a pattern of low wages and high investment, and a strong state (personified by the caricature of a jackbooted Vorster) with increasing executive powers at the cost of the judiciary. It was the high point of Apartheid social engineering policy, epitomised by the bantustans and group areas, and mass removals under both of these policies. The National Party showed a considerable gain in strength, while with foreign investors pumping money in, white South Africans displayed unprecedented levels of consumerism.

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24. This section of the paper is drawn almost entirely from Professor Colin Bundy's outstanding lecture series entitled Understanding 1985 : a Crisis Examined, delivered at the University of Cape Town summer school in January 1986. Since the lecture series has not yet been published, and this interpretation is based on notes, any errors should not be attributed to Prof. Bundy. In addition his analysis was far more extensive than space allows here, therefore full justice cannot be done to Prof. Bundy's wide-ranging and searching analysis.

By about 1972 pressures started to mount and contradictions to show. Investment had swelled the number of black workers, who carried with them increasing demands. At the same time, mechanisation of industry and agriculture created large numbers of unemployed blacks. It became more apparent that the bantustans "dumping ground" policies were becoming a source of more problems than solutions. Growth rate depended on a high level of importation of goods and skills while the domestic market remained fairly inelastic. There was rising inflation after 1972.

Between 1973 and 1977 the development of an acute crisis faced both state and capital. The crisis could be reduced to three main components. On the economic front the boom period declined along with world recession and the oil crisis. The economy contracted and combinations of rising inflation and unemployment led to problems and growing impoverishment in black townships. On the geo-political and military front, the South African subcontinent had become substantially altered by the mid-1970s, and costs for sustaining the losing Rhodesian war were escalating. Buffer zones had given way and potential military threats to the state were far closer to home. In addition the renewal of resistance in the areas of both mass politics and labour became a significant source of problems for the state. The strikes of 1973 and subsequent growing labour organisation and resistance, along with the 1976 Soweto uprisings which spread through the country, led to state response in the form of a technocratic reformist programme. "Reform" was designed to accommodate black anger and contain the possibilities of challenge.

Bundy's thesis is that by the mid-1970s South Africa had entered a new historical phase which is still in progress; furthermore that the present surface political troubles can only be understood in terms of the underlying economic crises, now over a decade old. While there has been a steady

economic downturn since about 1973, it has been interspersed with short recovery periods. For example, due to the gold-price spiral, a boom period was experienced in 1979-1981. By the end of 1981, the gold price fell by fifty percent and the economy as a whole with it. Accompanying rising inflation fell most heavily on the shoulders of blacks. During 1982, unemployment figures for blacks were estimated at between 1,5 to 3 million. This was most notably the case for the increasing number of black school leavers who along with organised scholars have proved a volatile mix for renewed mass political resistance.

The mini-boom upswing of 1984, coinciding with apparent greater acceptance of South Africa abroad due to constitutional proposals, Nkomati agreement, USA policy of constructive engagement and Botha's much publicised European visit, seemed to offer a temporary respite of optimism for whites. This was to come tumbling down however with the steepest yet decline in the "switchback economy", in July 1984. The Rand shrank and counteracting monetarist policies brought soaring inflation.

The economic reverses came at the worst time for the state. Mounting opposition to the August 1984 tricameral parliament elections opened new opportunities for mass black resistance, and started a spiral of violence in response to heavy policing and widespread detention of UDF leaders in particular. In early September 1984 all the elements intersected with the Vaal Triangle stayaways, police shootings, violence directed at beerhalls, shops, vehicles, councillors houses, and troops being deployed in townships. As P W Botha took his new role as State President a press cartoonist marked the event with this cartoon caption: "I'm not sure whether that's the dawn of a new era or the glow of flames."[25] With hindsight the cartoonist's

25. Cape Times, 6 September 1984.

only error, and a typical liberal one at that, was to show such uncertainty!

By 8 September 1984, more than 160 000 black students nationwide were boycotting classes, and some schools were closed.[26] By 12 September the stoning of bottle stores and police vehicles, attacks on buses, and petrol-bombing of councillors' houses had spread to Soweto, police responding with rubber bullets and teargas.[27] Publicity on the six detainees who were taking refuge in the British Consulate in Durban led to deterioration in international relations. Warnings were cast that the banning of all meetings critical of the government (11 September) could lead to more violence. As the new tricameral parliament cabinet was announced, it was reported that nearly 60 people had died in the Vaal Triangle conflicts.[28] Funerals were held, some were banned, and mourners were arrested or injured in police action. By October it was reported that the strike rate had increased 28 percent over the previous year.[29] At the same time, launching a strong attack on the UDF, the Minister of Law and Order announced a plan to increase cooperation between the South African Police and Defence Force.[30] Later that month, a "massive 7 000 strong police and army force invaded the trouble-torn Vaal townships of Sharpeville and Boipatong after they had pulled out of Sebokeng where 354 people were arrested."[31] In short, the full pattern of events, to continue unabated right through 1985 and into 1986, was already established. The surface pattern of crisis events, engendered by deeper structural crises, had become visible.

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26. Cape Times, 8 September 1984.
27. Cape Times, 13 September 1984.
28. Cape Times, 18 September 1984.
29. Cape Times, 5 October 1984.
30. Cape Times, 6 October 1984.
31. Cape Times, 24 October 1984.

Returning to the earlier question regarding the efficacy of 1985 repression in containing or "solving" the crisis, it is now possible to suggest that if one accepts the hypothesis of the 1985 crisis as emerging out of a decade-old, treble layered structural crisis, as posited by Bundy, then the possibility of providing any solution by merely repressive tactics must be seen as erroneous. Heavy handed repressive tactics, the well-worn South African 'reflex-action', were successful in the early sixties, but on each of the three levels of crisis, the present situation is substantially different. One can only conclude that the crisis will continue, even if at different sites and at a different pace, since the 'reformist' strategies, including repression, work only at the surface and are not intended to introduce social change in any substantive meaning of that concept. On the contrary, the state will attempt to resist any attempts at social change.

IMPLICATIONS FOR PSYCHOLOGY

Instead of attempting a detailed review of possibilities, the intention here is simply to mention some of the stances that are likely to be taken in considering this most grave situation. Two responses, which may be seen as at either end of a continuum of reactions, present themselves. On the one hand, psychologists will argue that their discipline is a science, and that science ought to remain neutral (or beyond, or above!) in relation to the tawdry vicissitudes of power struggles and political wrangles. On the other hand, different psychologists will suggest that the only solution lies in abandoning the 'bourgeoisie' discipline and turning fully to political activism. Closer to the ground it is probable that few psychologists are purists in either of these directions, but are somewhere in between with tendencies towards the sketched positions.

The contention here is that the first of these two positions is demonstrably false, on philosophy of science grounds at very least, and that the second position, while emotionally more appealing given the crisis as outlined above, is somewhat undesirable. It is also unfortunate, in the sense that it misunderstands the possibilities that do exist within the discipline for a more adequate and progressive theory of persons. In recent years, a number of new (or re-newed) terrains have begun to open up, offering fresh insights into "human nature" and the relationship between the person and the social. Realism, constructivism, ethogenics, structuration theory, reinterpretation of psychoanalytic theory, Marxist approaches to psychology, poststructuralism, semiotics and new departure in the theory of ideology provide some examples of the rich, and bewildering, array of fertile theoretical ground to explore.

Whether the tattered remains of the former field of psychology has anything to forward in the way of a concrete practice, other than the remaining virtues of individual therapy (much of what passes for group- or family-therapy is hardly progressive), remains something of an open question. All one can say with some optimism is that much contemporary theorising, as listed above, is centrally concerned with the relationships between theory and practice.

Within South Africa it is sufficiently apparent from the above description of the ongoing crisis that the fierce nature of a struggle for a full democratic society will leave little room for the comforts of a "neutral" stance. In the absence of a clear vision of appropriate practices, it seems that only through the cut and thrust of involvement within the struggles of a developing democracy, will the "isolated" discipline of psychology begin to carve out the foundations of a practice which contributes towards the real, not imagined, social arrangements in which full human lives may be lived.

Article:

Some Attitudes Towards Conscription in South Africa

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Conscription and the militarization of Southern African society are issues that have been largely ignored by psychologists in this country. This paper presents some recent exploratory research that has focused on the effects of conscription on "white" South Africans. In so doing, it attempts to provide guidelines for the conceptualization of further socially relevant research in this area. The research findings presented in this paper focus on student attitudes towards military conscription and the ways in which mothers come to terms with conscription of their sons.

Conscription into the SADF began when a ballot system was adopted. This took place in the context of the increased militancy of the ANC in the late 1950s. Compulsory conscription was introduced in 1960 with "white" males being required to serve for a period of 9 months. After the Namibian migrant workers' strike of 1971 and the subsequent increased activity by SWAPO, the period of conscription was increased in 1972 to 12 months plus

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the addition of five 19 day camps. Faced with the 1975 SADF invasion of and defeat in Angola, and the 1976 uprisings, the period of conscription was increased from 12 to 24 months with camps being increased to 240 days. After increased guerilla resistance in the 1980s, the length of camps was increased in 1982 to 720 days, giving conscripts an effective period of 4 years "National Service" in the SADF. Furthermore, in 1983, the penalties for conscientious objection were increased from two to six years in jail.

With approximately one million "white" males between the ages of 18 and 65 being eligible for military service, conscription into the SADF has aroused considerable opposition over the last few years. This has taken place against a backdrop of the increasingly political stance adopted by the SADF in terms of its deployment in townships, destabilisation of foreign countries and participation in the State Security Council. This increased opposition has been highlighted by the formation of and the support experienced by the End Conscription Campaign (ECC). In 1983, after a motion was passed at the Black Sash conference demanding "that the South African government abolish all conscription for military service" (South African Outlook, 1985 : 56), a decision was taken to launch a campaign against conscription. By the beginning of 1986 ECC committees existed in Johannesburg, Cape Town, Durban, Port Elizabeth, Pietermaritzburg and Grahamstown. The deployment of the SADF in the townships in an attempt to quell uprisings seems to have resulted in increased opposition to the system of conscription.

Another symptom of opposition has been the increasing number of people who have failed to report to the SADF. It was reported that 1 000 objectors were granted political asylum in Britain between 1977 and 1981 (Total War in South Africa, 1984, cited by Omond, 1985). It was reported in Parliament that 7 589 conscripts failed to report for duty in the SADF in January 1985

as opposed to 1 596 conscripts in the whole of 1984 (Omond, 1985). However, the SADF stated that the former figure was incorrect as it included some students and scholars (Objector, 1985). In January 1986, General Magnus Malan refused to reveal in Parliament the number of people who had failed to report to the SADF.

It is in the context of the increased political role played by the SADF, and resultant opposition to it, that these studies have been conducted.

STUDENT ATTITUDES TOWARDS MILITARY CONSCRIPTION

Feinstein (1985) investigated attitudes of white male university students towards conscription in South Africa. A sample of 18 "white" male students of the University of Cape Town (mean age = 21,6 years) was divided into three a priori groups : (A) a group adamantly opposed to conscription into the SADF; (B) a group with no particular strong views on the issue, and (C) a group adamantly in favour of conscription to the SADF.

Through a piloting procedure, an interview schedule was developed which investigated the following categories: (a) socio-political attitudes about South Africa and their relationship to attitudes towards conscription; (b) general attitudes towards war; (c) attitudes towards compulsory military service in South Africa; (d) the formation, development and strength of these latter attitudes, and (e) behaviour in relation to military service. In addition the following scales were adapted for use in South African conditions: Kerlinger's (1963) Social Attitudes Scale, Adorno et al's (1950) Ethnocentric Scale and Coleman's (1971) Attitudes towards Africans Scale. In-depth partly structured interviews were conducted and the participants completed the scales at the end of the interview.

The study found important differences between the groups holding divergent attitudes towards conscription. Meaningful differences in the factors influencing the formation of these attitudes were identified as were crucial "psychological moments".

Table 1. Mean scores on the Social Attitudes Scale (SAS), Ethnocentrism Scale (E-Scale) and Attitudes towards Africans Scale (AA) recorded by three groups of university students with differing attitudes towards conscription.

	SAS	E-Scale				AA
		Jews	Africans	Others	Total	
Group A : opposed to conscription	42,5	1,25	1	1,4	1,2	21,33
Group B : no strong views on conscription	2,17	2,36	1,31	2,7	2,09	20,5
Group C : in favour of conscription	9,5	1,97	1,94	4,43	2,69	12,33

It was found that attitudes towards conscription of the group adamantly opposed to conscription (hereafter referred to as group A), formed part of their general world view. There was a link between this group's attitudes towards the SADF, perception of the unjust nature of the government and scale results : the group recorded a highly liberal score on the Social Attitudes Scale, an item mean score on the Ethnocentric Scale lower than the original "low ethnocentric" in Adorno et al's (1950) study (i.e. 1,2 as against 1,8), and a very favourable attitude toward Africans. In addition, they

described the disadvantages of conscription in purely moral and political, as against pragmatic, terms. Thus group A, in the same way as the anti-war group tested by Gaier et al (1972), reflect an "inner directedness" which serves as a basis for their attitudes.

In contrast, the attitudes of the group with no particularly adamant attitudes to conscription (group B) appeared to be contradictory. For instance, all but one of this group perceived South Africa as being economically unjust, whereas on later questioning, all six claimed that the present economic system is a means of bringing prosperity to all. Members of this group stated that their attitudes were still in a state of development and flux, and therefore it is suggested that this group does not have the inner direction of group A. This view was borne out by the quantitative results. On the Attitudes towards Africans Scale, this group's attitudes were similar to those of group A (20,5 as against 21,33), whereas their ethnocentrism and social attitudes scores are closer to those of group C (the group adamantly in favour of conscription). This inconsistency of attitude may have been due to the fact that the mean age of group B was 19,2 years in comparison to 21,6 and 24,8 years for the adamant groups C and A. Five of this group were first year students in comparison to two in group C and none in Group A. Therefore, it is possible that these differences in age could be of significance.

The group adamantly in favour of conscription (group C) believed that South Africa faced an external threat, believed in change that did not endanger the "white" minority, and had a conviction that racial, cultural and class differences were "natural". Thus the attitudes held towards conscription were also at one with their general world view. The scale results again validated this proposition of group C's belief in the inherency of the

divisions in South African society. Their fear of losing minority identity can be related to their less favourable attitudes towards Africans and their fairly high degree of ethnocentrism. Their negative social attitude score illustrates their general tendency towards conservatism, which was evident throughout the study.

Thus it was concluded from the study that those who hold attitudes strongly opposed to conscription into the SADF have a liberal/radical political orientation, have favourable attitudes towards "Africans", and are not ethnocentric. Those who hold strongly favourable attitudes to conscription into the SADF have a conservative political orientation, are less favourable in their attitudes towards "Africans", and are ethnocentric.

In analysing the attitudes of group C, it was interesting to note that they seem to have accepted the SADF's ideological portrayal of "National Service": viz. they share a belief in a "communist threat" to South Africa, the resultant need for patriotism and its concomitant sense of duty, and the "man-making" and educational effects of military service (as documented by South African Outlook, 1985 : 61-62).

The fact that group C's attitudes so closely approximated the SADF's portrayal of military service makes an analysis of the formation of their views of vital importance. With one exception, this group claimed that the media had a positive influence on their views. Half of the group also claimed that their school careers played an important role in developing their support for military service. In contrast, nine members of the other groups claimed that they reacted negatively to attempts at school to influence them in favour of "National Service". Sixteen of the participants mentioned that they were between 12 and 14 years of age when they realised that they would have to undergo military training, and four members of group B recalled

their attitudes to conscription changing when they had to register for the SADF in Std. 8. Eight of the participants reported that they had been in some way affected by cadets. These facts lead to the hypothesis that two seminal "psychological moments" can be isolated in relation to the formation of attitudes toward conscription, namely a boy's starting high school, which involves his introduction to cadets and its military concomitants (i.e. uniforms, shooting, discipline and subordination) and his registering for "National Service" in Std. 8. This thesis is supported by Adelson and O'Neil's (1966) finding that between the ages of 13 and 15, there is a natural development in political attitudes, suggesting that the period from Std. 6 to Std. 8 may be crucial to the formation of attitudes toward the military. It is suggested that the uni-dimensional approach to the military and its activities exhibited by these institutions is influencial in the formation of attitudes supportive of conscription. This suggestion should be seen in tandem with Meier's (1982) work on militarization in education.

School and media influences turned most members of groups A and B against the military, while university and its related political organizations had a profound influence on 11 out of the 12 members of these groups. In spite of the fact that there was only one pacifist among the sample, the church had had some influence on anti-conscription attitudes held by four members of group A. By contrast, no members of group C claimed to have been influenced by the church in the development of pro-conscription attitudes, but four of them denied that compulsory military conscription showed a lack of respect for the conscience of the individual. While nine members of groups A and B mentioned the effects of the presence of the SADF in the townships on their attitudes towards the military, no members of group C

made any like-minded mention of this issue. Instead four of the group felt that the SADF should be used in some capacity to quell the present "unrest" in the townships. It was felt that group C's attitudes towards conscription were also characterized by support for the present status quo in South Africa.

An interesting finding was that whereas groups A and B gave a wide variety of responses to the question of who the most important person in their life was, all six members of group C answered "father". Although only one member of this group claimed his father to be the most important influence on his attitudes toward conscription, every member of the group claimed that his father supported his views and played a role in their formation. This was in contrast to the fact that "father" was mentioned by only three other participants, two of whom claimed their views differed from their fathers.

The dominant role of the father amongst group C's participants is of interest in the light of the contributions of Adorno et al (1950). They posit the notion of an "authoritarian character" with the following components:

- a tendency to describe only the desirable and positive aspects of oneself
- the adoption of a "pseudo-patriotism" and a suspicion towards other nations
- an identification with the father in a patriarchal, disciplinarian family situation, leading to a repression of feminine trends and a "pseudo-masculinity"
- an uncritical obedience to the father and an idealization of him
- submission to parental authority which is related to submission to

authority in general. This masks resentment which is activated in the guise of displacement to out-groups

an inability to identify with humanity as a whole which is a result of high ethnocentrism and a need for an out-group

a tendency to take up ready made options, attitudes and values of a given group.

Although Adorno et al's (1950) thesis is highly generalized, and suffers from a number of other weaknesses, as documented by Billig (1978) for example, it is felt that it has particular relevance for group C in the following four ways :

(1) No member of this group mentioned a negative factor about himself in the self-description section of the interviews.

(2) The group's support for conscription was based on a belief in an external threat facing South Africa, and the need for patriotism and duty. They also scored high on the "Other minorities and patriotism" sub-section of the Ethnocentrism Scale, and they expressed the opinion that other countries should be more positive to South Africa or should "leave us alone", a view that pervaded their responses to the Social Attitudes Scale.

(3) As has already been seen, all six members of this group identified their father as the most significant person in their lives, and four members of the group still lived at home (in contrast to a combined total of two in the other groups). This leads one to speculate that the "authoritarian" family situation may well apply to all members of this group.

(4) They appeared totally accepting of the ways in which dominant ideology portrays the military, gaining impetus for their attitudes from largely government controlled sources, such as schools and the media.

Based on this information, it is tentatively suggested that there may be a particular authoritarian attitude to military conscription in South Africa, with the prototype being similar to that of group C in the present study.

In analysing the participants' intention to do "National Service" it was felt that group A, given the inner-directedness of their attitudes, would, as they claim is their intention, not do their military service. Group C's attitudes towards the military are also related to their general socio-political attitudes. Their resultant acceptance of the status quo on attitudes towards conscription compels one to predict that they will follow their intentions and complete their "National Service". The inconsistent nature of group B's attitudes, suggests that their subjective norm or reference group, as described by Ajzen and Fishhein (1980), would play a pivotal role in their decision whether to do their military training or not and that they would follow the advice or opinions of people close to them.

MOTHERS AND CONSCRIPTION

Moyle and Savage (1985) investigated the ways in which "white" middle class women in South Africa came to terms with their sons' military service in the SADF. They were primarily interested in the contradiction between the mothers' opposition to conscription and their sons' possible personal involvement in the SADF.

Eight women aged between 40 to 45 years living in Cape Town's Southern Suburbs were interviewed. They all had at least one son over 15 years of age liable for conscription, with the sons attending schools or university in the area. All women were opposed to apartheid. An interview schedule was developed through a piloting process. The schedule focused on the

mother's attitude to conscription and her perceptions of her son's attitude on the issue.

All mothers were opposed to conscription into the SADF, although they did make a distinction between conscription into the SADF and other armies. All women were concerned with the presence of troops in the townships, which had been particularly active at that time in Cape Town: "every time I see one of those trucks (Buffels) full of boys that are contemporaries of my children I feel like bursting into tears." They were all concerned about the psychological effects of conscription, concerned that their son ".... would he come back different, would he come back acting and behaving like a thug." Their perceptions of alternatives to the SADF were seen as "awful" with six years in jail not being seen as a viable option. Seven of the mothers felt it was their son's decision and that they would not attempt to influence him.

The mothers' understanding of their sons' attitudes towards conscription was that peer groups had been most influencial in their formation. Only two sons had made decisions about their military service, with one deciding to go to the SADF and the other to leave the country. Some mothers saw boarding school as being perceived by their sons as important preparation for the participation in the SADF. Cadets was also seen as being influential by some mothers, especially in schools with a strong cadet tradition.

None of the fathers was seen to have played an active role in influencing his sons. Generally, the fathers were less "vehemently" opposed to conscription than mothers. The issue of conscription was hardly discussed by the families. Discussion between mother and son on the issue of conscription was almost non-existent. All mothers felt that sons should be informed, but distanced themselves from the process.

What seemed to emerge strongly from the study was the dilemma experienced as a result of the mothers' opposition towards conscription and their simultaneous feelings that, as mothers, they should be committed to supporting their sons :

> "It's a very narrow and difficult line for a mother to tread ... I don't think that you have any problems if you are saying "go for it Boetie" and "we are all proud of you" ... Maybe (it) is a lack of courage in actually confronting the issues, but also it was this feeling of anxiety about making sure that X would feel that he would be supported whatever decision he would make. In a way I suppose that is partly an abdication of responsibility, very difficult ... this extraordinary dilemma that one is sort of in and yet in a way it isn't a moral dilemma because what are the options? The options are too ghastly to contemplate."

When confronted with the issue of conscription, the participants responded as mothers, with the feeling that their primary role was to be supportive. The supportive role ruled out the prospect of full discussion on the issue of conscription, as this was interpreted as introducing conflict into the family.

DISCUSSION

Both of the above two studies lead to very tentative conclusions as they have been based on small samples. However in the two studies, there are a number of themes that arise, that when examined together perhaps have implications for further research in the area of conscription.

The most obvious theme is that of the role of the parents and family vis-a-vis the conscript. On the one hand we have the father, who Feinstein (1985) found to be important in influencing students who were in favour of conscription. The particular home environment of these students seems to

have been influential in the development of their "authoritarian character" and attitudes in favour of conscription. On the other hand, Moyle and Savage's (1985) study illustrates that the role of the mother in the family was largely traditional insofar as they felt that their role was supportive. Their personal feelings on the issue of conscription seem to have been largely subordinate to their defined role in the family. The role of the family in terms of the development of positive or negative attitudes towards conscription could warrant further investigation.

In both studies, the influence of other socializing institutions were briefly highlighted. The school and cadet system emerge as institutions that would seem to have had some influence in the formation of attitudes towards conscription. In Feinstein's (1985) study the media also seems to have been important, while Moyle and Savage (1985) found that the peer group seems to have had important influences. The results of these studies would also seem to have some implications for researchers in the area of political socialization.

Feinstein's (1985) study would possibly also warrant further investigation into his hypothesis that two "psychological moments" are important in the development of attitudes toward conscription, viz. the boy starting high school and his registering for "National Service" in Std. 8. It would also be of interest to investigate the relationship between the authoritarian-type attitude and conscription by using the F-scale of Adorno et al (1950), and by evaluating socio-cultural influences more quantitatively with larger and broader samples.

Both of these studies are illustrations of the sort of work "relevant" psychologists could be contributing in the field of conscription. Other contributions in this area could be an examination of the impact of

"National Service" on both the conscript and his family. A longitudinal study of those who complete their two years "National Service", with an analysis of the effects of the experience on general socio-political attitudes, attitudes to the SADF, and general psychological health could be useful. The documentation of aspects and manifestations of the militarization of Southern African society and its consequences would also be a priority.

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Article

Some Thoughts on a More Relevant or Indigenous Counselling Psychology in South Africa : Discovering the Socio-political Context of the Oppressed

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INTRODUCTION

Psychology has historically been conservative in the sense that it operates primarily within the individualistic paradigm. The role of counselling psychologists has traditionally been to help people make informed choices or decisions - without necessarily contextualizing these choices. This aim of facilitating better efficacy in dealing with the decisions in life tends to be undermined when the psychologist ignores the socio-political forces that influence these decisions.

Seen in the light of the need for social change in this country, psychology, as dispensed at South African universities, has become of mere academic interest since it prefers to ignore the dialectical relationship that exists between individual South Africans and the unique socio-political context within which their behaviour is manifested. In practice psychology

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predominantly serves the needs of a privileged minority whose needs are, in view of the South African socio-political reality, very different from those of the majority. There is within the South African context, therefore, an urgent need for a more relevant or indigenous psychology in which full consideration should be given to the socio-political conditions under which the majority of South Africans are compelled to function.

The writer does not pretend to have the answers, but wishes to share some personal thoughts about psychology in South Africa and the direction it could take.

There is a purposeful absence of any citations, quotations and references from published works which influenced the writer's thinking, as an expression of protest (i) against conforming to conservative, ritualistic practices in the name of science, and (ii) to the fact that some of the relevant literature is banned in this country.

WHAT IS RELEVANT?

A very important feature of contemporary South Africa is the fact that the majority is oppressed by the system of racial capitalism and is engaged at different levels in a liberation struggle against the oppressive structures that maintain the system. An important criterion for the relevantizing of psychology in South Africa would be the degree to which the behaviour of especially the majority is studied within the context of racial capitalism. For example, to discover the impact of political oppression and exploitation on development and functioning and how to go about changing rather than adapting to the oppressive structures. The psychologist does not function within a social vacuum, neither can he claim to be strictly a scientist who is not interested in political issues. Oppressive political conditions

in South Africa are highly likely to influence the mental health of the oppressed adversely (W.H.O, 1983). (The concept "oppressed" as used here refers to the black working-class as well as that section of the middle-class that desires radical changes).

Being a mental health expert, the South African psychologist is duty bound to examine those factors which will promote social change of a kind that will ameliorate the present suffering of the oppressed. This will require the South African psychologist to venture out of the cosy precinct of his counselling room and speak out loudly and clearly, indicating to the authorities and to the public the effects state policies and legislation have on the mental health of the oppressed. Their silence at a time when serious erosion of human rights and mental health takes place can easily be interpreted as condonation of and connivance with the system, or even worse, as a sign of apathy. No matter what inference is made, all are indictments against the psychologist, in view of the ethical codes which he is supposed to uphold.

Eurocentric theories of human behaviour can never be fully relevant to this society as human reality is not the same all over the world - and particularly in South Africa where the majority is still concerned with bread and land issues. Clinical interpretations based on eurocentric theories are problematic when the mental illness of the oppressed is to a certain extent a function of their oppression. The psychologist who thus approaches human behaviour solely from the western perspective will necessarily have to question its relevance in the South African context. Psychology must necessarily be enmeshed in the social reality and must take up issue with the South African reality - which is fundamentally that of a severely oppressive capitalist society. Psychologists will have to

come to grips with the fact that the South African situation calls for a different approach because of the different priorities of the majority of the population. With their supposed concern for human dignity, psychologists need to be active agents in the struggle towards positive change and address the pathologies of this maligned society at the core.

AWAY FROM CONSERVATIVE COUNSELLING

Psychologists within the existing structure of helping will have to realize that different perceptions of reality will result in different ways of interpreting "problems". One cannot refer to specific counselling techniques that should be utilized with the oppressed, but one can speak of specific interpretations of "their problems", as well as specific priorities and actions in their lives. The political nature of the problems, priorities and actions of especially the oppressed is a fact that all psychologists should be intensely aware of. As problems arise in the oppressed communities, for example, detentions, psychologists will have to adapt their skills and be flexible about their roles. Maybe the most important criterion for the role of a psychologist should be the commitment to social change. Such a commitment will at least ensure a better understanding of the structurally created problems of the oppressed.

In order to be of service to the oppressed, it is also essential that the psychologist should share the world view of the oppressed - their hopes, fears, conflicts and goals. This knowledge cannot be attained from traditional literature and media sources. The traditional ingredients of Freud, Jung and Rogers, to name but a vew in South African university syllabi, need to be augmented at least with the works of Lambley (1980, 1973), Biko (1978), Fanon (1968, 1977, 1979), Freire (1979) and the World Health Organization (1983).

The committed psychologist not sharing the world view of the oppressed can at least elaborate on his understanding and approximate the experience of the oppressed by subscribing to publications such as Grassroots, Frank Talk, Work in Progress, Free Azania and SASPU National.

It is a fact that counsellors usually come from a middle-class background and the majority of counsellors in South Africa is white. As white middle-class people who adhere to white capitalistic middle-class values it might be difficult for most of them to empathize with the oppressed. Even the conservative middle-class black counsellor might find it difficult to understand the world of the working-class black client. Counsellors should therefore take full cognisance of their own world perception and should perhaps only work with clients whose world-view they share, since such a major difference might impede their functioning and effectiveness as helpers.

TOWARDS COUNSELLING THE OPPRESSED

The most important aspect of a more relevant counselling psychology is that a client's problem should be socio-politically contextualized. This will result in a fundamentally different interpretation than if not contextualized. Instead of only indicating what types of conflict the client is experiencing, he should be made aware how the system in which he is functioning plays or played a role in the development and manifestation of his difficulties. Many so-called personal problems are really an expression of the socio-political context. It is in the interest of this context that people see the problems in their lives as separated and isolated from any shared world. Many of the difficulties over which people go and see a counsellor - such as hating one's parents, hating one's physical features, hating school, having no desire to succeed - may be more intelligible when interpreted within their political context.

In counselling the oppressed, the psychologist needs to work on empowering the client to use his inner resources - to change his external situation. By joining a trade union, a migrant labourer will have more power to bring about better living conditions for himself as well as have more support from fellow workers - therefore, the counsellor should awaken the worker to the advantages of joining the union. In other words, in dealing with the oppressed, the psychologist should not hesitate to be practical, directive and to encourage participation in collective action towards social change. Psychologists have to help facilitate or join progressive organizations and help awaken the oppressed to their inner strengths by allowing them to draw on their mutual power and energy.

Because the system has denied them access to power by excluding them from government positions of decision-making and enforcing servitude, many of the oppressed find themselves in a state of learned helplessness (Seligman 1975). That is, they have come to believe that no matter what they do in an attempt to improve their lot, their responses are futile in the face of such obstacles. The cognitive state of learned helplessness is behaviourally manifested in apathy. An essential aspect of the psychologist's job when dealing with such people, would be to liberate them from this inertia by means of practical strategies rather than to indulge in a game of reflecting feelings - a luxury which can be indulged in only by the affluent. When working with the oppressed, it is very essential that the counsellor stress the praxis of life. The oppressed has to act!!

In the light of the goal of a new social order, the writer wants to suggest very briefly certain guiding principles that could be important to a counsellor of the oppressed if he wishes to be optimally effective in the liberation struggle against oppressive capitalist structures:

- Counsellors typically come from the middle-class and in order to be effective and relevant to the oppressed, they should have the conviction and consciousness to break out of the traditional mould which is very much in tandem with the existing order, even if at risk of victimization and detention. To be relevant as counsellors they have to be radical - judged in terms of the present status quo.
- Counsellors of the oppressed have to realize that the liberation struggle cannot be isolated from the fabric of life for the oppressed. Similarly it is not a role which one does for a few hours each day. What is called for is almost total commitment to the struggle and this commitment has to be reflected in all actions.
- Everything in life should be regarded as political for the oppressed. The idea of being neutral is a myth and signifies noncommitment to social change. People who claim to be neutral are in fact being supportive of the status quo.
- Given the economic situation of the oppressed, private practice would be a misnomer because of its exploitative and selective nature - and consequently the counsellor should seek employment in areas where his expertise can be better utilized for the community - in fact, these counsellors need to have credibility in the eyes of the oppressed and should visit detainees in jail and attend political funerals.

RELEVANT COUNSELLING

Counselling has historically served the function of a "repair shop" for capitalist society. A more relevant or indigenous counselling psychology has to awaken the oppressed to political action. The counsellor should conscientize all clients about the influence that socio-political factors

have on their lives. Counsellord of the oppressed have to help break the psychological chains of learned helplessness and apathy. Clients will awaken to a sense of empowerment and will then be ready for the most important life task : unite in action towards liberation from capitalism.

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Article : # Psychology and Politics in Manganyi's Work : a Materialist Critique

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1. INTRODUCTION

N C Manganyi has the distinction of being the first black clinical psychologist trained in South Africa. His published work (1973, 1974, 1981, 1983) reveals that from the beginning he has been involved in an attempt to contextualize his discipline. More specifically, his main concern has been to utilize psychological discourse to address questions relevant to what can broadly be called 'the black experience' in South Africa. As such he stands as a solitary voice, on the periphery of a psychological establishment which has tended to become increasingly mute as regards major political and cultural issues of the last two decades. The critical perspective developed in this paper must therefore be seen in the light of the author's appreciation of the boldness of Manganyi's endeavour to make psychology speak beyond the narrower confines of the

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discipline and its institutional practices.

Manganyi's work is characterized by a broad range of interests, and diverse influences. At the most apparent level there is an oscillation between Manganyi the psychologist, with a distinct propensity for abstract theorizing, and Manganyi the fiction writer. Notably, the major themes enunciated in his unfinished novel Mashangu's Reverie, are elaborated in an appended theoretical essay on the valency of the 'violent rêverie' in the psychology of racial oppression, and its relevance in the black literary renaissance of the 70's in South Africa. In the space of a mere seventy pages Manganyi moves from a work of fiction on the theme of the divided experience of a black intellectual, to a theoretical attempt at revisiting the Hegelian Master/Slave dialectic in terms of Melanie Klein's theory of the depressive position, and from there to a critical appraisal of the black literary revival (Manganyi, 1974).

On the one hand, it is difficult to avoid the impression of a voice in search of itself, a voice whose inspiration is psychological and yet cannot speak within the resonance of what is conventionally meant by the psychological. By this I mean that Manganyi is at work from the beginning making an intervention which is relevant to the psychology of racial oppression in South Africa. This intervention, however, is not systematic but rather achieves a variety of forms and is directed at a variety of foci which are perhaps starting to find a synthesis in his latest ventures into black psycho-biography. His latest 'Exiles and Homecomings' (Manganyi, 1983) thus stands at the crossroads of fiction writing, psychology and history.

On the other hand, in his attempt to make psychology speak about politically pressing issues, he approaches this task with certain theoretical

assumptions and categories which de-facto guide and permit a certain type of articulation between the psychological and the social. It is to these theoretical categories that the major thrust of my criticism will be directed.

In a nutshell, insofar as the understanding of human subjectivity in the social sciences and humanities has become a major theoretical preoccupation and a site of ideological struggle (Jacoby, 1975) my intention is to unearth the idealist conception of a black subjectivity in Manganyi's psychology and criticise it from the perspective of a materialist theory of human subjectivity. As part of this criticism I intend to show that it is the assumption of an abstract, already-constituted black subjectivity, hence essentialist, which allows Manganyi to achieve a dubious rapprochement between the psychological and the social since both realms function as vehicles for the unfolding of this quasi-transcendental black essence. In order to do so, however, it is essential to situate his work historically and to trace the development of Manganyi's contribution through the variety of forms in which it is expressed so as to disengage the underlying assumptions which provide the main thread in his work. This task will focus on a close reading of five of his published works (Manganyi, 1973; 1974; 1981(a); 1981(b); 1983) which span a most crucial decade of political history in South Africa.

The materialist conception of human subjectivity from which this critical appraisal proceeds is mounted on Freud's radical category of the Unconscious insofar as it is this category, and its re-appraisal by Lacan (1966) which has provided both the point of departure and the impetus for Althusser's seminal paper on the construction of the human subject in ideology and the reproduction of human subjectivity by and in ideology (Althusser, 1969).

The rapprochement between psycho-analytic theory and historical materialism has never been an easy one. It is important to specify, however, that both theories have acquired the status of conflictual theories insofar as they share in common, although from the perspective of two distinct and separate theoretical objects, a radical interrogation of the long tradition of philosophical humanism around which many of the bourgeois social sciences such as sociology, economics, psychology, history and epistemology are organised (Althusser, 1978). Central to theoretical humanism is the idea that the human subject or the abstract category of the subject is the agent of all social phenomena and production, including knowledge itself (Henriques et al, 1984). Furthermore, the specific notion of human subjectivity contained in a humanist outlook is one of a unitary, essentially non-contradictory entity whose unity is founded on the property of consciousness. It is precisely this long and pervasive tradition which both Freud and Marx undermine; after them it becomes difficult to think of subjectivity with either consciousness or a rational ego at its centre or of history and society with the category of the individual subject, or groups of subjects or an abstract conception of Man at its centre. In both Freudian theory and historical materialism the conscious subject is de-centred and furthermore subjectivity is revealed as non-unitary (Althusser, 1969; 1978),

2. SOME FEATURES OF EARLY BLACK CONSCIOUSNESS MOVEMENT (BCM)

There is no indication that Manganyi was ever a member of BCM. Yet it is imperative to situate his work within the historical and intellectual context of the late 1960s and early 1970s when the main themes of BC ideology were being developed and exerted a considerable influence over black

students, intellectuals and artists (Lodge, 1983). K. Sole (1983) has shown quite decisively the depth to which the artistic and literary revival which took place in the 1970s was influenced by BC theories and assumptions. Manganyi's interest both in the psychology of racial oppression and in the literary revival and his defence of the social realism of black poets and writers (Manganyi, 1977) shows his involvement with themes central to BC ideology. In fact it is paradoxical that Manganyi's first book entitled Being-Black-in-the-World (1973) is generally considered as a forceful expression of many early BC ideas and has become a standard reference on the subject although it does not appear to have been widely read by BC political activists (Nolutshungu, 1982).

In this brief section my aim is to isolate certain key components of BC ideology which in my opinion play an operative role in Manganyi's contribution. The emphasis will not be on the historical parameters of the emergence of BCM nor will it be on the political effectiveness of the political movement as such. The former is well documented and will not be recounted here (Gerhart, 1979; Kane Berman, 1978; Hirson, 1979; Nolutshungu, 1982; Lodge, 1983). The latter is too complex since it involves a major discussion on the relation between the class struggle and the struggle for national liberation in South Africa and the role of BCM is that conjuncture (Hirson, 1979; No Sizwe, 1979; Nolutshungu, 1982). The emphasis will rather be on the idiom of BC ideology and more specifically on its strongly humanist and subjectivist components.

Three features of BC ideology will be briefly reviewed:

2.1 BCM placed an unprecedented emphasis on the political necessity of addressing directly the psychological and cultural degradation suffered by blacks on an individual and collective level. The ideology of

racial supremacy and its materialisation in practically all walks of social, economic, and political life in South Africa is a means whereby blacks come to believe in the psychological and cultural inferiority foisted upon them. An intrinsic component of BCM was thus to develop a counter-ideology and initiate a programme of conscientisation whereby this process of psychological and cultural inferiorisation could be combatted. The development of this ideology was undoubtedly influenced by a well articulated body of literature which accompanied the prominence achieved by third world struggles in the 1960s. Gerhart cites the decisive influence of Frantz Fanon's analyses of settler colonialism, the writings of Afro-Americans (Cleaver, Carmichael), Negritude writers (Senghor, Césaire, Cheik Anta Diop) and to a lesser extent the declarations of Kaunda and Nyerere on African Humanism and socialism (Gerhart, 1979).

2.2 The selective amalgamation of such heterogeneous ideas was not marked by any degree of formal rigour. Most writers are at pains to extract a coherent theory that could be associated with BCM. The terms ideology or philosophy instead are used interchangeably to refer to the guiding ideas of BCM. The preoccupation of BC proponents with antiracism, black unity and national liberation were often combined in a language which can best be described as humanist. The mixture of existentialist, phenomenological and psychological notions used to condemn apartheid and the colonial legacy of apartheid meant that the condemnation of the oppressive system were often couched in humanist terms.

Although BC proponents were centrally preoccupied with the mode of domination of apartheid society they lacked the theoretical concepts to

articulate this mode of domination. The absence of Marxist theory in BCM meant that they lacked a proper theory of the State, of ideology itself and of the class nature of South African society (Nolutshungu, 1982). As a result their disjointed analytic statements tended to reflect an emphasis on what is most palpable and tangible : the racial ordering of economic, social, political relations in South Africa. The category of colour was given particular salience at the expense of the manner in which racial domination articulates with and is inseparable from the capitalist mode of production and definite class interests in South Africa (Wolpe, 1970; 1972).

If no systematic sociological or historical analysis is to be found amongst BC proponents there is nevertheless an implicit sociological viewpoint which can be derived from the writings of S. Biko (1978) and Pityana (1972). Conflict in South Africa is understood in terms of political, economic, social and ideological domination of blacks by a superordinate, homogeneously constituted white group. The white group is guided by a system of values and attitudes dictated by a racist, supremacist, eurocentric ideology which bears all the hallmarks of colonial legacy. In other words this implicit 'two-nation' theory repeats some key aspects of an established sociological legacy which is after all solidly entrenched in South Africa. Both the liberal industrialist thesis (Horwitz, 1967; Houghton, 1969) and the conflict pluralist model (Kuper & Smith, 1969; van den Berghe, 1970) assign to the realm of values and attitudes or to the ideal component of ideology an ultimately determining role on the social. It seems that the BC viewpoint reiterates the same tendency.

Whilst it is undoubtedly true that racial ideology or its variants have played an overdetermining role in giving class formation a specifically racial character in South Africa a materialist analysis of South Africa

precludes an understanding which would leave the realm of the ideological in a position external to and independent from the capitalist mode of production. In other words a materialist analysis forces us to understand the development and the transitions in racial ideology from the perspective of the structure of class relations. BC in many ways repeats some of the assumptions of established analyses.

Two consequences emerge from such an implicit sociological viewpoint. Firstly, oppression can be seen to operate a four levels simultaneously : psychological/cultural, social, political and economic. Ultimately those four forms of oppression derive from the same set of causes : white, racist culture taken as a given and as ultimately determining. Secondly, in conjunction with existentialist and phenomenological categories of thought, which place such an emphasis on the property of consciousness, the entire process of oppression can be subjectivised and thereby reduced to a grand Hegelian master-slave dialectic in which white consciousness, racist and supremacist, oppresses black consciousness. Thus one often encounters in BC discourse references to that dialectic of two consciousnesses (Biko, 1978). If capitalism is criticised and opposed it is not understood as a mode of production and as an objective set of economic relations but rather as a property of the 'white personality' with its capitalistic, individualistic and profiteering values. In other words material relations, independent of the consciousness of any individual are transformed into subjective properties.

The subjectivist idiom of BC thus does not refer only to the obvious emphasis that the movement placed on the set of psychological conflicts engendered by racially oppressive practices. This field of investigation and its relation to psychopathology is eminently worthwhile and indeed

paramount for psychology. The term subjectivism, however, also refers to the formal category of the human subject and the role such a category plays in understanding the social and history. The category of a white consciousness entails such a subjectivism and it is predictable that such a conjuncture of psychological and sociological viewpoints needs for its functioning an antithesis in the form of another consciousness, a black consciousness, out of which a different set of values, attitudes and practices will flow. This moment is best observed in the ideological programme of redefinitions which is central to the process of conscientisation.

2.3 At the centre of BC ideology is the representation of a black man reduced to the homuncular status of an empty shell (Biko, 1978). This representation provides a formidable condensation of the various feelings and complexes engendered by racial ideology in which black subjects can recognize their oppressed condition. It deserves to be quoted in full:

> "But this type of black man we have today has lost his manhood. Reduced to an obliging shell he looks with awe at the white power structure and accepts what he regards as the 'inevitable position' . . . In the privacy of his toilet his face twists in silent condemnation of white society but brightens up in sheepish obedience as he comes out hurrying in response to his master's impatient call . . . His heart yearns for the comfort of white society and makes him blame himself for not having been 'educated' enough to warrant such luxury . . . All in all the black man has become his own misery, a slave, an ox bearing the yoke of oppression with sheepish timidity." (Biko, 1978:28).

The ideology guarantees and promises the restoration or recovery of a wholeness which has been lost in the history of contact with the dominant white racist group. In contradistinction to the homuncular caricature is a representation of the black man who has come to himself, undone his

complicity in his own misuse, a black man infused with pride and dignity. Thus a representation emerges of a black man with his own positive, authentic attributes: humanist, communally oriented and sharing in the community. These attributes constitute a negation of the white attributes.

3. REVIEW OF MANGANYI'S PSYCHOLOGICAL CONTRIBUTION

Manganyi's first book, Being-Black-in-the-World (1973), published during the heyday of the BC movement, is primarily concerned with themes central to BC ideology. The collection of essays is not a detached commentary on BC ideology, but reveals the extent of Manganyi's indebtedness to BC for providing a worthwhile vehicle for the development of a committed psychology.

Manganyi's doctoral thesis had led him to the conclusion that there was no significant difference between the body image of healthy black subjects and that of paraplegic black subjects. Defying all predictions, 'healthy' black subjects showed the same internal psychological disorders (body-images with diffused boundaries, usually associated with passive-submissive and non-coping life strategies) as hospitalized paraplegics.

Manganyi situates the etiological locus of such an alarming finding at the level of the racist socialization of the black body:

> "It means, as we suggested earlier, that in the African experience there was over time developed a sociological schema of the black body prescribed by white standards. The prescribed attributes of this sociological schema have, as we should know by now, been entirely negative. It should be considered natural under these circumstances for an individual black person to conceive of his body image as something entirely undesirable, something which paradoxically must be kept at a distance outside of one's self so to speak." (Manganyi, 1973 : 51)

The treatment of such a disturbance cannot take place at the individual level since the pathology is endemic to a system which entrenches cultural and aesthetic hegemony:

> "My own experience in the field of the body has long led me to the conclusion that a socio-cultural assault on the body requires an equally wide-ranging offensive on the socio-cultural level." (Manganyi, 1973 : 53).

My aim is to trace the evolution of Manganyi's conception of this corrective program, of the 'wide-ranging offensive' on the socio-cultural level through his work. Manganyi's psychology in the service of this 'wide-ranging offensive' evolves through four distinct phases.

3.1 The psychologist as creator of black identity

In the four essays entitled 'Black Consciousness', 'Being-Black-in-the-World', 'Nausea' and 'Us and Them' (1973), Manganyi's psychological program is essentially concerned with the question of re-definition so central to the BC Movement. The psychologist is an active producer of a set of ontological mirrors whose speculary reflection combats a negative black identity by restoring a positive identity. This restorative program is intrinsic to the concept of Black Consciousness itself and depends on the following logic.

By virtue of being black and having lived under centuries of colonial oppression and decades of apartheid rule, each black subject has a 'testimony' within himself of the experience of any other black subject. This transubjective accessibility is not limited to the South African black experience, but transcends the confines of class, geographical, and historical boundaries, and is available to all blacks in South Africa, Africa,

and in the larger diaspora.

Black Consciousness thus as a universal consciousness, comprises the experience, and hence the knowledge, of having been devalued both culturally and psychologically. In South Africa, more particularly, apartheid has led to two modes of being-in-the-world : the white and the black. The black mode of being can be analysed according to 3 categories of experience.

(a) The body : the black man has inherited a negative sociological schema of his black body as a result of which he experiences himself as an object, as something outside of himself.

(b) The individual in society : the relationship of the black man to his society, which was historically characterized by communalism or the corporate personality, has been eroded by colonial conquest. As a result of the destruction of indigenous cultures and the subsequent suppression of true leaders who could reinstate the communal mode of being, blacks have relinquished an essential aspect of their ontology. The age old characteristic of communalism has been replaced by 'an individualism more malignant than that found within white elitist societies' (Manganyi, 1973 : 331), but the individualist and materialist ethic is essentially alien to the black mode of being. Manganyi refers briefly to the introduction of money economies as being significant in the genesis of individualism, only to dismiss this historical factor in favour of an explanation that the white mode of being is essentially individualistic and materialistic.

(c) Being-in-the-world with objects or things : whites have lost their spiritual dimension, and as a result they invest material objects with values they do not possess. Cultural hegemony has ensured that blacks have also lost their spiritual and noëtic dimension. Blacks attempt

to mimic white compensating manoeuvres by fetishizing objects, with the difference that they are deprived of the economic means of fulfilling such aspirations.

Black Consciousness thus entails an awareness of such negative features in the black mode of being. The consciousness of this negativity moreover, provides the condition for the transcendence of such negativity. Black Consciousness thus involves:

> ". . . the entire promotion of creative, experiential and attitudinal values which are not consonant with individualism and materialism. This objective may not be realized within the current existential structures created by the white dominant culture. It seems logical for black people to adopt a posture of positive, creative 'isolation'. Group introspective analysis - an inward look - is mandatory for us in any attempt at restructuring our value system." (Manganyi, 1973 : 32).

In Being-Black-in-the-World the call for an introspective analysis is only partially fulfilled. Manganyi's deeper introspection will come later, while in the United States. What is evident here is a search outwards for the discovery of a black ontology. If Biko finds inspiration in the writings of Kaunda on African Humanism so as to propound the basic characteristics of the African Personality, Manganyi has direct recourse to the work of Senghor on Negritude so as to redress the debased black image.

Manganyi specifies that Negritude or the African Personality is not a racially determined concept; nor is it a collection of fixed personality traits. It is rather a psycho-cultural concept, a sum of cultural values common to the black world and providing the concrete medium for the structuring of the dialogue between man and the world, that is, for the

experience of the world. These characteristics are : black solidarity, communalism, sharing and communication, as opposed to the antithetical attritubes specific to the white mode of being : individualism, atomization, profiteering and exploitation.

In addition Manganyi reiterates Senghor's view on the contribution of African Philosophy to philosophical anthropology. More specifically, African philosophy promotes a holistic conception of man. The spiritual or noëtic dimension of Africanhood that was lost owing to the imposition of the white man's materialistic ethos, is restored with the insertion of a spiritualist philosophy marked by two basic categories : Being and Life Force. The material world and its existents have various appearances but they all culminate in a single reality which is the ultimate reality of the Universe : the life force which emanates and ends in God. This spiritualist philosophy, though eroded, is not dead amongst millions of present day Africans : it manifests itself in the recourse of Africans, even those who are educated, to traditional healers. The resilience of traditional beliefs in the area of health and disease attests to this African spiritualist ontology which conceives of reality as consisting of interacting life forces.

Echoing Senghor's claims on the contribution of black ontology to a coming world civilization, Manganyi asserts the role of the surviving spiritualist philosophy in healing the moral decay of the West and its grotesque materialism in the following terms:

> "This development in itself is sufficient to support our view that Western civilization is post-menopausal, decadent and sterile. Something may yet come from the black world to inject a new vitality into this beautiful menopausal old lady." (Manganyi, 1973 : 41)

3.2 The black rebel and the undoing of the White Mask

Manganyi's second book, entitled Mashangu's Rêverie (1974) seems to me a nodal point in Manganyi's development and lays the ground for his future venture into biographical writing. Its interest from a psychological perspective lies in its exploration of Fanonian themes such as that of the acquisition of the mask or a false consciousness and that of the importance of violence in undoing the mask.

Fanon's concept of the White Mask Neurosis denotes a social psychopathology specific to colonial oppression. It is a process whereby the oppressed black individual assumes a white identity, thereby becoming alienated from his 'race' and from himself. It is impossible for the black child to make a normal entry into colonial culture since this entry, operated through language, entails the internalisation of a set of negative and negrophobic cultural stereotypes regarding his colour, his family and the history of his'race' (Fanon, 1970). To be heir to colonial culture entails a process of self-negation and condemns the colonial subject to live in a psychological structure of ambivalence both vis-a-vis colonial culture and his own.

Dr Mashangu, the hero of Manganyi's unfinished novel, born in the Northern Transvaal, is a visiting fellow teaching a course in Comparative Literature at an East Coast Ivy League university. In the throngs of a personal crisis Mashangu embarks on a course of psychoanalytic psychotherapy, at the same time keeping a writer's journal.

As can be expected, the descent into Mashangu's inner world does not disclose an exquisite subjectivity. The disturbing psychical reality which surfaces is organized around his murderous fantasies of slaying a white figure. This symbolic murder is at the same time a symbolic birth :

it is Mashangu's mother who recounts the passage of his life from birth to murder.

The murder is equivalent to an undoing of his captivity, dating from his early education at a mission school where he learnt to say yes to white culture, an affirmation which entailed the negation of his blackness, his past and his origins:

"A final no - - - no indeed
there, in his bath tub
I saw his cheeks heave
crying for mercy
killed a prime master
not a nondescript
said no on the sharp edge of a dagger
no, indeed
'Today I say yes and no being ablaze with affirmation.'"
(Manganyi, 1974 : 8).

The black subject can only emerge through the symbolic murder of the white man who represents the internal mask which has held him captive for so long. And in a subsequent psychotherapy session Mashangu explains the psychological mechanism by which the black subject is enslaved and colludes with his enslavement :

"I . . . I was thinking of repudiation. You know what I mean? Repudiation. I was looking at my life since the days at the Mission School. It has been one big battle repudiating, negating something or other --- myself, my culture even my people. You see, we're forced to speak only English on certain days at school. Mind you, not only to enable us to read Milton or Shakespeare at a later stage but to prepare us . . . to create in us a readiness to repudiate everything which was native to us. Can you visualize that . . . each one of us carries a double . . . a kind of replica of self

that is always in conflict with the mask that faces the world. To protect this mask from its double, one cherished an illusion and nourished it -- the illusion that the future and prosperity of the mask depends upon a negation of the past both individual and collective." (Manganyi, 1974 : 20)

In this passage Manganyi reconstructs an explanation of the acquisition of a false identity. Why false? For two, interlocking reasons. Firstly, the acquisition of white culture is in the nature of an exchange : it requires the substitution of a white symbolic for a black one. But secondly, and this seems more decisive, this exchange is unequal. The taking on of or identification with white culture is a lure which does not fulfil its promise. Having said yes to white culture the black man is captive of a system which assigns him an inferior status.

In the novel, Mashangu's final rebellion against his captivity is triggered off when his passport, the document of his South African identity, is not renewed, for unknown and arbitrary reasons. The hero then engages in a widespread attack against the symbolic per se. Psychoanalytic psychotherapy, the realm of the symbolic par excellence, is rejected, and so is the hero's immersion in Western Literature, represented by the absurd metaphysics of Camus' Sisyphys.

Mashangu declares to his therapist :

"I am suffering as I do and have done not from neurosis, metaphysical anxiety, but from a negation of the rebellious impulse in me. What I need is not analysis . . . the verbal and symbolic realm. Action . . . I need to do things. It's not inside this skull that work needs to be done but out there in the realm of social and historical action." (p 44).

Mashangu's rebellion traverses a path similar to the one taken by Fanon himself. As a result of his analyses of colonial pathology Fanon resigned his post as psychiatrist to take up the struggle of the FLN (Algerian National Liberation Front) as editor of the newspaper, El Moujahis. It seems that Manganyi's hero is thinking along the same lines, of the irrelevance of psychology in a situation of national liberation struggle and the need to confront the social oppressors directly, since it is the social which engenders psychopathology.

But Manganyi's novel is unfinished and does not resolve the crucial question it raises. Action in the realm of the social and historical takes on a different meaning in Manganyi's theoretical essay entitled : 'The violent rêverie : the unconscious in literature and society' (Manganyi, 1974).

3.3 The appropriation of the symbolic and the élitism of the writer

If Mashangu's Rêverie contains an interesting fictional portrayal of the inner conflict of the black subject, Manganyi proceeds in the theoretical essay to explore the overall psychological and historical relevance of the 'violent rêverie' and its attendant conflicts.

The BC Movement placed emphasis on the responsibility of the oppressed individual, to understand his role in his own oppression, through a process of introspection. In his theoretical essay Manganyi applies a variety of psycho-analytic theories to explain the collusion of the slave with the master and to extoll the valency of the murderous rêverie in undoing this collusion.

Despite the fact that Manganyi does not respect Klein's logic to the full, he makes use of her concept of ambivalence, and the vitally important

role which ambivalence as an emotional structure plays in human development, to explain the collusion of the slave. This collusion is primarily unconscious and is predicated upon the co-existence of both loving and hostile impulses towards the master. At the unconscious fantasy level the slave's destructive impulses towards the master lead to the anxiety of talion and of loss. As a consequence the destructive fantasies and impulses are turned against the self, so that the structure of ambivalence is maintained. It is true that clinically speaking the conflicts of ambivalence, which typify the depressive position as a key structure in human development, can be witnessed in their spectacular dénouement in a great variety of clinical configurations. In other words, Klein's theory has been widely validated in clinical practice and on the basis of clinical case-studies.

Manganyi extrapolates from the clinical arena to the socio-historical situation of subordination. In his view there are three paths open to the subordinate subject in conditions of long subordination of one group by another:

1. He can continue to collude and maintain his false consciousness based upon a negation of the violent impulse towards the master. This psychical scenario manifests in the 'proverbial smile of the colonized, the expressionless face in the wake of intense provocation' (p 64).
2. He can redirect the violence against the self outwards in the form of violence against superordinates and their symbolic representations. However, Manganyi is not clear about the exact social manifestations obtained by such a psychological scenario although he gives examples of 'politically motivated assassination' and 'terrorist blood-bath' as manifestations of social action which reveal the 'acting out' of

unconscious themes. The concept of acting out is borrowed from the psychoanalytic vocabulary to refer to a process whereby an unconscious impulse is not submitted to the cognitive and linguistic transformations usually associated with secondary-process thinking (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1973). The destructive or murderous impulse is released in its primitive and unmediated form as a direct manifestation of unconscious processes. It is difficult to ascertain what the term 'historical rebellion' involves, whether it covers any form of political rebellion or whether it refers only to the case of extreme violence. The ambiguity is serious especially in the South African context with its specific history of political struggle and armed strategy. If Manganyi's notion of acting out of the murderous includes such events it seems to me that he is misusing psychoanalytic theory to refer to political acts that may form part of a conscious strategy, given the logic of the particular political struggle in this country.

3. The third way of coming to terms with ambivalence and undoing the false mask occupies a position of privilege in Manganyi's scheme. This is the position occupied by the creative artist and the writer in particular : "He [the writer] differs from his brethren to the extent that in his case the silent and secret anguish form itself into images and not as is the case with the slave into instant action during a propitious moment.' (p 65).

If earlier Mashangu seemed involved in a rebellion against the symbolic itself and left the reader groping for the meaning of direct social and historical action, the subsequent theoretical essay leaves no hint of ambiguity whatsoever :

"For the artist, therefore, the creative act itself assumes the same importance which the violent and rebellious act assumes for the common rebel. The image(s) force itself from formlessness into clarity and through this creative act the artist also transforms subjective experience into the realm of the universal - the natural community. The artist is enchanted by the charisma of the image"(p 66).

Creative writing becomes a privileged moment of social and historical action. As an act it is equivalent to social or historical rebellion. As a process it is superior because of the mediation through the symbolic. Black Artists are social actors par excellence since by 'letting their creativity emerge from the resonances and dissonances of the socio-political fabric of which they are part, [they] remain rooted and true to the themes struggling for expression, resolution and clarification in the consciousness of their people' (p 63). The writer is in a superior and privileged position in relation to the common rebel and yet simultaneously at one with his people.

The argument raises several problems. Firstly, in terms of Manganyi's own development and his oscillations between psychology and fiction writing, what becomes of the role of the psychologist now? Secondly, what ensures that the writer, probably an educated member of his community and in all likelihood belonging to a different social class, will produce a literature which is a literature of the people and thus on a par with the actions of the historical or political rebel?

Manganyi absorbs these questions into his argument, invoking the notion of the black collective psyche in the following way:

"Beginning with Negritude in the 1930s and the notion of the African personality during the 1960s there emerged in the United States and later in South Africa the

black consciousness movements. I want to suggest that these movements, discontinuous as they appear and isolated both in temporal and geographical terms as they have been, are symptomatic of some profound need in the inner world of the black collective psyche to materialize a new identity to harness all the resources of its cultural and historical unconscious" (p 54 : my emphasis).

Despite the differences that may exist within the black community the writer is the actor who divines and expresses the profound need in the black collective psyche to develop a new identity. And since it is the task of the psychologist also to allow for the emergence of identity the role of the writer and that of the psychologist coalesce : the writer is the psychologist of his people and both roles are conflated.

We shall return to the notion of a collective unconscious since it seems to play an essential role in guaranteeing to the intellectual a privileged and quasi de-facto access to truth amongst his people. It is clear however that Manganyi's predominant concern with black writing since his return from America and more especially with his biography of Mphalele do not constitute so much a departure from psychology but rather an extension of what is entailed by a committed psychology given the set of assumptions enumerated above.

3.4 The biographer as guardian of black identity and history

In a recent article entitled 'Biography : the Black South African connection' (Manganyi, 1981) Manganyi lays down a manifesto of sorts for the prospects of black life-writing in Southern Africa. He argues that the study of black lives cannot be mere literary adventure or cultural play; nor can it be concerned with an individual's anguish in view of the extent of the 'degradation of the wretched in the black diaspora'. In

other words, one of the aims of modern biography, its concern with the 'inner truth' of the subject, a project greatly influenced by the advent of modern depth psychologies (Edel, 1981), of necessity must be curtailed in Southern Africa. In such a historical situation the biographer must subscribe to a different set of guidelines and fulfil a different set of roles.

In Manganyi's view, biographical writing, like its twin, autobiography, has the power of restituting 'the past' a vital function in a regime which deprives the black community of the inheritance of its past, through censorship and political oppression and disfigures it through cultural oppression.

Writing about an individual becomes equivalent to writing about a community since the fate of the individual is so intertwined with the fate of the community. The biographer therefore 'freezes' the history of an entire community in his narrative of the life of an individual life. The biographer becomes the historian of black people, an especially significant role in the absence of a solidly established written tradition.

The idea that the biographer of an individual is the historian of a community rests upon the assumption of an organic unity existing between individual and community, an assumption recurrent among black writers in the 70's (Sole, 1983). It is legitimate to ask: since the black biographer cannot be concerned with the inner reality of the individual subject, this is being a luxury on the subcontinent, and since the individual has an organic relationship with the community, which means that the particular individual's response to his community is a non-problem, why write a biography and not write history proper? In addition it seems to me that there is a particular contradiction which leaves practically no room for the psychologist to operate.

This contradiction, however, finds partial resolution in the concept of individual and collective identity. Manganyi argues that an important role of the biographer is that of 'uncovering for us the meaning of African-hood as an immutable reality in the specific and special circumstances of the historical saga of the subcontinent' (Manganyi, 1981 : 60 - my emphasis).

The concept of an immutable African reality is akin to the notion of an African essence (essence by definition being immutable), which Manganyi has elsewhere expressed as the black collective unconscious in which all blacks partake. Therefore black biography still contains a role for the psychologist, in his privileged position to make the muted African essence vocal and articulate. The study of a life and an identity has an intimate connection with the collective identity of the people since both are vehicles for the unfolding of the same immutable black ontology.

4. CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF MANGANYI'S CONTRIBUTION

In the preceding section I have attempted to show that despite the variety of forms which Manganyi's contribution assumes there are nevertheless certain underlying assumptions which give a unity to his work and to the development of his committed psychology in South Africa. Although highly unconventional and unsystematic his contribution stands out as unique in South African psychology. As far as is known there is no other South African psychologist who has attempted to employ psychological theory with such an explicit political intention. In this respect Manganyi's committed psychology bears strong similarity with the major trend amongst black writers and poets of the 1970s to write and perform a literature aimed at having meaningful political insights and effects (Sole, 1983).

If one were to attempt a characterisation of Manganyi's ideological

stance it could be said that it is one of cultural nationalism. He situates his work implicitly and explicitly within a perspective which heralds a new South African nationalism which would replace the existing and divisive Volk Nationalisme. This new nationalism is prefixed by the term cultural for a variety of interrelated reasons. Firstly, in this new nationalism it is the majority African culture which would play the leading role (Manganyi, 1981b). Secondly, Manganyi reiterates a view of nationalism founded on the notion of culture as a global concept which comprises all the institutions in society : the ideological, social, economic and political. Thus African culture would de-facto bring about a new nationalism and a new social order. Thirdly, culture itself is understood in terms of an abstract subjectivity : "In any society, social and cultural institutions are a materialisation of the primacy of subjectivity - the achievement in practical terms of man's capacity for symbolisation" (Manganyi, 1981b : 67). And since subjectivity and identity are closely linked all the social institutions which emanate from this abstract subjectivity are props for a new national identity : "Institutions retain their symbolic power and meaning primarily because they clarify for a society its own cultural identity to the exclusion of other societies. Institutions consolidate nationalism and identity provided they are intimately associated with a specific territorial unit" (Manganyi, 1981b : 67). Given such a definition of nationalism which is populist and depends on the notion of an abstract subjectivity and identity it allows Manganyi to situate his work as psychologist, writer, biographer, that is, as an intellectual involved with 'black identity' as an intrinsic part of the struggle for a new national identity.

In this section my main aim will be to criticise Manganyi's committed psychology for its intrinsic idealist stance. I will attempt to show that

the ideological assumptions which subtend his work leads to the favouring of certain concepts which have two distinct sets of effects. On the one hand they blur the materiality of history and politics and on the other they restrict the depth of his psychological investigation.

4.1 Black ontology and the obfuscation of history and politics

It is evident by now that the concept of a unitary subjectivity plays a fundamental role in Manganyi's work. Whether this concept is expressed in the phenomenological language of a mode-of-being-in-the-world, in the depth psychological language of the collective unconscious or in the Negritude language of Africanness as an immutable reality the concept remains the same. It is this concept which allows Manganyi to pass unproblematically from the realm of individual identity to that of group and national identity since both are manifestations of the same abstract subjectivity. What needs to be stressed, however, is that such a concept functions in such a way that it obfuscates the materiality of history and also has the paradoxical effect of de-politicising the 'African experience'.

To refer to the apartheid state as a white-mode-of-being is tantamount to a psychological reduction which can only mystify social reality. Nationalist Party policy - apartheid - was a result of the political struggle between the United Party and the Nationalist Party. The shift from segregation to apartheid is characterised by an intensification of repressive state policies of the economic, political, social and educational levels. This new mode of domination, in contradistinction to a mode-of-being, cannot be attributed to a mere mental quirk on the part of an abstract and homogeneous white subject. Neo-marxist historiography has put forward the strong thesis that apartheid cannot be understood outside

of the context of specific contradictions which emerged in the capitalist mode production (Wolpe, 1970, 1972; Legassick, 1974; Davies, 1979). On the one hand changes in the reserves were threatening the conditions for the production and reproduction of cheap black labour vital to the accumulation of surplus. On the other hand, the erosion of the reserve economics which subsidised the employment of migrant workers entailed a growing exodus of African workers who were becoming proletarianised in the capitalist sector. The advent of apartheid policy and ideology as a mode of domination and control has to be understood in relation to the erosion of the prior basis for cheap labour and the problems posed to the capitalist classes in maintaining their rate of exploitation.

Although Wolpe's thesis has been criticised for its functionalism and economism (Posel, 1983) its value has been to show that it is impossible to understand racialist ideology and practices as stemming from an autonomous realm of irrational values and attitudes (white subjectivity!) which a psychology would ultimately explain given its supposed ability to explain irrationality. The task of psychologists is thus to step out of their discipline so as to be able to formulate appropriate questions informed by a knowledge of history. The abstract concept of a white-mode-of-being assigns to subjectivity a primacy which is tantamount to an obfuscation of the material structure of history and politics.

In a similar vein, the concept of a black ontology, as a universal consciousness, allows Manganyi to link the 19th century Afro-Cuban renaissance movements, the culmination of Negritude in the work of Césaire and Senghor, to the various struggles for independence in Africa and to the various BC movements in the United States and South Africa. It cannot be denied that subjection to racist domination will engender moments of recog-

nition amongst black subjects and a basis for a certain black solidarity. But to link all these movements under the aegis of an abstract black essence is tantamount to a denial of history itself and of the heterogeneous social, political and national experiences and struggles of black subjects. To stay on the South African arena how would the concept of a black ontology account for the emergence of competing black movements with their specific ideological, political and strategic differences such as the PAC, the ANC, the NEUM and later BCM, AZAPO etc ...? Clearly the struggle of the oppressed does not reveal one unitary subjectivity but a plurality of 'subjectivities'. Despite the fact that Manganyi is at pains to point out that the African Personality is not a racially determined concept but rather a psychocultural concept the effects are exactly the same. The concept of a unitary black subject, whether anchored in a crude biological theory or in an essence of black values, remains an idealist concept which explains everything, hence very little.

Manganyi's concept of a unitary black subjectivity reiterates the two fundamental propositions of Negritude, namely, that black people experience a unique perception of the world and that there are fundamental black values. What is not understandable, however, is that Manganyi fails to take into account the cogent criticism addressed to Negritude by various authors, some of whom were themselves deeply involved in political struggle. Both Mpahlele (1962) and Keita (1973) have pointed to the politically conservative ends to which the concept of black ontology has been put. It is Fanon and Cabral, however, who have formulated more incisive criticism. Fanon's relation to Negritude was ambivalent from the start. On the one hand he condemned the concept of black metaphysics on two main counts : for its tendency to stereotype blacks and perpetuate an image of homogeneity which masks the heterogeneity of their social experience. For Fanon this tendency

reiterates the racial stereotyping of blacks omnipresent in racist ideology. He expresses his disapproval in caustic sarcasms such as : "My black skin is not the wrapping of specific black values" (Fanon, 1970 : 162) or "I secreted a race. And that race staggered under the burden of a basic element. What was it? Rhythm?" (Fanon, 1970 : 87). Behind the irony, however, lies the more forceful argument that to posit a black ontology is to neglect the historical character of men and the fact that culture is first and foremost national, not racial, and its determinants are those very same forces which shape the economic and historical foundations of man's experience (Fanon, 1978). Despite Fanon's disdain for the content of Negritude thought he nevertheless retained some regard for its subjective value as regards the psycho-affective disequilibrium of the 'évolué'. Negritude thus can be of help to the native intellectual and help him or her forge links with political struggle (MacCullogh, 1983).

It is Cabral, however, who has voiced the more decisive critique of Negritude and the social class of those who espouse it. Although writing about an experience different to South Africa since in South Africa there is no peasantry, Cabral links the concern with identity and the philosophy of a return to the source more specifically to the urban petty-bourgeoisie. The proximity of that class to colonial culture and its inability to participate fully in that culture leads to an obsession with personal identity. For Cabral, however, the quest for identity is politically sterile unless it leads to a commitment against imperialism and an active identification with the bulk of the people : the peasantry (Cabral in MacCullogh, 1983). For Cabral, negritude is the ideology of the petty-bourgeoisie and the plight of this class cannot be universalised.

It seems unfortunate that Manganyi has not integrated these important criticisms in his work. In addition, the attitude of Manganyi to politics

per se, as reflected in his writings, is unclear to say the least. In his first book (1973) he refers to the suppression of true political leaders who could reinstate the communal mode of being without specifying what the latter entails. His hero Mashangu (Manganyi, 1974) in his moment of liberating anger threatens to involve himself directly in historical action but the novel ends at this precise moment. As has been pointed out artistic and intellectual creativity is seen as the privileged moment of the solution of the white mask neurosis and the term historical rebellion is left undefined. Since artists and intellectuals are a small minority there is no reference whatsoever to the role which political and other collective organisations may play in helping the black subjects overcome their oppression. In addition, the relation of the intellectual and artist to such organisations is not raised. Instead the abstract notion of black subjectivity allows Manganyi to assume that writing about 'black experience' in itself has political and historical relevance for all blacks. It is in this sense that the concept of black ontology is tantamount to a denial of politics since it fails to take into account class divisions, divergences of interests, and a diversity of actions and goals guided by differing ideologies amongst blacks.

4.2 The conflict between existential-phenomenological and psycho-analytic categories

Despite Manganyi's interest in psycho-analytic theory and his utilisation of concepts borrowed from a psycho-analytic vocabulary it seems evident that his portrayal of the subjective conflicts engendered by racism is in fact dominated by categories derived from existential-phenomenological psychology. The subjectivity of the colonised is presented as conflictual

and divided but this division is articulated in terms of a distinction between a false self-for-others, constructed in contact with racist culture, which masks the authentic unitary black self-in-itself with its positive attributes. In other words, the psychological portrayal rests upon the possible recovery of a discrete, unitary black subjectivity. However important such a representation may be in a counter-ideology designed to combat racism its theoretical ability to provide an understanding of subjectivity in a situation of racial oppression is questionable.

The psychological problematic of a false consciousness is fundamentally pre-Freudian and remains above all a psychology of consciousness. Freud's radical insights - his theory of the Unconscious and of the development of the ego - as re-visited by Lacan (1966) show that the I or the ego, what is usually presumed to be the centre of subjectivity is in fact a precipitate or a crystallisation of the dialectics of identification with the other. Subjectivity is then de-centred and has no true centre. The category of a self-in-itself or of a true self is thus exposed as essentialist or naturalist. The entire edifice of humanistic psychology hinges on such a conception of the individual as endowed with a true self and dualistically separated from the other and the social, although in interaction with the social. It is from within such a conception that the other can impinge on the true self and lead to the development of a mask or a false consciousness.

The concept of a black self who would have undone its false consciousness and come back to itself contains all the trappings of a humanistic and essentialist psychology. If one asks : what is the black self, the answer is always in terms of a mythos of idealised attributes with the habitual qualities of communalism, democracy and love of peace. As an ideological

concept it reiterates features of the structure of any ideological discourse which is to interpellate concrete subjects in terms of the subject of ideology - God, the Nation, the Family, Man, Woman ... the Black self - and thereby reproduce subjectivity (Althusser, 1969). But if it is not situated as an ideological concept and adopted as a theoretical one its value in helping us understand the manner in which 'racial' subjectivity is acquired in a racially divided social order is perforce limited.

Although the topic deserves far more rigorous treatment it seems important to point out Fanon, given his status of paterfamilias of the radicalisation of various BC movements (Sutton, 1969), has left behind a psychology legacy which deserves close scrutiny precisely because it reflects a constant tension between humanistic and psycho-analytic psychology. His formulation of the White Mask Neurosis is of great interest because it is based on an explicit repudiation of what is most central in psycho-analytic psychology : the theory of the Oedipus Complex. Far from wanting to impose the specific Freudian theory on kinship structures different from the nuclear bourgeois family it is nevertheless essential to point out that, at a more general level, Freud's articulations leave the field of psychopathology far behind and is in fact a radical interrogation on the acquisition of masculinity and feminity in a sexually divided universe (Mitchell, 1974 : 19). It is from this vantage point that the question his theory points to has validity beyond Freud's own culture. Furthermore, theoretically speaking, it is impossible to understand the formation of the Unconscious without the theory of psycho-sexuality. Fanon's articulation of the Mask Neurosis is precisely based on a repudiation of the Oedipus Complex : "...it would be relatively easy for me to show that in the French Antilles 97 percent of families cannot produce one

Oedipal neurosis. This incapacity is one on which we heartily congratulate ourselves" (Fanon, 1970 : 108). This repudiation leads him to make the unsubstantiated claim that in a colonial situation : "every neurosis, every abnormal manifestation, every affective erethism in an Antillean is a product of his cultural situation" (Fanon, 1970 : 108).

In Fanon's radical psychology the family of the colonised is exonerated and the central etiological locus is colonial culture and more specifically the school since it is this latter which is a point of maximal transmission of colonial culture. The question which needs be raised is whether this exoneration and exclusion of the family does not simultaneously entail the ejection of a theory of the Unconscious and open the way rather for phenomenology between self and other in which the black self is always already constituted and yet never positioned. It is omnipresent and omniabsent : a becoming, a mythical past, an idealised future. Yet the concrete black subject exists : he/she is born in a family, with its specific traditions, language, mythologies, a family situated itself in a class formation and having to face the problems of that class. He/she has to become a sexed subject in a culture with its own rituals of masculinity and femininity. The formal contact with colonial culture only starts later in school. How can a psycho-analytic psychology of the black subject ignore its childhood and by so doing doesn't it automatically entail a neglect of the theoretical category of the Unconscious which is always infantile and archaic? Furthermore, can such a psychology provide an explanation for the specific trauma engendered by racist ideology, the internalisation of racist values, if it fails to take into account the prior structurations of subjectivity into consideration?

Manganyi's first hero is essentially Fanonian. His problems start

exclusively at the mission school and are articulated totally within a humanistic psychology of consciousness. The distance b-tween the authentic black self and the White Mask is small : the expression of anger and rage leads to a retrieval of authenticity and subjectivity has recovered its centre. We are back into the pre-Freudian days of the cathartic method when Freud still pinned his hopes that the recovery of the traumatic memory, dating back to adolescence at most, and its abreaction, would lead the hysteric to recover her unitary consciousness and overcome her dual consciousness - 'double conscience' (Freud, 1895). It is clear that the concept of the Unconscious has no place in Manganyi's novel. His concept of repudiation is not akin to the concept of repression in Freud. The undoing of repression is a complex task which introspection alone cannot fulfil and in no way can it be argued that the Unconscious is the true subject of consciousness. The relation of true and false falls away in psycho-analysis. If the concept of the Unconscious is present in Manganyi's work at that stage it is not in its psycho-analytic form but rather in its Jungian form, as a collective unconscious, which allows him to link his experience to that of all blacks universally. But essentially his psychology is a surface psychology of consciousness with no radical topographical opposition (Freud, 1915). Accompanying such a psychology is the emphasis placed or experience. Since humanistic psychology is a psychology of consciousness then experience holds the key to the truth of the subject. Looking into oneself, or into the life of another black man, reveals unproblematically the truth about black experience in its individual and collective form.

Manganyi's second hero is Mpahlele (Manganyi, 1983). The task of psycho-biography is more complex because it entails the narrative recon-

struction of the complex facts and patterns of another person's life in a specific historical and political milieu. Although justice cannot be done to 'Exiles and Homecomings' in its entirety I will attempt to show that from a psychological perspective it is still his notion of a unitary black subject which guides his reading of Mpahlele's life as compared to one which would problematise the contradictory ways in which the subject is positioned at various stages of his life.

One of the main features which strikes in the biography is that it is composed in the first person singular. It is difficult to know whether it is Mpahlele who speaks, or a fictional Mpahlele or the biographer. Manganyi himself acknowledges that his intention was to present 'a certain degree of authorial uncertainty' (1983 : 4). The choice of the first person, however, quite apart from reducing the distance between biographer and biographee inevitably promotes a complicity between the former and the latter. How can the hero who speaks about his own experience avoid the complicity inherent to all confessions? As soon as the interrogation of his experience reaches moments of discontinuity and disequilibrium - Freud's 'gaps in consciousness' - which provide the privileged terrain for a more complex investigation of the subversion of the subject, the I has only one alternative : that of restoring its equilibrium and unity.

An interesting example of such 'complicity' can be found in the manner in which Mpahlele's first breakdown at St Peters college is dealt with. The reader is referred to chapter two of the book entitled 'Grand Mother and the Mountain' (Manganyi, 1983). Briefly, the young Mpahlele with conflicts about achievement and failure has a nervous breakdown on the eve of his mid-year examinations. His anxiety was so severe that he lost consciousness followed by severe headaches. The significant fact, however, is that this acute anxiety spell was preceded by a disappointing first

sexual experience in which the hero's hope of triumph had been betrayed by an acute sense of guilt and feelings of being 'drained as if some vital part of me had been taken away'. It is clear that Manganyi senses the importance of that moment of discontinuity in the subject but it becomes equally clear that he forecloses its investigation.

The aim here is not to provide a definitive clinical answer since a biography is not a therapeutic case-study. In addition the application of psycho-analytic theory to biography or literature can be extremely reductionistic despite the fact that Freud's concept of overdetermination precludes any simplistic or mechanistic view of psychical causality. But the type of adolescent symptomatology is strongly suggestive of an unresolved Oedipal scenario (Malan, 1979). In addition the biographical material at our disposal invites such an investigation : an emotionally inaccessible father, violent and abusive and for whom the hero felt contempt; the deep emotional attachment to his mother, to whom his academic success was devoted; this relation was, however, marked by a protracted separation at the important age of five into the inhospitable care of a grandmother 'as frightening as the mountain'. Whatever the dictates of reality were for his sub-proletarian family the emotional reactions of a child of five are not guided simply by such dictates but rather by the logic of loss and separation so often experienced as stemming from the child's own failure to be loved as he wishes by one or both parents. The fear of academic failure and its corollary, the ardent coveting of success so central to the young hero's life and to his family, invites reflection on the symbolic meaning of work and performance for an adolescent.

It is at this juncture that the theory of Oedipus becomes interesting. Through work and scholastic achievements the subject defines its place

within the social. But psychically speaking the entry into sociality is marked by a positioning of the subject in relation to his primary constellation of figures : the family, father and mother. According to the Oedipus theory this entry always involves a narcissistic failure since oedipal desire, and hence the place in which the subject imagined itself to be, has to be given up in its encounter with the social law which proscribes desire. Scholastic performance, from the perspective of the unconscious, can regressively acquire the valency of a displaced incestuous terrain on which the subject still occupies the tabooed place. The oedipal experience of success and failure can become symbolically dramatised in any realm of social performance.

Whether the above reconstruction is valid or not is not the main issue. The point which it aims at making is that if inner reality is not treated as a mere 'luxury on the subcontinent' but as informing a complex view of subjectivity within the social it can open up various avenues of investigation such as the place of women within the hero's life, his relation to male authority including white authority and the domain of politics, and above all the relation of the hero to the art of writing itself. Manganyi's treatment of this adolescent episode, however, gives it the status of a mere 'crise de passage' which the hero's centred ego salvages impeccably. The 'I' confesses :

> "The experience itself had been unrewarding and I caved in emotionally - and yet in some ways my first sexual experience was an achievement. It expanded my horizon for the possibilities of adult intimacy. One mystery of adult life had been unwrapped before my very eyes and a few years later I was to make use of this precious knowledge to start an enduring relationship with a woman." (Manganyi, 1983 : 66)

Other examples from the biography could be cited to illustrate the thesis that the hero is an existential hero who always surmounts his

moments of unconsciousness as bad-faith (à la early Sartre) and manages to abolish discontinuities and contradictions which beg for a more radical exploration. The real subtext, consistent with the view of black ontology, is that of the return to the source, and assumes that there is a real source.

5. CONCLUSION

In lieu of a conclusion it can simply be said that this critical appraisal of Manganyi's contribution has proved a daunting task in that the critic is forced to operate on a plurality of levels simultaneously. It is a work which aims at a view of the totality. I have attempted to show that it is a certain political position (cultural nationalism) and the adoption of certain conceptual categories (abstract subjectivity), the latter being consistent with the former, which permit such a totalisation. Many aspects of the critical appraisal need to be elaborated since one of the virtues of Manganyi's work is that it raises many questions, without necessarily answering them, which are important for the psychology student in South Africa. But the main point which needs to be stressed is that it is perhaps easier to rally to call for a committed psychology in a situation of political polarisation than to produce one. The labour of radical enquiry into the status of the theoretical categories we employ, although it is no substitute for political activity, is an essential part of the political process in that theory, like all discourses, produce effects of a certain type.

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Briefing

Clinical Psychology and the 1985 Crisis in Cape Town

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Crises tend to bring into relief both the strengths and weaknesses of a system. They are also potential catalysts for change. In this report we discuss the effects that the 1985 State of Emergency in South Africa has had on clinical psychology as practised and taught in Cape Town, and specifically at the Child Guidance Clinic of the University of Cape Town. We also consider some of the implications of our experiences for the development of relevant training and practice in the South African context.

Some introductory comments on training and practice in clinical psychology at UCT and in the Cape Town area will be useful to contextualise developments. The important issues are to a certain extent generalisable to training and practice in the rest of the country. Professional training takes place at a post-honours level, and is concentrated into a two-year period, with a year of broad-spectrum teaching and training at the Child Guidance Clinic, a year of internship in the Valkenberg/Groote Schuur Hospital context, and a thesis requirement.

Psychology in Society, 1986, 5, 131 - 138.

Training at the Child Guidance Clinic falls within the general ambit of British/American models, consisting of courses in psychiatrically oriented assessment, psychometric assessment and basic training in psychodynamic psychotherapy, family, behaviour and group therapy. Students apply all of these approaches in the course of their training, but the predominant model, reflecting the orientation of the majority of Cape Town therapists, is psychodynamic and tends towards developing therapists who will primarily work on a one-to-one long-term psychodynamic basis, generally with relatively affluent middle-class patients. Inevitably, work in a child guidance clinic requires students to work with a broader spectrum of clients, using a spectrum of behavioural or family therapy techniques on a short to medium term basis; but the overall approach is reactive and individual/family based, and the hospital internship tends to reinforce the one-to-one psychodynamic approach.

Community-oriented work has not been wholly absent from Clinic training. For several years Clinic staff and students ran behaviourally-oriented parent training groups through the UCT Centre for Extra Mural Studies, and Clinic students are given some practice in giving public lectures in the community. The Child Guidance Clinic also provides facilities for community service organisations such as Rape Crisis, in which many of our trainees have been active. However, this kind of work has been relatively marginal to the main thrust, which involves psychiatrically-oriented differential diagnosis and one-to-one psychodynamic work.

There are substantial strengths in a formal course of this nature, in that our trainees are readily conversant with the concepts and developments in mainstream "western" clinical psychology, and are able to draw on these resources. However, for some time it has been clear to us that there are

also substantial limitations, arising in the delivery of appropriate services to great numbers of South Africans living in third world conditions. The state of emergency brought about conditions that caused us to focus on the needs of this section of our client population and accelerated the process of attempting to address those needs, initially in the service which we were providing, and then necessarily in the structure of our training programmes.

Although stress was felt in the entire population during the state of emergency, black communities suffered very severely. Black residential areas were virtually occupied by security forces, and individuals, including children, were vulnerable to arbitrary arrest, detention, assault, injury and even torture or death. The education system was severely disrupted, and movement on the streets was frequently hazardous. Detention, injury and deaths in the community led to a range of crisis reactions, and many families were split by conflict over these events. It is also true, of course, that many individuals and families were strengthened by the development of unprecedented solidarity in their communities, but these people do not tend to come to the notice of clinical psychologists, for obvious reasons.

The State of Emergency led to a re-examination of attitudes in many sectors of the UCT community, and became a time of crisis for the Clinic's staff and students. There were personal and professional reasons for this. On a personal level, increasing involvement in the crisis took its toll on the ability of both staff and students to give their work undivided attention. A sense of being distanced from regular work routines added to an increasing awareness of the lack of fit between the role traditionally taken up by clinical psychologists in South Africa and the immediate needs of the community the Clinic is intended to serve. The crisis in Cape Town also highlighted

a number of professional problems. It became clear that the traditionally-adopted "neutral" stance of the clinical psychologist was becoming difficult to maintain, for two reasons: firstly, clients frequently wished to discuss political activities and viewpoints in therapy, often in the context of asking for support during a time of considerable stress; and secondly clinicians were feeling increasingly the need to make a public stand on political issues, either as individuals, or as a group. Further, many clients found themselves unable to keep appointments because of the situation; school work was extensively disrupted and this affected a substantial proportion of the Clinic's interventions; and a widening rift in the opinions of parents and their children made family-based interventions more and more complex.

Initial meetings between staff and students at the Clinic established the outlines of the problems and proved to be an important means of ventilating anxieties and channelling efforts towards coping efficiently with the new demands being experienced. Soon after this it was established that clinical psychologists in private practice were undergoing similar difficulties, and a number of them were drawn into a loose group of clinical psychologists and trainees who decided to meet regularly in an attempt to address the issues that were being raised.

The meetings held at the Clinic during this time debated the following major topics: the role of the clinical psychologist in South Africa especially with respect to the current political and economic situation; the need for a revision of the training of clinical psychologists so that their skills would be better suited to particular conditions in South Africa; the effects of the crisis on particular clinical interventions, including individual psychotherapy and family therapy; and specific ethical problems arising from

clinical interventions at times of political upheaval. The larger group was divided into smaller working groups to explore these issues further.

A second purpose for the meetings was found as the number of interventions related directly to the "unrest" increased. Clinic staff and students, as well as clinical psychologists in private practice began to see individuals and families who had been affected. These included people who had been detained, families involved in violent confrontations with the army or police and families more indirectly affected who were feeling unsettled and badly stressed by the degree of upheaval within their immediate surroundings. Regular meetings at the Clinic then became an appropriate setting in which to discuss both the pattern of problems emerging in our interventions, and possible responses to them. It also became clear that clinicians needed to talk regularly, and in a supportive context, about their own anxieties and confusions in dealing with unrest interventions, and the Clinic's meetings provided that context.

The pattern of problems emerging from these interventions fell largely into three groups:

1. unmanageable levels of anxiety or depression as a result of prolonged exposure to stressful situations;
2. post-traumatic stress disorders, including memory impairment, poor concentration, survivor guilt, sleep disturbance, flashbacks, recurrent intrusive dreams of a traumatic event, and detachment or numbness following a stressor such as a period in detention, or a violent confrontation with physical injury; and
3. an exacerbation of problems existing prior to the crisis - for example, chronic marital conflict, alcohol abuse, psychotic breakdown, prolonged depression intensified in some cases as a result of exposure to stress.

It was also found that severe economic hardship, lack of support within families or from friends and organizations, and isolation increased people's vulnerability to stress.

Documentation on children's responses to the unrest also began at this time. Some of their problems were very similar to those of adults and adolescents; others, like enuresis, were specific to younger age-groups. Children seemed to cope with stress partly through playing out traumatic scenarios in games. Those with absent or very anxious parents, or with family members physically injured by confrontations with armed forces or in detention seemed more vulnerable to acute stress reactions.

Interventions with individuals and families was only one part of the evolving series of interventions which were moving increasingly towards meeting with and counselling groups rather than individuals. It is both efficient and therapeutically useful to run groups for people whose predicament has a common denominator because of the support group members are then able to offer to one another. Clinic staff and students have been involved in a number of groups for children with parents in detention, parents with children facing charges of public violence, for the children facing those charges, and for ex-detainees.

Another aspect of the response to the crisis has been the involvement of the Clinic and other clinical psychologists in workshops designed to assist community workers, counsellors, teachers, and clergy in crisis intervention work. The role of clinical psychologists in this type of work is partly didactic and partly to provide back-up clinical support for front-line workers.

Developing parallel to the increase of these interventions was the degree of organization in the group making the interventions. After a

series of meetings it was decided to affiliate to the Organization for Appropriate Social Services in South Africa (OASSSA), a Transvaal-based organization comprising progressive psychologists, psychiatrists, social workers and other individuals interested in relevant social and health services. The Cape Town group has thus become a formally constituted organization with OASSSA's constitution. Informal connections exist with other organizations such as NAMDA and the Detention Treatment Team. The group has also been expanded to include social workers and psychiatric registrars, and it is hoped that further diversification of interests and qualifications will take place as membership increases.

Although clearly there will be further calls on social services to do the kind of crisis intervention work described here, this is perhaps an important juncture at which to plan beyond times of crisis, to restructure training programmes and to reconsider the role of clinical psychology in relation to South Africa's emerging needs. The experience of the past year has highlighted the value of workshops as a forum for debate and dissemination of skills, and as a source of support and affirmation for teachers, counsellors, nurses, clergy and community workers of all kinds.

For years to come South Africa is going to be in a situation in which there are too few psychologists to meet the community's needs, and workshops will go some way towards alleviating the consequences of that shortage. Front-line workers will evolve appropriate means of dealing with common problems within the community; attention will be drawn to more serious problems where gaps in facilities exist; and hopefully clinical psychologists, working closely with community workers, will become more responsive to their immediate needs.

This has important implications for training. During the coming year,

the Clinic's trainees will have a regular commitment to attend and participate in workshops, to become familiar with principles on which to plan, run and evaluate workshops, and with the process of community consultation. There will be a parallel shift in the orientation of clinical intervention towards group work and away from the traditional model in which intervention with individuals has a central role.

Part of the challenge we face - and this is a challenge for our profession as a whole - is to develop a mode of practice truly appropriate to our environment. This means more than being reactive to circumstances of crisis, and requires us to reassess our training and practice at every level. We believe that we have made some progress on the issue, but also recognize the necessity for continuing change and development. A rigorous and robust approach to theory is also required. Without some knowledge of the South African political economy, for example, clinical psychologists cannot hope to have an adequately contextualized understanding of the organizations, families and individuals with whom they consult. The isolation of clinical psychology as an academic discipline needs to be countered in tandem with the growing involvement of the profession in community issues. Of necessity, we have to make ourselves more open to input and criticisms from non-psychologists and non-professionals. We shall need, in effect, to give up some of our formally-constituted power so that we can be effective in a broader sense than we have been in the past.

Briefing:

Carl Rogers in South Africa : The Issue of Silence

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In early 1986, Drs Carl Rogers and Ruth Sanford came to South Africa to run experiential workshops designed to assist participants in exploring and modifying their intergroup attitudes. It was hoped that these group members would in turn facilitate other groups, and that ultimately intergroup conflict would be lessened and intergroup understanding increased. Drs Rogers and Sanford were however careful to state during their visit that they were not being prescriptive and that they did not pretend to have answers to South Africa's problems.

It is all too easy to be dismissive about the Rogerian "African safari", to point out that Drs Rogers and Sanford seemed less than adequately informed about South Africa, to marvel at their political naïveté as witnessed by their individualizing perspective on group matters, and to chide them for their apparent ignorance of (or, at any rate, lack of serious attention to)

Psychology in Society, 1986, 5, 139 - 143.

major developments in the psychology of intergroup relations over the past 20 years. All the allegations appear to be reasonable, but in this brief note I should like to focus on another issue which seems to me to be important for the development of a critical psychology in South Africa. The issue is that of silence.

Most psychotherapeutic methods, Rogerian therapy included, depend on transforming what has been silent into words. Speaking the unspeakable is commonly thought to be an ingredient of psychotherapeutic process. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Rogerian prescription for South African problems is that people from different groups talk to each other, and render the unspeakable harmless by virtue of its having been said.

It is quite clear that South Africa is a country of silences. The words of many of the country's leaders cannot legally be said; all kinds of people and information are banned. Opposition groups are spoken about, spoken for, presented for public scrutiny by others. In this climate, once again, it is understandable that Rogers, his hosts and followers should feel that talk must be the cure.

What they fail to recognize, however, is that talk in the context of silence can become little more than a smokescreen for that silence. If Carl Rogers and others can talk completely openly in South Africa, then it may appear that "completely open talk" is universally possible in this country. Our laws tell us otherwise, but on the other hand the state repeatedly calls for all reasonable people to talk, or for all non-violent people to talk. "Completely open talk" of a particular kind is called for. Not all talk is permissible.

Psychologists working with individuals know that not all silences are the same. Only certain things that are unsaid are repressed. Other

unsaid material remains unsaid simply because of its inappropriateness to the context of psychotherapy. Similarly, there are many kinds of talk. It is possible for talk about very intimate matters to be serving a defensive function far more profound than would be served by silence in the same context. An example of this can be seen in the talk of somebody who is very well-read in psychological theory and who can talk at great length about sexual and other fantasies in a distanced and intellectualized way. Even if we accept, with Rogers, that there is little qualitative difference between individual psychotherapy and facilitation of intergroup understanding (I, for one, do not), then we can argue that just as in individual therapy it is possible for talk to be defensive. It is possible for the facilitator to collude (wittingly or unwittingly) with interests in the groups which seek to submerge or at best deny aspects of what is in fact being expressed by the silence.

In his refutation of what he terms "the repressive hypothesis", Foucault (1978) has argued that there has been an "incitement to discourse" about sexuality. Sexuality has been discussed more and more, but within the context of particular power relationships. I suggest that Rogerian talk in this country is part of an "incitement to discourse" which, though in some ways very different from the incitement to discourse about sexuality, has some similarities to it. Over the past few years it has become not only permissible but actually desirable (in government terms) for state officials to speak about any number of "unspeakable" things: inequality, racism, discrimination, and so on. Silence over the inequities of the South African system has been replaced by repeated public admissions that things have been wrong and need to be changed ("reformed"). Posel (1984) has argued that the language being used by the South African state is that

of late capitalism, and that its solutions are essentially technicist. In this ideological climate,the political arena is carved up and technical "experts" are given the authority to speak about the "realities" of matters falling within their areas of expertise.

The Rogerian intergroup enterprise is an incitement to discourse about the psychological realities of life in South Africa. Rogers is not only a psychologist (i.e. a person who has technical and hence authoritative understanding of the subjective) but he is also a leading psychologist who comes from a country which is the undisputed leader of the capitalist world. Given these facts, the subjective (as opposed, say, to the material) becomes a key factor in the need for change in South Africa. Even more importantly, though,that which Rogers renders sayable becomes, to some of those who accept his approach, the key factor that has been repressed. The feelings that emerge in Rogerian encounter groups take on a preeminent status in the discourse of change in South Africa. What Rogers does not see, or ignores, becomes relatively unimportant, precisely because of Rogers' authority. By further implication (and it is here that the Rogerian collapse of individual and group issues becomes most salient), those who do not participate in the Rogerian incitement to discourse can be seen to be operating for subjective, irrational and unreasonable motives. To be silent when a technical expert like Carl Rogers invites you to speak can be seen to be choosing the side of repression as opposed to the talking cure. What Rogers is trying to do is cast as constructive, respectful of the person ("unconditional positive regard") and facilitative. Other ways of operating become the opposite.

In this note I have raised issues which clearly await further elaboration and concretization. I hope that I have begun to show, however, that

full understanding of the Rogers visit does not lie simply in speculating about his motives or those of people who brought him here. There is no question in my mind that he is sincere in his aims and that he may have helped many people deal with their feelings during his visit. Examination of the ideological context of the visit, however, may tell us something about our own position as psychologists in South Africa as well.

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Book review : # E.E.Sampson : Justice and the Critique of Pure Psychology.

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For Sampson, the study of justice gets to the very heart of the legitimacy of the social order. The requirement ought to be therefore to examine the social processes which operate to maintain legitimacy. But psychological approaches to the study of justice have failed to achieve this. Rather, in terms of the very assumptions by which psychology conducts its analyses, it tilts towards reproducing the existing social order instead of offering much of a challenge. How is this so?

The central argument of Sampson's Critique runs something along the following, not entirely original, lines. Knowledge derived from modern psychological research is not necessarily false, but reflects existing social arrangements, neither understanding/explaining their origins nor contributing to their change. He takes as his illustrative vehicle, psychological theories and empirical work on justice. Contributions placed under his searchlight include social exchange theory (J. Stacey Adams and

Psychology in Society, 1986, 5, 144 - 150

Homans' view of distributive justice), equity theory (Walster et al), theories of relative deprivation, Lerner's 'just-world hypothesis', game theories, Hardin's tragedy of the commons and derivative approaches, as well as some examples from the field of industrial psychology, such as the human relations movement emerging from the well known Hawthorne studies. While these perspectives provide different emphases - they are all guilty according to Sampson of the twin failings due to psychologism and positivism. In addition, all mainstream approaches to the study of justice give primary attention to distribution or allocation of resources, neglecting entirely examination of processes whereby resources are produced. Such emphasis falsely restricts understanding of justice to distribution, not production. Economic and social structures and systems are taken as given, thus by default treated as universals. The market economy is viewed as natural and timeless, not as itself a sociohistorical product.

In accounting for this failure Sampson rests his case on a critique of 'pure psychology' characterized as a field built on three major foundations : (i) a positivist-empiricist approach to knowledge (ii) a truncated understanding of human subjectivity, and (iii) a romance with abstracted individualism.

Weaknesses of positivism, chiefly its illusions of objectivism and universalism, are raised and alternatives proposed : realism, which assumes non-empirical structures whose presence must be inferred in order to explain phenomena; hermeneutics which privileges meaning, i.e. non-literal or non-objective observation, and claims that only indexical (i.e. context bound) analysis is possible; and post-structuralism which attempts a synthesis of realist and hermeneutic perspectives. Post-structuralism agrees with the hermeneutic view of taking language and symbolic practices as key components,

then draws on the realist moment by examining social and historical practices in fixing certain meanings. Human subjects are no longer seen as the embodiment of some pregiven idealist essence, rather as formed in and constituted by language. Individuals are already subject-ed to structure.

In the truncated view of human subjectivity held by 'pure psychology', cognitivism is usually dominant and the subject stands forth as primary. Ironically however, human agency is minimized in favour of a view which sees reality as processed by meaning-endowing systems. In the truncated view furthermore, materialism is disavowed in favour of idealism. The alternative, suggests Sampson, drawing on Habermas, would seek to locate features of human subjectivity within the social and the historical, as well as within hermeneutic and emancipatory groundings of human knowledge.

The abstracted individual of 'pure psychology' generally takes the person, as object of inquiry, to be a factual and self-evident entity. This abstracted view of the integrated, centred individual may be held to be ideological in helping to sustain underlying socio-economic forms. According to critical theorists, this fictitious character is but the appearance, while reality is different. Under the advanced capitalism of state intervention and market manipulation, this model of human autonomy and abstracted individualism has become increasingly dysjunctive, yet the myth continues to be used to define what is real.

Like the 1984 book by Henriques et al, Changing the Subject (see J. Muller's review article in Psychology in Society, Vol.3, 1985, pp.33-42), Sampson tackles the thorny, but oft ignored theoretical question of the relationship between psychology and society. He concludes that sciences of society and of persons, since they constitute the very subject matter they study, cannot be neutral : they assist in either the reproduction or

transformation of society. Not surprisingly, Sampson's Critique favours the latter and provides a rationale for a transformative view. Since persons are constructed in and through ideology, efforts to challenge the unitary subject form part of a process to break up ideological practices that support domination and exploitation, which ultimately serve to objectify the human subject.

Regarding the dilemma of individual-social polarity, Sampson's Critique is similar to Henrique's Changing the Subject in being rather better at pointing out wayward paths than providing definitive solutions. Yet both works do sketch useful route-maps toward a way forward, Sampson giving greater weight to recent writings of Giddens, Bhaskar and critical theory in contrast to the heavier reliance upon Foucault and psychoanalytic theorizing favoured by Henriques et al. But similar terrain is covered by both texts, both have similar aims. and are in concert in wishing to reject the Humean epistemological (laws refer only to empirically observed regularities, not to logical or necessary connections between events) and Cartesian ontological (the entity of a centred individualism) heritages.

Returning to psychological theories of justice, Sampson shows their limitations in terms of each of the characteristics of 'pure psychology'. That is, psychological approaches to justice are dependent upon the actors' phenomenology (truncated subjectivism), remain within individualistic terms, ignoring social processes, describe only 'what is' rather than what 'might be' or ought to be (uncritical empiricism), are ahistoric, and show restricted social and economic understanding. The social mechanisms which allocate injustices in the first instance are simply never examined. Exchange principles upon which most psychological theories of justice are based, draw as their model upon earlier forms of capitalism (market exchange)

not upon advanced capitalism. Yet this historical falsity goes unacknowledged.

At a time when the state, under advanced capitalism, seeks to manage legitimation crises (and maintain existing injustice) by entering into sociocultural and private spheres as well as the economic, the ground rules of 'pure psychology' in maintaining the myths of 'self-contained individualism' serve both the reproduction and legitimation of the existing social order rather than challenging its legitimacy.

Finally as a 'modest proposal' Sampson outlines a new 'frame of address' approach to the study of justice. Focus is given to justice as a public accounting practice; grounds for explaining acts as fair or just. In laying stress on the conversational, self-presentational and negotiated quality of justice, the 'address frame' view does distance us from standard theories which take equity solutions (rather than say equality) to be basic attributes of human nature, and not products of current social conditions. It does also alert us to the fact that negotiation is rarely a matter of equal partners, but involves power and domination at its very core. Social context and power conceptions are seen as part of the very notion of 'address frame'. He uses Habermas' ideal speech situation to remind us that ethical principles are only constituted in dialogue but that for participants to evaluate the validity of competing claims, the objective conditions of optimum social structures and formations are required. There can be no dialogue of competing justice claims under conditions of domination and exploitation. South Africa is a splendid case in point.

All very well. But there is something of a disappointment in the end result of Sampson's quest. There is a danger of moving back to the interpersonal levels of dynamics; there is a danger of the analogies - of

negotiated conversations, of ideal speech situations - superceding the real nature of struggle for justice. Particularly for those in South Africa, there is something far too tranquil, pleasant and decent about the 'address frame' model. There is too much of the flavour of drawing-room or armchair about it, in contrast to the petrol bombs, detentions, military vehicles and mass killings characteristic of our own battle for justice. There are also the dangers, on twin flanks, of not adequately addressing the way in which the social interpenetrates the personal, and of being left with a somewhat empty human subject, albeit now formally decentred! To be fair (aha, justice as 'address frame' after all!) Sampson himself recognises some of these problems, and the present niggles hardly negate his considerable achievement.

Since both themes in Justice and the Critique of Pure Psychology are of major importance in South Africa at present - indeed the struggle for a just social order is our very raison d'etat - the book is clearly most relevant. There is a good deal of material to mull over and digest. The critical analysis of 'pure psychology' is particularly valuable in its clarity and summary of major failings. For those of us who had hardly realized that psychology had even attempted to study justice, this book is an eye-opener. The book is also refreshingly open and honest for Sampson gives a candid view of his own 'social amnesia' when he admits that for years his own involvement in research left him unaware of preceding critical work such as that by the Frankfurt School. At the end one is left with a feeling of relief - in that, along with other works such as those of Henriques et al and Wexler (1983), this book enables one to conclude that the 'crisis' of psychology in the 1970s was not without some positive outcomes, just as one began to fear that nothing had changed. If the theoretical way forward

is still rather murky, and the implications for psychology in South African society even less clear, then the pleasure is in having at least some useful assistance in taking up these vital challenges.

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