

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

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

EDITORIAL

Intelligence testing has come to occupy a central place in emerging materialist critique of mainstream psychology. Against the tester's insistence that the IQ test is the best, the most polished example of scientific rigour applied to the management of human beings, is counterposed the notion that IQ testing consists in a set of social practices which are fundamentally oppressive and exploitative. Adrian Tyghe, in this edition of Psychology in Society, draws out the substance of this critique: IQ tests, he argues, amount to a sophisticated legitimation of the deskilling process which is so central to modern capitalist development. Furthermore, they do much of the ideological job of convincing people - workers, managers, and various natural allies of both - that the order of things is inevitably the order of things. Melvyn Freeman, in the second article devoted to questions of IQ, counterposes this reductionist conception of human intelligence with a materialist conception of cognitive life, and argues that activity must become the central concept in any account of thought which is to overcome the blindness of traditional notions of IQ testing.

Johan Muller provides a penetrating revies essay of Changing the Subject, yet another neo-Althusserian contribution to recent debates concerning subjects and subjectivity. His wrestling with the individual-society dialectic along the way provides an understanding of the importance of this book. In another revies, Jacklyn Cock finds much of importance for critical feminist thought in the often caricatured latest offering from Germaine Greer, Sex and Destiny.

The kind of vigorous debate which we hope will become the hallmark of Psychology in Society emerges in the contributions by Michael Cross and D A L Coldwell. Taking issue with some key arguments put forward by contributors to the previous edition of the journal - Cross in the realm of "African" culture and Coldwell on radical critiques of Industrial Psychology - these pieces provide the to-and-fro debate which we must ensure becomes part of the future editions of this journal.

The Social Use of Intelligence Tests

Adrian Tyghe

This paper seeks to apply historical materialism to an examination of the process whereby psychological tests have such an effect on our lives. In order to do this, I shall employ the method suggested by Les Levidow (1979:15) when he asks,

> "What kind of society has IQ science helped to create? This means asking what kind of new relations between people IQ science helped to mediate and therefore what kind of science it is and what kind of truth it is. And as for its ideology, this means asking what kind of 'ability' it defines and reproduces, what kind of social relations it represents as somehow rooted in the nature of things and therefore as natural and eternal".

To tackle these series of questions, it is important to understand what uses psychological tests have in our society and thereby discover in what social situations they appear. Psychological tests have a wide application ranging from their aim to measure individual difference as such, to their use in schools and in work. All these are inextricably linked and provide a partial answer to our search for their social usage. The important point, at this stage, is to realise their focus on individual difference for this has a profound effect on their use in society.

Their supplementary function is measurement and thus we need to investigate what these tests measure when they seek to establish individual difference. If we take intelligence tests as our main concern, then we find that, even after many years of discussion, those who use these tests are unable to say what psychological processes they assess. They will simply state that it is intelligence or educability. The fact that they only measure some vague notion of intelligence in terms of

individual difference is vital, as it is my opinion that these tests are designed more to detect a difference than to detect intelligence. Explanations like "Intelligence is what an intelligence test measures" must provide a pointer in this direction. The results give us a single score on an ordinal scale. They do not tell us how we are different or why, just that we are different.

Binet (Anastasi, 1976 : 10) actually said that,

> "In the measurement of the more complex functions great precision is not necessary, since individual differences are larger in these functions."

Anastasi (1976 : 7) states also that the change of focus of the early researchers of testing was from an investigation of uniformities to provide a generalized description of human behaviour to the measurement of individual differences.

The second focus is comparative, the tests compare people against each other. Anastasi (1976 : 26) states the use of the standardization sample which serves to establish norms

> "Such norms indicate not only the average performance but also the relative frequency of varying degrees of deviation above and below the average. It is thus possible to evaluate different degrees of superiority and inferiority."

Thus it is these three features that we seek to explain and which distinguish intelligence testing

i) Its measure of individual difference.
ii) Its ability to compare (relative rather absolute).
iii) Some scale of 'intelligence'.

We need to investigate the history of the intelligence testing movement to trace i and ii. During the early stages of capitalism, science sought to shake off activity as idle contemplation and decided to dedicate itself to practical tasks.

> "The scientific community now had a goal to aim for, - the mastery and possession of nature, and a set of problems to work on." (Albury et al, 1982 : 74)

Thus they sought to explain, appropriate and change nature. Newton's theory postulated a universe of solid, massy, hard, and impenetrable particles that only moved or changed when acted upon by an external force. So one investigated observed phenomena and experimented with the mechanism that set an object in motion.

Psychology, in opposition to the Wundtian theory that stressed consciousness, was to be the evolutionary theory of Darwin which emphasised individual variation between members of the species and the transmission of these variations through inheritance. Some of the variant features were assumed to enable their possessors to cope better with their environments. Francis Galton, the cousin of Darwin, founder of mental tests and many of the presently used statistical methods, was prompted by these considerations to embark upon the beginnings of differential psychology. Darwin emphasised behavioural rather than constitutional aspects:

> "Darwin was hard put to give any intelligible account of the way in which the natural variations occurred and turned to the argument of biological heritage from one generation to the next." (O'Neill, 1982 : 60)

Galton observed in his maths exam at Cambridge, that he was at the upper end of a statistical distribution (designed by himself). O'Neill adds that Galton gathered data to convince himself that comparable variations were general. He believed human abilities were also inherited and he obtained his data from family trees. They showed that people of outstanding ability were more likely than others to have distinguished parents, distinguished off-spring and distinguished relatives:

> "He substituted for the conception of individual differences as discrete qualitative types the conception of them as constituting quantative continua with a typical form of distribution." (Ibid : 60)

Cattell (O'Neill, 1982 : 72) in his paper "mental tests" sought to give psychology the certainty and exactness of the physical sciences by applying a series of mental tests and measurements to a large number of individuals:

> "The results would be of considerable scientific value in discovering the constancy of mental processes, their interdependance and their variation under different circumstances."

And Spearman proceeded to tidy up the mental tests by means of a whole series of statistical techniques. This is how intelligence tests evolved. Thus tests rose from a desperate need to do science, and from a preconceived idea of intelligence based on an evolutionary theory. Since the theorists saw themselves as being 'intelligent' they strove to find tests that would determine this and tests that would differentiate themselves from other people. In manipulating certain statistical data by testing

large quantities of people, they could ascertain that these were the human mental processes and that they were validated by science. They also certainly had definite goals about who were more intelligent, the reason why, and strove to protect this. As Thorndike so neatly put it in 1927,

> "In the actual race of life, which is not to get ahead, but to get a head of somebody, the chief determining factor is heredity." (Rose 1976 : 112)

Francis Galton in 1869,

> "The natural ability of which this book mainly treats is such as a modern European possesses in a much greater average share than the men of lower races."

And L.M. Terman in 1916 in "The Measurement of Intelligence,"

> "If we would preserve our state for a class of people worthy to possess it, we must prevent as far as possible the propogation of mental degenerates" and "moral judgement, like business judgement, social judgement or any other kind of higher thought process, is a function of intelligence." (Matthews, 1980 : 136)

Thus we come to the concept of intelligence. Henderson (1979 : 142) says that we need to direct ourselves to the social basis of the concept, but before we can do this, we need to establish that the concept has a social basis.

Anastasi (1976 : 23) states that firstly

> "the test items need not resemble closely the behaviour the test is to predict. It is only necessary than an empirical correspondence be demonstrated between the test and it"

And further

> "By studying the validation data, we can objectively determine what the test is measuring" (p.29).

If we then study the validation data of IQ tests, we find them to be people's scholastic achievement or grades and initially the teacher's assessment. Thus the IQ test measures what a person is likely to achieve at school (it is important to note that it does not measure one's actual ability at school). I intend to show later that the school is not a neutral proving ground for individuals but tends to favour a particular social class and that its main emphasis is not only the transmission of certain kinds of knowledge but also the dominant ideology.

Brody and Brody (1976 : 88-89) are puzzled by the close correspondence between IQ score and scholastic achievement and question its use:

> "... the relationship is of little use to the schools since they have the information about grades. A measure that predicts grades with a correlation of .6 is not a useful surrogate for grades. Therefore, the fact that intelligence tests predict school grades is of little practical or theoretical interest."

If they have little practical or theoretical use in schools, what is their function and why despite all the tremendous criticism that they face, do they still remain with us?

Let's turn to some of the items in the test and hopefully, this may reveal more about their nature.

Anastasi (1976 : 6) describes Seguin's work with the mentally retarded. He experimented for many years with what he termed a psysiological method of training. By these methods, severely retarded children are given intensive exercise in sensory discrinination and in the development of motor control. An example of one technique he used was the Seguin Form Board, which is now a non-verbal test of intelligence. The SSAIS Manual (Madge, 1980 : 27) describes it as such

> "It is a test based on the assumption that the synthesis of parts into an organised, integrated whole constitutes a valid criterion of intelligence.

This jump from a training technique of sensory discrinimation an motor control to an assumed intelligence can only be a leap of faith. The Manual agrees by stating,

> "Its correlation with general intelligence is fairly low to medium."

Mediated learning, like the training technique described, is a social event and all that this test can say is that in comparison to other people, a person can do this task better or worse than the average. I would like to make two points here - a) that it is only one form of measuring this assumed ability and b) the evaluation process itself is a socially defined one (We are measured against each other).

However, let's turn to one of the more "reliable" measures of intelligence - vocabulary. Jensen (1973 : 74) argues that

> ".... much of what is tapped by IQ tests is acquired by incidental learning, that is to say, it has never been explicitly taught. Most of the words in a person's vocabularly were never explicitly taught or acquired by studying a dictionary. ...."

He adds (p.75)

> "Even after repeated drill, it will quickly fade beyond retrieval"

and concludes

> "this is mainly the reason that vocabulary tests are such good measures of general intelligence ... even those that are entirely non-verbal."

In attempting to find a solution as to why even rote learning will not aid vocabulary, he adds (p.75)

> "If there was no conceptual slot that needed to be filled, that is to say, no meaning for which the individual has a use and which the word serves to symbolize, it is exceedingly difficult to make the definition of the work stick in the individual's memory."

This tells us three things a) that a person's own activity is closely associated with word meanings and b) the person must have a use for them, i.e. words only become meaningful, when we use them to symbolize something in our daily lives. c) words have social origins. Thus if we examine the SSAIS Test and on one card, there is an item of a person trying to catch a train and people working on a car assembly line. The word "procrastination" for working class people could be more likely applied on the car assembly plant (a hidden form of resistance) than their daily frustrated attempt to rush from work and catch a scarce train. For middle class people, because theyhave more leisure time at their disposal, the key image is the train.

Strangely, Vygotskii would agree with Jensen but for different reasons. It would certainly not be incidental learning but one's vocabulary would rely on social and historical factors.

Luria (1971 : 262) argues,

> "In short, we must seek the roots of such higher psychological functions in the mastery of general, human, historically formed experience."

Reality then, is reflected, in the significance of a word and thus assists the process of direct sensory reflection of a world. As Luria and Leonteiv (1967 : 347) say

> "It is an idealized mental form of crystallization of social experience and social practical activity of people."

People master the significances already formed in their lives. A person's personal consciousness is social in nature. According to Vygotskii, the conditions of social life determine specific features of people's psyche and the development of consciousness is directed by people's practical activity in reality. (Vygotskii rejected attempts to simply infer people's consciousness directly from their practical activity). Child development, including the development of specific abilities, is a matter of forming out of history. Marx's thesis was that people do not have a fixed human nature but continually create themselves and their consciousness through productive activity. Peoples''natures' change as people work to transform nature. So, in people's productive activity, we not only produce material products but mental products as well (law, religion, science). Therefore, productive activity encompasses both manual and mental labour. As Matthews (1980 : 86) states

> "Consciousness arises out of and is shaped by practice and in turn is judged in and by practice."

It is not a mechanical process, but a dialectical one. It is people working on the world (nature) that develops their consciousness. Marx rejects the notion of society being a collection of isolated, atomistic individuals each having their own private interests to pursue. People are always involved in a set of relationships, primarily those concerned in their productive activity i.e. their mode of production. Consciousness then must be explained, -

> "either from the contradictions of material life, from the existing conflict between the social productive forces and the relations of production," (Fischer, quoting Marx, 1978 : 81)

So in order to understand what has gone on before and what we seek to do! We have established the fact that IQ tests wish to test individuals and compare them, but the items in the test are socially derived and seek to test social phenomena and that they wish to differentiate people on this scale and compare them, in a hierarchial form from superiority to inferiority. However, they did not seek to establish the differences between any people, but it does seem they had particular people as their object of study. Middle class women initially scored low on the test, items were juggled around and this was corrected for, but Anastasi argues

> "Insofar as culture affects behaviour, its influence will and should be reflected in the test. Moreover, if we were to rule out cultural determinants from a test, we might therefore lower its validity against the criterion we are trying to predict."

Matthews (1980 : 135) indicated that the disadvantaged groups of society initially scored higher on mental tests. Thorndike had this to say (1980 : 135)

> "the apparent mental attainments of children of inferior races may be due to inhibition, and so witness precisely to a deficiency in mental growth"

Subsequently items were dropped from the tests. In tracing the founders' of the IQ tests, lot's try to understand their position. Calton's science informed him that the only material to work with was observed data. He noticed in the society people of different social status had different degrees of success and he assumed they were the more "intelligent", so he strove to measure this "intelligence" and the differences that people exhibit. Later when the "inferior" groups scored higher, this did not tally with the observed data, and so tests were rectified accordingly.

Thus, in terms of our previous discussion, if we want to understand why this particular form of consciousness developed (the need to test individuals on an intelligence scale and find the differences), we must trace the history of people's productive activity. It is from this source that we wll find why intellectual functioning became so paramountly important as a fact of social life. Henderson (1979 : 142) reports that the concept of intelligence is unknown in non-industrial society.

I would like to state quite clearly that I am not associating or equating intellectual functioning with what intelligence tests measure. It has been shown from less ethnocentric studies, that despite the very real material deprivation which so called "culturally deprived" children suffer, the assumption of cognitive and linguistic deprivation or deficiency has no basis in reality (see Farrant W. (1979), Labov W. (1978), and Cole M. and Scribnew S (1974). Intelligence testing, on the other hand, can claim very little ability to measure intellectual functioning.

So, I am not trying to explain the nature of intellectual functioning but to show why intellectual functioning came to be isolated and given so much value. It became the distinguishing feature of people by which one judged people and by which we still judge them today.

Capitalism is characterized by the private ownership of the means of production, which constructs two basic classes in society that are in conflict with each other. Capital owns the means of production while workers have no access to it, including the products of their labour. Commodities are produced for exchange value and workers are similarly transformed into commodities. Workers have only their labour power, or capacity to work and by the nature of the system, have to sell it to the capitalist, who puts it to work. This is the basis of class division and class rule in the society. The history of capitalism is also the history of class struggle and the movement of capital is directed by this process.

In the formative period of capitalism, when bartering was still a way of exchange, it was difficult to establish a surplus or accumulate. Capital realised that to push costs down one must "buy cheap and sell dear," They needed to master and own natural resources. However, unless nature is worked on, there is no transformation of these resources into products, and so the control and supply of human labour or resources became paramount.

The craftsmen who were involved in the daily chemistry of production, through experience and judgement, occupied a pivotal position of authority and entrepeneurship. They had enormous control over the production process as they had all the skills through their practical training. They also controlled who could enter the job, the hierarchy being linear rather than pyramidal - the apprentice would one day become a journeyman and possibly a master later on.

As long as the control of the production process lay in the hands of the worker, capital's hands were tied. Capital sought to reduce this control by the introduction of machinery that would absorb part of the worker's skill. This is the process usually referred to as "deskilling and re-skilling" and implies the undermining of the craftsmen or skilled worker.

Andrew Uri in 1835 (Berg, 1979 : 68) refers to this process,

> "It is in fact, the constant aim and tendency of every improvement in machinery to supercede human labour altogether, or to diminish it's cost, by substituting the industry of women and children for that of men, or that of ordinary labourers."

Marglin (1978 : 14) stressed the search for a technologically superior organisation of work was secondary to an organization which guaranteed to the entrepeneur, an essential role in the production process, as integrator of the separate efforts of his workers into a marketable product and that in this substitution of the capitalists for the workers control of the work process, the worker's choice became (pg.14):

> "from one of how to work, and produce based on his relative preferences, for leisure and goods, to one of whether to work or not to work."

E.A.G. Robinson in 1931 (1958 : 17) while arguing for this division of labour, unwittingly refers to the inventiveness of workers.

> "By the separation of a single process, and its constituent parts, the task of devising a machine to take over much or all of the labour and skill of the worker is facilitated .... Many of the small inventions which have done much to simplify machinery to make it more nearly automatic, have been the work of operators who, during the hours of tending a machine have consciously or unconsciously analysed their own part in the rythm of the operation, and have found a way of throwing yet another task on to the machine itself."

Contrast this with Frederick Taylor, the founder of scientific management (Matthews, 1980 : 189), who contributed much to the detailed fragmentation of work.

> ".... the man who is fit to work at any particular trade is unable to understand the science of the trade."

Thus the worker whose control is wide enough to see how each operation fits into the whole is turned into a worker confined to a small number of repetitive tasks. It is out of this particular form of the division of labour, that the separation between conception and execution came about. Sarup (1978 : 158) describes this process in which each of the operations are separated from each other, they are assigned to different detail workers who are unable to carry through any complete production process.

Thus (Sarup, 1978 : 158)

> "the skill and knowledge of the worker is separated from the labour process. .. Mental labour is separated from manual labour, but mental labour itself is then further subdivided into those who conceptualise, plan for others, and those who execute the work."

Workers now perform simplified jobs but without comprehension of their underlying reasoning. Their output increases but their level of training decreases and knowledge of the process becomes centralised in the hands of a few. This monopoly is used to control the steps of the labour process and its mode of execution. Science has become a part of this monopoly and develops machinery and technology suitable for this process.

Capital, in breaking peoples' skills down, redefines them in its own terms. The knowledge and division of labour are now used as instruments of control over the labour process and what was originally the creation of the worker, is removed from him/her and turned against him/her. This is the process of alienation.

Alienation hastens the process of displacement as more and more people face unemployment and are excluded from any productive activity at all. Knowledge becomes capital as capital seeks to monopolise, define and narrow it according to its interests. A polarization of wealth occurs. At the one end there is vast wealth and at the other, many are paid less than in a living wage. Skill, too, becomes polarized - mastery over the labour process through scientific, technical and engineering knowledge, is dominated by management, while there is a fall in the skills of many.

Thus, in this separation of intellectual and manual labour, between conception and execution, we can discover the need for a consciousness which stresses intellectual functioning. Capital sees intellectual functioning as its own and seeks ways to affirm it. IQ serves as a measure of discrinination whereby a hierarchical scale from non-intellectual functioning (manual labour) to intellectual functioning is created, which in turn functions to control and regulate social life.

IQ tests reaffirm this. "Intelligence" serves as a measure to define persons, judge them and predict their role in society. It becomes a hegemonic definition in that people regard this form of intelligence as

the only one and deny all other forms. As it favours the dominant group in society, it defines intelligence in their interests and can be seen to be serving the same purpose as "deskilling and reskilling." Thus, if a person does badly on a test, Anastasi says (1967 : 299)

> "The cultural differentials that impair an individual's test performance are likely to handicap him in school work, job achievement, or whatever other subsequent achievement we are trying to predict."

and on pg. 300.

> "If these differences in present developed abilities are ignored or obscured by any assessment procedure, the individual will be assigned to a job in which he will fail or be exposed to an educational program from which he will not profit."

and finally (1976 : 37)

> "It is certainly not in the best interests of the individual to be admitted to a course of study for which he is not qualified or assigned to a job he cannot perform or that he would find uncongenial."

Thus failure in life is explained to individuals, not in terms of their lack of access to the wealth in our society, but as a consequence of their lack of "intelligence."

Another pointer to the IQ's social discrimination is its validation data i.e. scholastic achievement. Janet Shapiro (1981 : 104) states that liberal analysis of schools assumes that people are differently equipped, by nature or social origins, to occupy the varied economic and social levels in society and that the role of education is to sort out, on the basis of 'equality of opportunity', just how they are equipped and for what they are best suited. The result is the myth of social mobility.

She states that syllabi, text books, teachers and the language used in the educational system are all based in a middle class ethos. The middle class child has better facilities for studying at home, better libraries, better equipment at school, parents who share a common background with the teachers, and is probably better fed, better taught and more encouraged. Added to this, middle class children have more security in the sense that they have the time and money to study while working class children have to either go to work themselves, or become responsible for much of the domestic life since both parents are at work.

Thus, the function of the school has been to restrict access to 'knowledge' and qualification to those who are socially qualified to exercise authority. Shapiro, 1981 : 101):

> "Education functions to feed workers into different levels in the occupational structure; in terms both of skills and expectations. Moreover in so called democratic societies where occupational stratification is supposedly a function of merit rather than birth, educational achievements serve as a justification for the disparity in rewards at the varying occupational levels."

Thus education serves to reproduce this division of labour, and slots people into their suitable places in a fluid and hierarchical division of labour. If IQ tests are validated on these achievements, achievements which are already socially determined, we can reach the following conclusions with Matthews (1980 : 136)

(i) All intelligence tests begin with the identification in advance of groups that are accepted as intelligent and unintelligent. These then become the groups against which the tests are validated.

(ii) The raw material of the "science" is an abstraction from the real world, it is a socially produced, theoretical object - the IQ score. This means it has no concrete properties itself but is surmised from certain behavioural tasks.

(iii) Judgements of intelligence are comparative and relative rather than absolute. (It is oddly strange that the results were validated on middle class people and we get above average, average and below average intelligence.

IQ science examines what is social and treats it as natural. Matthews, (1980 : 118) asserts that

> "Ideology is thought which refuses to understand itself as historical."

Marx (Matthews (1980 : 118) says of the classical economists:

> "The same men who establish social relations in conformity with their material productivity also produce principals, ideas and categories conforming to their social relations. Hence these ideas, these categories are no more eternal than the relations which they express."

Ideologies are not necessarily true or false but are partial views in the sense that they are limited because they express the view of only one group or class. They are partial aspects of reality which are

imposed as the total or only possible view. They are also "structured systems" in that they are coherent outlooks of particular social groups or classes who share broadly similar material interests. Inherent in this definition, then, is a recognition of social conflict.

How does IQ do this?

It asserts:

i) IQ is hereditary

This is accurate. IQ scores do not change from one generation to the next. However, it is a partial view when it represents these differences as genetic or biological. This implies they are fixed and immutable (this is incorporated within the tests anyway). The social relations that exist today are represented then as natural and resistant to change.

ii) IQ measures intelligence

It is rather a measure of one's class position and one's likely success in the social formation, we either possess it or we do not. It is a quantitative term set on a hierarchy, and as such replicate the hierarchical nature of society. (Ruling class people have more than working class people). It is a continuous scale which implies there is no conflict in society and the test actually measures one's conformity (consider items in vocabulary and comprehension (parliament, trials, money).

iii) Intelligence is an important determinant of success

As Henderson (1976 : 148) says when he reverts the argument

> "due to intelligence, people are in a privileged position," to "due to their privileged position, people are 'intelligent'."

However, it is partially true in that people who score high on IQ generally succeed in life rather than those who do not. This is due rather to the status accorded to ruling class positions which are rewarded by wealth. The assumption here is the meritocratic one, which is, that people with high social status jobs need to be rewarded the most. These people will only work for gain and as their skills and abilities are so needed and are so scarce in society we need to attract them with high wages. Chomsky (1977 : 33) shows that the people who can choose their occupations, choose those that suit their interests and that they find them most fulfilling.

In short, while IQ tests do detect differences between people, they are class differences and not individual differences. They misrepresent the

relationship between classes in society and help to reproduce the status quo. So it is not people's abilities or skills that determine their life chances, but their relationship to the mode of production.

These differences lie within the design and operationalisation of the test. The testing situation is a social situation which simply replicates the situation at shcool:

(1) Only certain skills are tested in a uniform manner as in school.

(2) The control of the test situation lies largely outside the control of the testee, as in schools where the student is subordinate to the teacher.

(3) Motivations for doing the test are extrinsic to it, - one gets an IQ score, a job as in school where we get marks, grades, certificates, position in class, teacher approval.

(4) Rewards are unequal, for someone to succeed others have to fail, - we are alwayscompared to someone else.

(5) Competitiveness rather than co-operation is the basic relationship of people doing the test. Co-operation at school is called "cheating".

(6) Rule conformity is highly valued.

The SSAIS Manual (Madge, 1980 : 46) in discussing the role of the tester in the situation, says that the tester can detect the person's personality through the test.

> "... the basically matter-of-fact practical, no-nonsense young male examiner who is aware that children are in awe of his manner. When he examines a boy who sits on the edge of the desk, pops upand down with no attempts at self-control, whistles loudly as he works, and accuses the examiner of 'tricking' him, he is able to conclude that this test behaviour was not induced by the examiner's covert acceptance - and could be characteristic of a poorly controlled little boy, who has not accepted authority."

Other evidence to indicate that this is a very social situation include the numerous "extraneous variables" that affect the testing results. These vary from race of examiner, whether examiner is a stranger or someone familiar to the use of desks or chairs with arms or without, and the type of answer sheet. (Anastasi, 1976 : 33)

So, we can see that if we do not answer Les Levidow's questions (pg.1), these tests mediate the relationship between capital and labour in the service of capital. As a science it is atrocious and acts as an ideology to protect these interests.

Psychology in its further service to capital, not only aids it indirectly, but directly and has become its servant. A historian (Matthews, 1980 : 39) said this about scientific management. It

> "not only conditioned the industrial climate for the psychologists, it determined to a large degree the direction, scope and nature of psychological research."

Once capital had created a particular division of labour which meant the fragmentation and destruction of skill, it sought to split these even further. E.A.G. Robinson (1958 : 15) states that there were 7,882 jobs in the Ford factory. He explains their advantages.

> "A rhythm of work and an economy of motion may be evolved, ... which will make the work less fatiguing, and enable the worker to keep up a high rate of output for a longer period. Less thought and concentration will be necessary to ensure that each movement is that which is next required, until the whole action becomes automatic."

The process of selection, categorization, and elimination fits people into ever changing narrower categories. The person is moulded and adapted according to the needs of the organisation. Psychology has devised tests of selection, motivation, attitudes, intelligence and aptitude to serve this purpose. It addresses itself to the problems of management and focuses mainly on the selection and performance of workers.

NIPR was initially attached to South Africa's Department of Defence, the gold mining industry and the iron and steel industry. (Bulhan, 1981 : 28). He adds.

> "Under the initiative and direction of Biesheuvel (the founder of NIPR), a host of psychological instruments were developed to screen black mineworkers, aimed at increasing labour-productivity for white owned industries."

Simon Biesheuvel himself states that one of the objectives of Euro-American psychological research in Africa is to gain an understanding of the behaviour of African peoples, to test it, and to determine the extent to which the African behaviour is modifiable. Bulhan concludes about South Africa

> "Nowhere else has a scientific speciality been so uncritically embraced or been obsessed with the pre-conception, ideology and mystifying explanations of the colonial oppressor." (See also Bozzoli (1977) and Webster (1980)

Memmi (1965 : 80-89) portrays the further consequences of categorizing people in terms of traits like mental retardation (stupid) or non-productive (lazy). By devaluing the person's skill, this justifies paying people low wages and

> "It is in the colonized's own interest that she/he be excluded from management functions, and those heavy responsibilities be reserved for the colonizer."

He asserts that the mechanism of this remoulding is a series of negations, - the colonized is not this, is not that. All the qualities which make a person crumble away, his/her humanity becomes opaque and is collapsed into an anonymous collectivity - they are this, they are all the same. The person's private occurrences in her/his life is never considered. She/he tends rapidly towards becoming an object (they know no better, - they are good for nothing).

At the end, people exist as a function of the colonizer's needs and then one does not have a serious obligation toward an animal or an object. A shot directed into a crowd that kills a leader causes people merely to shrug their shoulders. All action against the colonized is justified. This portrait, is at its worst when it is accepted by and lived with, by the colonized. By agreeing to this ideology, the dominated class practically confirms the role assigned to them. This gives society a semblance of stability. He concludes,

> "In order for the legitimacy (of the colonizer) to be complete, it is not enough for the colonized to be a slave, he must also accept this role."

Shaw M (1977 : 23), however, reveals that in the Hawthorne studies (an attempt to improve work performance) showed that output was not determined by intelligence, personality or any other individual characteristics, but by group standards. They suggested to control the collective consciousness of the workers through forms of social interaction.

So, while capital seeks to limit and monopolize knowledge, it is evident that they are only able to appreciate certain forms of con-

sciousness and knowledge, and that other forms exist. Farrant (1979 : 125) points to some of the differences between African childhood and middle class childhood in which such needs as independence, responsibility are fulfilled and opportunity to learn through real life experience is displayed. There is also a high level of social maturity. A small example would be toys which are created by the children themselves, rather than manufactured by adults to meet the developmental needs defined by adults. Paulo Freire in his work on literacy indicates how a different educational system can be a vehicle of liberation rather than domination. (See Mackie, 1980).

In class struggle, workers have developed a consciousness, and have since the beginnings of capitalism, resisted against this dominant form of production. (See Cohen, 1978). Students too have displayed a similar form. In 1980, the 'coloured' school children boycotted their schools and in a pamphlet titled "From the School to the People" they said.

> "Our parents have got to understand that we will not be "educated" and "trained" to become slaves in a apartheid-capitalist society .... so we, together with our parents, must try to work out a new future. A future where there will be no racism or exploitation, no apartheid, no inequality of class or sex".

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I.Q. and the Process of Cognition

Melvyn Freeman

The notion that IQ testing is pseudoscience and that tests are used as an instrument of, and as the rationale for, discrimination and racism is fairly well documented. Most of the critique of testing as pseudoscience has centered around four points: that 'intelligence' is not definable; that it cannot be operationalized and measured; that intelligence (whatever it may mean or be measured by) cannot be proved to be genetically transmitted; and that IQ tests are culturally biased. Yet though the criticism has had some impact on test use, the tests are still nonetheless used with the utmost regularity.

While it cannot be claimed that continued test use is <u>due</u> to insufficient - or the type of - criticism of IQ tests, it will be argued in this paper that most of the criticism has faulted by not offering an adequate explanation of what <u>is</u> being measured by an IQ test, and that in certain respects the criticism has inadvertently supported a questionable understanding of cognition. This paper will thus look at the conception of cognition which is implied by the testing movement, as well as in some of the criticism. An alternate view of cognition and how 'that which is measured by an intelligence test' fits into this understanding will be offered. It will be argued that the process of cognition and how it is acquired is fundamental to an understanding of 'intelligence'.

Psychology has stood accused on various occasions of being blinkered and cut off from other disciplines in the social sciences such as sociology, social anthropology and political science. Psychologists in the Soviet Union - notably Luria and Vygotskii - have altered this state of affairs to a large extent. It appears, however, that their influence is very slow

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in filtering into Western psychology. Certainly the field of 'intelligence' does not seem to have been affected by their work. Even in the 80's it must be presumed from the many articles and books produced around the topic of intelligence that either what these psychologists have written has nothing whatsoever to do with intelligence, or they have never been read. It will be argued here that 'intelligence' can only be fully understood if linked to a notion which examines the process of thought as outlined by these psychologists.

Inspection of the debates which are predominant in the field of intelligence show that the framework in which the majority of debates take place is a positivist one. Discrete variables are linked and correlated with a large proportion of research concerned with the measurement of variables which contribute to IQ score. Central to this has been the question "What proportion of which different variables goes to make up an IQ score have been genes and the environment - the old nature/nurture problem. Research is then conducted using sophisticated methodology and statistics to prove the contribution of each.

I will now briefly look at a study which has concerned itself with the 'contribution question', show how two critics of the study - one from a pro-genetic and one from a pro-environmental position - have interpreted the raw data of the original study, and draw out the view of cognition implied in both the study and critique. Anomalies of this view will be discussed later.

In order to separate genetic factors from rearing conditions so as to measure the affects of each, Scarr and Weinberg (1981) studied black and interracial children adopted by advantaged white families. The design was proposed as an analogue to the cross-fostering design common to animal behaviour genetics research. The question in this study was how well do IQ scores of black children reared by white families compare to white adoptees and the biological children of these parents? Results of the study yielded a heritability of around .45. Using Scarr and Weinberg's raw data, Jensen (1981) claimed that the heritability figure that should have been derived from this data was around .80. Amongst Jensen's criticisms of the original researchers' methodology were 'selective biasing', i.e. that technically eligible families did not volunteer for

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the study, that the use of partial correlations and regressions were wrong statistical choices, and that although Scarr and Weinberg's data does not prove .80 heritability, neither does it rule it out.

The same data under the scrutiny of Kamin (1981) were shown to be able to yeild a heritability of .0. According to Kamin, anomalies in the Scarr and Weinberg study included the fact that the researchers used educational level when referring to natural parents of the adopted children, whereas in the case of adoptive parents IQ scores were used; that black adopted children may not reap the home environment advantages that a white child would; and that the researcher's division into 'early adoptee' and 'late adoptee' at one year old did not take into account the differences between an adoptee at, say, one month old, and a child adopted at eleven months.

One could be tempted at this point to jump onto the bandwagon and consider which figure and which researcher is correct. Is the correct heritability figure from this data .45, .80, .0, or something else? Whose methodology is more correct, is it Scarr and Weinberg's, is it that suggested by Jensen, or is Kamin's proposed methodology the best? The response which I suggest to these questions is that no answer can be correct as, firstly, one is dealing more with value judgements than with facts, and secondly, it is the answer to a meaningless question. It is meaningless because a view of cognition which separates and measures variables is a false and distorted picture of cognition.

I shall deal only briefly with the first reason and then move onto the second, which will form the major thrust of this paper.

One of the major criticisms of positivism is that though it claims to be value-free, it cannot be. That value <u>is</u> operative is nicely illustrated by the three sets of results obtained by the three researchers above. If one looks at the theoretical positions held by the three researchers vis-a-vis the heritability question <u>prior</u> to the above study, one sees the following: Scarr and Weinberg (1981) had declared themselves moderates; Jensen (1969) had been the main advocator of a .80 herit - ability since 1969, and Kamin was in the forefront of the campaign which attributed an IQ score primarily to environmental factors. That the

three/....

three researchers would take the same raw data and each empirically prove that their previously held positions were proved by the data seems to indicate that there is something more than objectivity involved when it comes to choosing methodology - and which data to include and which to leave out.

Now to the point of this paper. That separate variables make up an IQ and link to each other in the form Y = (f)(X) is a false notion (see Moll, 1983). Further to conceptualize the brain as having 'entities' which correlate directly with behavioural or cognitive manifestation is similarly false. Thus a view of intelligence which presumes either one of these is a distortion. I will now attempt to illustrate this by drawing from the work of Luria and Vygotskii.

Luria (1966) asserts that complex cognitive processes are organized 'functional systems' and not entities or capacities. The components are represented in different areas of the brain, but operate through a combination of different constellations, depending on the task at hand. But most importantly (for the arguement presented here), he states that neither the components nor the functional relations into which they enter are already formed at birth. Each individual's development forms through experience of their particular social environment.

> 'It is now generally accepted that in the process of mental development there takes place a profound quantitive reorganization of human mental activity, and that the basic characteristics of this reorganization is that elementary, direct activity is replaced by complex functional systems, formed on the basis of the child's communication with adults in the process of learning'. (Luria, in Simon, 1980, p.20)

Two points must be taken from this. Firstly the positivist assumption that variables which contribute to intelligence can be isolated, either in the brain or anywhere else, is an inaccurate assessment of cognition. And secondly, a crude environmentalism must be ruled out. The environment cannot cause cognitions. Rather, the development of cognitions, and this includes those cognitions measured on an IQ level test, involve relations. Vygotskii (1978) argues that the development of cognition involves relations between people, and between people and economic and social systems. In this view one is dealing with changing relations,

and/....

and these are only understood when seen as a totality of interconnections with everything else. Thought itself is involved in dialectical relationships with everything around it and with its own progression. The pivot around which all relations take place is an economic one. It is primarily this which determines human consciousness.

> 'The mode of production of material life conditions the social, political and intellectual life process in general. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness'.

The mode of production, the historically changing economic system and the activity which takes place within it are crucial to the development of cognition. Through time, and in different places, productive activity varies and thus different 'styles' of cognition develop.

The view which sees social and economic relations as being fundamental is in sharp contrast with any of the answers given (above) to the issue of what proportion are genes responsible for intelligence compared to that of the environment. The two views are looking at the same issue - cognition - from incommensurable positions. Even the view which Kamin adopts here is incommensurable with the idea of cognition as social relations. Though he rejects the idea that the contribution to IQ score of either genes or the environment can be conclusively measured, and though he says that the onus is on those who say that IQ is heritable to prove this, he nonetheless takes a strong environmentalist (as opposed to a dialectical) stand.

> 'The data have repeatedly demonstrated profound environmental effects on IQ scores in circumstances where the genes cannot be implicated'. (Kamin, 1974, p.145)

Kamin's conception is a linear one. By entering into methodological debate within a positivist framework (as seen above), Kamin gives credibility to the question "What proportion of genes versus what proportion of the environment?" And, as has been said, the question is meaningless. Kamin attempts to prove that genes cannot be implicated to the extent which they are in influencing an intelligence test score by attempting to prove the effect of the environment. Yet while this

approach/....

approach has been useful to some extent, the impression is given that the environment 'acts on' the individual. Whether one sees heredity, the environment, or a combination of heredity and environment (the two-factor theory) as determining intelligence, there is no room for the person's own movement here. Simon says that one cannot

> '..... see the child as a given product (heredity) impacted (as it were) by a kind of global 'environment'. On the contrary, the child, by finding activity in the given circumstances, both changes his environment and changes himself ..... the major influence in a child's development lies in the nature of the activity - not in the 'environment' as such, but in the child's activity in that environment; in his relations with adults, other children, the school, natural and artificial (man-made) phenomena generally with which he is surrounded from birth. It is the activity which shapes (or determines) the child's development. (1980, p.21)

Intelligence is therefore not 'in' the person or 'caused' by the environment, but is developed, as is all cognition, through activity within the environment. Activity is crucial. It is "the most important initial methodological principle for explaining mental phenomena and the determination of consciousness." (Bueva, 1969, p.113) When researching cognitions then, social relations and the individuals' intentional actions (all embraced in the term activity) will be primary. This approach, says Bueva,

> exposes the essence of objects under investigation in their actual development, and explains the origin and functioning of mental phenomena in intentional activity, both individual and social. (1969, p.113)

IQ AND CULTURE

When one studies cognitions of people from different cultures, or examines their performance on IQ tests, differences are usually noted. For the purpose of this paper there are at least three ways in which such differences may be viewed. Firstly, as differences in genetic make-up; secondly as due to environmental differences and thirdly, as differences in activity within different socio-historical circumstances. I will now briefly examine three aspects of cognition, all of which have been regarded as forming part of intelligence: i.e.

abstraction/....

abstraction, perception, and logical reasoning, and consider them within the three alternate conceptions of cognition.

Abstraction

Amongst certain groupings the inability to abstract at the same level as western whites has led to the hypothesis that there are innate capacities which determine this. Jensen (1969) differentiated between innate 'Level 1' intelligence, which involved associative type role learning, and innate 'Level 2' intelligence, which involved 'higher' intellectual functioning, cognitions associated with 'abstract' thinking. There have been various studies which have proved the notion that abstract cognitions develop relatively independent of the environment as untrue. Some examples of this will be given.

A western individual usually develops cognitively in the following way. Classifications first take a 'perceptual' form such as colour, size, shape and position. This is followed by 'functional' classification in what things can do or what can be done with things, and finally to the groupings of these together under a common class name. The development does not move beyond the first or second classification amongst most non-industrialised people.

Western schooling has been claimed to be the crucial factor for developing the higher level of abstraction. Greenfield (1974), for example, found that Wolof children in rural Senegal who had attended school, be it in a city or a 'bush school', performed very similarly to a western child. Colour preference decreased with age in favour of form and functional groupings. The children who did not attend school rarely used super-ordinate language needed for 'higher' classification and in fact showed greater preference for perceptual classification as age increased.

However, the simplistic notion that schooling was the only factor in determining the development of abstract cognitions was challenged by Scribner (1974). She showed that not only schooling, but mere contact with Westernization, increased abstracting processes. A group of non-literate adults holding 'cash jobs' in a transitional-type village were able to use category groupings (though usually functional ones of the

type/....

type needle, scissors, shirt), whereas those villagers who had not had this contact showed much more jumble (though according to Scribner there were indications of adhering to some other category influence). Certainly the 'type' of abstraction measured on an IQ test is specific to Western culture.

Perception

Herzkowits (1974) found that when he presented photographs to a group of people with no Western contact, not only was there no recognition of the representation (even though this may have been a picture of a close relative), but the people did not know what to do with the paper. Perception is certainly not a 'direct copy' of the external world, but mediated through the culture.

Perception of spacial relations ability were given to four groups by Berry (1971). The four groups, the Temne of Sierra Leone, New Guinea Natives, Australian aborigines, and eskimos varied widely in their ability. The reasons for this will be explored later.

Logical Processes

Luria (1971) found that responding to simple verbal syllogisms is a learned convention. In a study in Central Asia in the early 1930's, he presented two kinds of syllogisms to collectivised and uncollectivized peasants in the area. The one kind consisted of content related to the practical experience of the villages, whereas the other kind bore no relation to familiar practical life. The uncollectivized group were unable (or refused) to use a purely symbolistic conception. When the syllogism was related to their practical world they could answer, but not when pure syllogistic reasoning was required. On the other hand, where people had had even a small amount of schooling or who were engaged in a collective planning of farm production were able to see the syllogistic assumptions in order to draw conclusions. The same finding was recorded by Scribner (1974) using a variation of Luria's syllogism in a different population sample.

To what, then, should all the above differences be attributed?

The/....

The genetic argument does not suffice for the following reason. The two samples given under 'abstraction' and the example under 'logical processes' both use as their sample subjects who presumably come from the same gene pool. The counter argument which may suggest that it was those individuals who had the greatest abstraction and logical reasoning abilities who went to school, became cash workers, or become collectivized, would surely be stretching a point too far.

The more difficult position to counter is the environmentalist one, i.e. that the differences found in the examples above are due to a different environment. Though this view may be able to behaviourally correlate and describe environmental variables which affect cognition, it cannot explain these differences. Besides, as has been repeatedly pointed out, the positivist position is a distortion of the way cognitions are developed. The person's own movement is not considered, nor are the social and economic relations which give rise to the cognition.

The position offered by Vygotskii, which takes a person as a relating aspect of totality, is able to explain the differences. When Vygotskii discovered that some people had not acquired advanced abstraction and logical reasoning, he argued that socio-historical circumstances determined that these people did not move beyond practical cognition. The lifestyle representative of peasant and many people from poor urban communities necessitated only manual labour, thus not needing and hence not developing more abstract cognitive processes. The activity of the children was not mediated by the adults to achieve abstract thinking. If we now return to the Berry study (under Perception), we are able to explain the differences found. The four groups measured on spacial abilities tests were ranked according to the importance of hunting in that culture. Results showed that increase in hunting requirements increased spacial abilities scores. The activity practiced developed the needed skill.

Positivist researchers have studied not only the effect of the environment, in its broadest sense, on intelligence, but have isolated particular variables such as motivation, nutrition, the test environment, etc. Now, while it is undoubtedly true that such factors may affect a test score, this means very little. One needs to ask "what is

motivation/....

motivation, nutrition or the test environment linked to?" "How do they fit into the totality?" When one begins to see that motivation cannot be explained or understood unless related to class structure, then one sees the meaninglessness of its correlation with intelligence. Motivation is inextricably tied up with the possibility of occupational success and with the belief in one's own success on the test, and these are in turn inextricably linked to one's class position (or, in South Africa, racial group). The motivation of groups who have a high chance of personal and occupational success is likely to be much higher than groups which have a low success chance. Similarly with nutrition and test environment. Social and economic conditions are invariably behind lack of nutrition, or having fifty people crammed into a room without desks. Low IQ scores thus cannot be said to be a result of bad motivation or poor nutrition and test environment.

It should have become clear by now that research into intelligence, and critique of it which does not take the totality of the person into account, which isolates and measures separate variables, and which does not take the process of mental development into account when studying the subject of intelligence, will end up with a truncated and distorted idea of what intelligence is and how it develops. An intelligence test merely isolates in time and aspect, a 'piece' or a 'slice' of cognition. This 'piece' is no different in how it develops or what it is than any other 'piece' which could be isolated. The score on an intelligence test is, therefore, no more than a part of cognition which has developed in the process of social relations.

The central point of this paper has been to illustrate that it is the questions asked which determine results. When a researcher asks "What proportion of intelligence is contributed by the environment?" the answer can only range from .1 to .0. It is meaningless to answer this question with "the individual's activity related to the mode of production, one's class position within it, and mediation with adults." To arrive at this answer, whether the answer is correct or incorrect, requires a different question. When doing research into intelligence it is fundamental that the question one asks is not going to yield a number, but an explanation. 'Activity' rather than 'discreet variables' must be the starting point.

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The End of Psychology: Review Essay of Changing the Subject*

Johan Muller

* Changing the Subject: Psychology, Social Regulation and Subjectivity. J Henriques, W Holloway, C Urwin, C Venn, V Walkerdine (Editors). London: Methuen, 1984.

There was a time when psychology carried the torch for a certain kind of personal enemcipation, a liberation founded on an evolutionary sequence of human qualities that applied equally to the cognitive, affective and social domains of personal functioning. Psychology could, so ran the story, assess our relative standing with respect to a vast number of attributes. It could also apply certain methods that would shift us more quickly towards that distant but free end, when we would find ourselves to be cognitively evolved and emotionally adjusted human beings, at one with ourselves and society. The heyday of this humanistic mumbo-jumbo was the mid sixties, that apex of late capitalism just before the second slump and the onset of the international fiscal crisis, when the multinationals held undisputed sway at the colonial periphery while at home in the civilised centre liberal welfare democracy seemed to be holding, if only just.

In the wake of the ensuing world recession and legitimacy crisis came a widespread cynicism about unreflectively optimistic fairy tales, a cynicism focussed most wonderfully by those debacles of liberation like the May 1968 uprising in France, the student movement in Europe and the USA, the impractical and complicit politics of the hippies, and most importantly, by what has come to be called the failure of the working class to achieve its historical mission. Whether these perceptions and diagnoses were justified or not does not matter here. What is important is that these circumstances inaugurated a process of intense re-theorizing in every domain of the human disciplines - with the conspicuous exception of psychology. That this process was uneven, at times localised, arcane, often childishly vituperative and abstruse beyond belief cannot be denied. By the late seventies however, a series of convergences could be discerned: specific theoretical gains found a large sympathetic audience and a certain paradigm

called post-structuralism began to dig itself in and to file a bid as the new orthodoxy in studies of the human and the social. In areas like media and cultural studies and in literary theory the take-over bid has been largely successful. In politics and sociology the contours and stakes remain bitterly contested. A particularly unfluential if much misunderstood strain reigns in european psychoanalysis. But in psychology - nary a ripple.

That is really neither accidental nor surprising, for the entire project of post-structuralism strikes at the heart of humanistic psychology. It denies the existence, on theoretical grounds, of the unified individual, or subject. What theoretical anti-humanism entails - for that, to the horror and outrage of the humanists is what it calls itself - is the understanding of persons as non-unitary, as a field of effects produced by discourse; in other words, as a by-product of meaning. Furthermore, this by-product is stripped of autonomy, agency, and all forms of effectivity central to the object of humanistic psychology, the self-functioning person. To put the case at its simplest: post-structuralism seems to propose the impossibility of psychology as we know it.

There have of course been periodic rumbles of discontent within psychology most of them addressing the issue of the pristine unified subject of psychology by way of arguing for an understanding of persons in terms of their social context rather than solely in terms of potentialities locked up in the monad. The collections by Israel and Tajfel (1) and Armistead (2), and the writings of Archibald (3), Shotter (4), Kelley (5), Gergen (6) and Ingleby (7) all attempted various forms of bridge-building that were in the end more tantalising than successful. The reason was that bridge-building tends to leave its promontories intact. The bifurcation between the individual and the social was being produced and perpetuated by the very conceptions of the individual and the social that were to hold up the bridge. The rapprochement efforts of the late sixties and early seventies could do little about that. The debate became trapped into a person-centred versus a society-centred argument about relative determination, an argument reminiscent in many ways of the phenomenology - behaviourism debate of the fifties and sixties.

Meanwhile what structuralism and post-structuralism had been busy with, had the psychologists only looked, was an extensive retheorisation of the

nature of subjects and the social, and what it was achieving was a new wayof conceiving of them. The fundamental insight central to all forms of post-structuralism is derived from structural linguistics : the world, or the 'real', can be encountered only via a representation of it. So far so phenomenological. The idea is however pushed considerably further in post-structuralism. The representations (preferably called signifying practices) are not reflections of the 'real' as they are for most forms of idealism. For post-structuralism, they have an autonomy, an effectivity and a positivity such that what the 'real' is, is constituted by the emsemble of signifying practices, otherwise known as discourse. Discourse is less a gateway to the 'real' than the network that makes up the 'real' itself. Care has to be taken not to crudify the issue. The post-structuralists are not saying that all material is somehow dissolved into mere meaning, although some otherwise canny commentators like Stuart Hall(8) sometimes feel they ought to impute this idealist move to them. The point is that the 'real' we percieve and act upon can only exist for us as a set of signitive differences. This is simultaneously an epistemological and an ontological claim. When we deal with the world, we act upon, connive or interfere with a set of differences. A capitalistic mode of production or a schedule of reinforcement, romantic love or humanist pedagogy intersect with human lives as a specific structure of differences, that is, as a discourse. They cannot and do not brutely and prerepresentationally bang us on the head. They are not any the less real for all that. Materiality and meaning are isomorphic.

The idea is taken still further. Having achieved discourse does not mean that the 'real'/discourse is automatically then transparent to everyone. What meaning as a system of differences effects is an opening up and a closing of positions from which it is to be accessed. It constructs positions from which people may encounter it: and encountering the discourse means being positioned in it in a particular way. We cannot experience anything outside of a particular subject position in a particular discourse. Indeed, we don't even exist pre-predicatively outside of a discourse! Discourse positions us as particular subjects and it is only from a particular subject position that our sense of self and of world is constructed. Discourse in effect constructs subjects, and empirical persons are simply the time/space intersection of their subject slots in the hierachy of discourse extant in society at a given time. This is the precise meaning of theoretical anti-humanism.

The breathtaking counter-intuitive impertinence of this way of talking is not lost on practicing humanists even when the accompanying ludic dimensions most usually are, and the yelps of dignity - impaired outrage like those of E P Thompson have become commonplace. But the implications for psychology had yet to be tackled head on. This is the monumental ambition of Changing the Subject (hereafter CTS). The title announces a dual intention: first, to change the subject of psychology, to open it up so that its complicity with power is seen and, perhaps, re-aligned to a properly emancipatory account; and second, to develop a politics of changing the human subject from its thrall in dominant discourse. CTS anounces itself therefore as a project of reconstruction, or at least demystification. This project is not unproblematic, as I shall show.

The five authors divide the work into three sections, each section prefaced by a longish introduction that tries to make various chunks of post-structuralism understandable if not plausible to Anglo-Saxon eyes. Section one dissects the individual - social dualism in current psycho and then goes on to discuss two issues: one, how that dualism, and especially its individual-centredness, fatally flaws the practice of psychological assessment in organisations (Wendy Holloway) and two, the way in which social psychology approaches the issue of racism by thematising individual prejudice (Julian Henriques). Section two dives in at the deep end and takes the reader by a long and complicated route through early anti-humanism via Althusser, discusses his failure to understand the issue of signification, then introduces us to Foucault's early work. The introduction ends with a useful discussion of Foucault's notions of discourse, power and knowledge. It is worth saying something about these, since Foucault is the central theoretical resource in the book.

For Foucault, power is not an external force, nor is it a possession of for instance a king, a jailer or a class. It is the vital current that animates the micro-circuits of human commerce and sociality. It enables as much as it constrains. It is explicitly theorised against a marxist notion of power as the-power-to-exploit. Power, says Foucault, should not be tied to a locus in this way. It is ubiquitous. It is, in short, a field concept, and as such has a lot in common with the concept of power used in systems theory. Raven and French's (9) social psychological classic on social power uses such a notion, as did Kurt Lewin (10) before

them. More scandalously, it has been suggested that Foucault's power is the obverse of that deployed by Talcott Parsons(11). Be that as it may, what all of these field notions of power have in common is their refusal to privilege either a source for power (like the ruling class) or, by extension, a source for its overthrow (like the working class or some other social movement). What Foucault calls knowledge is correlatively a set of signifying practices constituted in discourse always in tandem with power. What this ineluctable bondage of knowledge to power does is to refuse to privilege any form of knowledge. All power/knowledges are social constructions that in turn produce specific subjects. No one is truer than another. The discourse of clinical psychiatry, for instance, produces madness and mad people; the discourse of penology produces the incarceral subject, the modern criminal. It is not hard to see why Foucault is so frequently accused of relativism although the charge is, I think, misdirected. It is less easy to defend him against the charge of nihilism, for without any privileged forms of sociality it is difficult to see how any idea of emancipation could be forged (12).

Couze Venn's chapter produces an account of the conditions of possibility for modern psychology. the major condition is of course the construction of the solitary, radically interior, private and very bourgeois individual the birth of which Venn, along with Foucault, but also with Derrida, the phenomenologists and Bertrand Russell, - pegs in the seventeenth century with Descartes and his Meditations. This condition is only realised in the later nineteenth century when specific social technologies of regulation were developed to facilitate the transition of early capitalist society into a disciplinary regime policed by these technologies. These technologies worked by constructing a Darwinian 'normal individual' as a scientific object of study and normalisation. A psychology hellbent on calibration was the most important of these.

Now this is notoriously difficult stuff to read and evaluate not least because Venn does not show us the emergence of the bourgeois individual and the normalised subject by examining specific texts, as the deconstructionists do. He simply asserts connections and we have no way of judging them. He also radically backgrounds parts of the history, at least as I read it. What the emancipatory doctrines of the nineteenth century saw in Darwin's evolutionism was a man-made road away from

feudal pessimism and divine inevitability. This is why Marx, for example, was so impressed by Darwin. By marrying Darwin's primitive social engineering to Descartes' 'tremulous private body'(13)by fiat,Venn obscures the fact that an entirely different, more optimistic, assertive, and social theorisation of the individual could happily cohabit with Darwin, and did: Marx's social subject of the Manifesto and the Theses, for instance. That evolutionism was ultimately a constraining doctrine does not void its positive features. Broad-brush history of the sort produced by Venn tends to blast all such subtleties away.

Valerie Walderdine's chapter tackles the conditions of possibility of developmental psychology and child-centred pedagogy. She effectively unmasks the liberatory pretensions of humanistic pedagogy, and by looking at the actual classroom production of this pedagogy as well as at the way child-centredness began to be theorised by Montessori and Neill and also by Piaget - that is, by looking at both the transformation of practises as well as the transformation of discourse - she shows the emergence of a new form of scientifically produced regulation, what Foucault would call a new regime of truth.

She skillfully shows how the child-centred claims for freedom, caritas and unfetteredness emerged in the context of the medicalisation of poverty, the criminalisation of unemployment, and the principled isolation of individual children: "It is perhaps the supreme irony that the concern for individual freedom and the hope of a naturalised rationality that could save mankind should have provided the conditions for the production of a set of apparatuses which would aid in the production of the normalised child." (p.190)

There is enormous richness in this chapter, but there are also absences which require explanation or at least some contextualisation. This account of a new subjectification at the very site of the discourse of freedom and liberation succeeds in part because it is peopled by passive subjects, subjects constructed by virtue of practices which deny them effective agency. Indeed, this account is laced together by gerundives and the passive tense. Now, the problem is not simply one of omission. Once the turn towards theoretical anti-humanism is made, the issue of agency is automatically backgrounded, and this backgrounding

has itself become the site of a seemingly intractable misunderstanding. Judith Williamson for instance asks in by now familiar humanist exasperation how Walkerdine imagines pedagogy can be changed unless by some politics of agency, some humanistically-inspired political will to change (14). It doesn't suffice to rehearse against Williamson the theoretical arguments which underpin her misunderstanding of the kind of account produced here. The uncomfortable fact remains that subjects are passively constructed in Walkerdine's account, and passive they remain. The theoretical advance is made at the expense of a politics of liberation, or at least so it seems. By denying power a locus and a counter-locus, the possibility of subjection being an outcome of struggle is precluded.

By basing itself on the ubiquity of power, it theorises the issue of the social as the construction of a vast collectivity of individually-constituted subjects; it does not theorize the construction of a collective subject, a class or a social movement. This is a doubly strange lacuna since the success of the collective struggle of feminism from which 3 out of 5 authors of this book come is an obvious demonstration of its inadequacy.

The final section of the book grows more explicitly out of feminist concerns, having to do with gender difference (Wendy Holloway) and mothering (Cathy Urwin). The theoretical introduction takes on the developmental psychoanalysis of Lacan, and in particular tries to make workable his notion of desire. It will come as no surprise to learn that desire is discursively produced, but Holloway goes on to demonstrate that the subject-slots in discourses concerning sexuality are variably taken up, and the variation is produced by different investments of desire, which in turn depend upon a psycho-social history that has ultimately got to do with that tutelage of desire which we commonly call growing up.

What's nice about Holloway's chapter is that she develops her account through interviews and self-reflection. She tells us that as an adolescent she wanted "to walk, swim, run, drive - as far and as fast as my men companions" (p.229) and goes on to show that the terms of that investment were set by the particular gender discourses available to her. But her method raises questions of its own. There is a disconcerting

tendency in her account for the agency of subjects to turn imperceptibly into the agency of discourse. For instance she tells us how Clare uses her 'feminity' to ensnare Phil. Or are they both snared by the 'male sexual drive discourse'? The problematic nature of the notion of discourse surfaces here. Foucault's own use of the concept changes from one of discourse-agency in his earlier work (Archeology and Discipline and Punish) to one where subjects construct themselves, and latterly he barely mentions the notion of discourse (History of Sexuality). The distance marked by his theoretical development translates into a perplexing slippage in CTS.

An uncharitable view of what Holloway accomplishes here would see her developing a kind of political economy of courting, a post-Eric Bernian scenario of adolescent sexuality as a battlefield where boys are discursively predisposed to win. That would be unfair. In the end she shows herself to be less an intrusive interviewer than an extremely perceptive counsellor to her interviewees. Her method exemplifies a paradoxical politics of counselling where her theory might suggest that it could not succeed.

Cathy Urwin continues this theme in what is probably the most conventionally psychological chapter in the book. She comprehensively and persuasively re-interprets the current account of the development of children's language, and shows the need for a psychoanalytic dimension of power/language which she mines from Lacan. Subjectivity, she shows, is produced by specific mother/child practices which have far more to do with issues of control, loss and desire sited in the unconscious than with either developmental stages or pragmatic mothering strategies. Urwin goes furtherest in according an agency to desire/investment. Indeed, she shows that in their relations with their babies mothers choose whether to position themselves as active lovers or passive love objects: "we are produced as capable or assertive action, yet also fragile and acutely vulnerable".(p.321) This is an extremely important conclusion tho' it comes right at the end of the book. The next question must be: what are the discursive conditions which optimise such a production of assertiveness? This is surely the question posed by any project directed to 'changing the subject'. By a prolix, subterannean and extremely informative route, CTS falls just short of addressing it.

How are we then to evaluate this dole-queue theorising, and activity that would rather avoid premature totalisation or that "microscopic fascism installed at the heart of the machinery of desire" (15), than provide what Judith Williamson and the masses would regard as material useful for struggle? Detractors would probably want to see their theorisation of the 'private normalised individual' as being more a product of their theory of discourse than a necessary feature of late capitalism. This would quite simply be wrong. An important non-Foucaldian 'discourse-theoretic' politics is emerging in the work of Laclau and Mouffe (16), one which explicitly theorises how the democratic collective subject can be produced in discourse without sacrificing any of the theoretical gains won by the turn to discourse. Another response would find it passing strange that a long book on psychology almost totally neglects the issue of consciousness: the word is glossed only twice in the index, both times in the final chapter. Indeed, a parallel project to CTS can be found in Philip Wexler's recent book (17), an exemplary account of how the 'technologies of the social' like psychology have recapitulated the dominant cultural logic of late capitalism, and what critically conscious social movements might do about it. Perhaps also one could respond with Anthony Giddens and say that what Foucault lacks is a notion of 'discursive consciousness', a notion that points to the subject's knowledgeability about his or her fatal imbrication in discourse, and the very real material consequence this has for action (18). In the end, all of these responses would deflect attention from the main point of CTS: that human subjects are non-unitary, and that all unifications are the product of some or other form of discursive closure. Psychology has been party to one of the most insidious forms of unification, by putting the idea of the self-contained, unified individual at the heart of its practice and constructively ensuring that it stays there. If this book has done anything to dislodge that construction, and I think it most assuredly has, then it will have helped to return an "ethics of politics" (19) to psychology. That is not a contribution to be sneezed at.

NOTES

1. Israel, J and H Tajfel (eds). The social context of social psychology: a critical assessment. London : Academic press, 1972.

2. Armistead, N (ed). Reconstructing social psychology. Harmondsworth; Penguin, 1974.

3. Archibald, W.P. Social psychology as political economy. Toronto : McGraw-Hill, 1978.

4. For example, Shotter, J. 'Homo duplex, the personal and the political' unpublished paper presented to the BPS, UK, 1978.

5. Kelley, G.A. The psychology of personal constructs. New York: Norton, 1958.

6. For example, Gergen, K. 'Social psychology as history'. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 26, 1973

7. Ingleby, D. 'The job psychologists do' in N. Armistead op.cit

8. Hall, S. 'Authoritarian populism : a reply to Jessop et al' NLR, 151, 1985, esp. p. 122.

9. French, J.R.P. and B. Raven. 'The bases of social power'. in D. Cartwright and A. Zander (eds). Group Dynamics : research and theory. London : Tavistock, 1970.

10. Lewin, K. Field theory in social science. New York: Harper, 1951.

11. Kroker, A. 'Modern power in reverse image : the paradigm shift of Michel Foucault and Talcott Parsons'. in J. Fekete (ed). The structural allegory. Manchester : Manchester University Press, 1984.

12. See for instance the case made by Gillian Rose in Dialectic of nihilism : post-structuralism and law. Oxford : Basil Blackwell, 1985.

13. The phrase used in the title of Francis Barker's The tremulous private body : essays in subjection. London : Methuen, 1984.

14. Williamson, J. 'Is there anyone here from a classroom? and other questions of education! Screen, 26, 1, 1985.

15. Introduction to Section 3 : Theorizing Subjectivity, p.226. They are in fact the words of Deleuze and Guattari.

16. Laclau, E and C. Mouffe. Hegemony and socialist strategy : towards a radical democratic politics. London : Verso, 1985.

17. Wexler, P. Critical social psychology. Boston : RKP, 1983.

18. Giddens, A. The constitution of society. Cambridge : Polity Press, 1984.

19. See 'Politics and ethics : an interview' in P. Rabinow (ed). The Foucault reader. New York : Pantheon Books, 1984.

Reply to Nzimande

D A L Coldwell



Nzimande's long "bold and courageous" article against "mainstream" Industrial Psychology (Psychology in Society 2) has prompted me to write since it raises numerous issues that should not be "glossed over unchallenged".

Nzimande uses the time worn strategy of moving from "common knowledge" to inaccurate and, on occasions, highly emotive criticisms of, in this case, mainstream industrial psychology in order to build up a monstrous straw man, tailored to meet the requirements of his own ideological persuasions, which he then hastily proceeds to ignite without, I might add, too much concern for what else he burns down in doing so.

Let's have a look at some of the straw in this man. The first point is that by his own admission (p.55) the article is a critical evaluation which is neither positive nor creative; it sets out to criticise without having any real alternative other than a vague blue-print for a "materialist industrial psychology".

Secondly, again by his own admission (p.55) it is aimed at an out-group, the "them" industrial psychologists rather than the "us" critical social scientists. Moreover, the "them" he writes, require simplistic arguments to be able to understand "us".

These two points are quite breathtaking in that they imply that the article is not only destructive but simplistically formulated. Further reading confirms that the author is indeed accurate in his description of his own work. Unfortunately these are among the only really accurate

statements made throughout the entire article which stretches on for some length.

Allow me to point to some of these inaccuracies and misrepresentations, dealing more specifically with my own work to which Nzimande refers. I leave the others to the other authors whose work he criticises as I feel sure that, if they happen to read the article, they will take up the cudgels too on their own behalf.

Before he begins his argument against the methodology used in mainstream industrial psychology, Nzimande first makes certain assumptions which I feel are totally unjustified, except that they provide his with the initial handfuls to erect his monstrous man of straw. Firstly, that unpublished studies at the NIPR generally take the form of published ones. Even a cursory glance through the unpublished work of the NIPR will prove that this is simply not the case. Secondly, that the two authors he selects for his pillory, whose work was published in Psychologia Africana, represents a fair cross-section of the entire industrial psychological work published in a journal which had been in existence for over twenty years.

His arguments against the methodology used in such studies is equally superficial and erroneous. For example, his accusation that. "The one major characteristic of the methods used in such studies is that they have avoided the use of more open-ended approaches that may yield undesirable or controversial information" (p.57). Even a superficial understanding of the dialectical approach proposed in Psychologia Africana (1982) will indicate that this is a gross misrepresentation of that work. Similarly, his suggestion that there is some insidious "capitalist plot" to deliberately use methods which systematically exclude sensitive information among industrial psychologists is, in my experience, really quite wild. One wonders how, in any case, Nzimande is able to pontificate about something for which there is no certain evidence short of first finding out what the actual motive of the Psychologist (in this case Backer) really was. It is quite possible, in the example cited (p.58) that Backer merely, and without malicious intent, wished to reduce the amount of data he would otherwise have had to handle and to maintain a focus on the selected objective of his investigation. Nzimand's argument about the

use of statistical correlation techniques and his description of its aim as - "The basic aim of this technique is to get (sic) to what extent certain variables or factors correlate with other variables or factors" (p.58) - simply will not do.

His arguments about the dangers of using Likert-type scales and ranking techniques are well known among industrial psychologists and are usually countered with,for example, open-ended inclusions; and ranking scales, in nearly all recent examples are formulated to allow the subject to include factors not listed by the researcher.

Although Nzimande acknowledges that the laboratory experiment "... is on the decline in industrial psychological studies of black workers in the country" (p.60), he omits to give a single reference of this kind of work. Certainly, in my experience of roughly 12 years in industrial social science research I have not come across a single example of the kind of laboratory experiment Nzimande specifically describes.

The central methodological issue which Nzimande concerns himself with becomes clear on page 62 of this article: "The point which this article is trying to get to is that although the methods as such may be useful scientific tools they have been used in a manner that excluded contentious information, as it will become evident in the discussion of results of such studies". However, since there is no way of knowing precisely what contentious information (if any) has been left out, without highly imaginative ideological extrapolations, Nzimande's argument falls flat on its face. This is not to deny that methodological errors have occurred, but to argue as Nzimande does, that scientific tricks have been used deliberately by researchers to exclude information is simply not true.

On page 63 Nzimande refers to an article which I co-authored with Moerdyk (1982). He criticises the generalization about the socialization basis by which world views are passed from generation to generation (taken virtually unaltered from Onyemelukwe, 1973) for being "sweeping", and because it is "made without any reference to the possible influence of the current socio-political situation in South Africa". The whole purpose of this article and the earlier one is that they argue for a movement away from the current white cultural hegemony in industry where the Western managerial

paradigm rides roughshod over the indigenous African culture. The solution proposed by these authors is that the dominant Western paradigm in industry must be adapted and transformed in order to meet the requirements of Africans (just as it had been done with marked success by the Japanese). Hardly an argument in support of the "system" I would have thought.

Similarly, NZimande misses the point when he argues that world views take no account of political , economic and ideological relations in South Africa today (p.80). World views are both a product of these relations and pre-date them. These articles attempt to trace the core of these contrasting world views in African and Calvinistic philosophy, compare them with Japanese and Chinese world views, argue for the essential durability of the African concept of "ubuntu" across class and sub-cultural boundaries, and suggest ways of adapting, even dismantling, the dominant western business paradigm.

Generalizations they undoubtedly are, but no suggestion that they might be otherwise was ever made by the authors who believe they still serve a useful heuristic purpose. There seems little point in Nzimande criticising generalizations for being generalizations. In this regard, it seems quite reasonable to regard blacks as well as whites as homogenous groups since the level of generalization or abstraction of the world view or philosophical description justifies this. It is also quite wrong for Nzimande (p.81) to accuse the 'cultural approach' for treating blacks as a homogenous group since it clearly does not, and however much the "state machinery" may or may not perpetrate ethnic groupings, any cursory reading of history will reveal that these ethnic groupings long pre-date the foundation of the apartheid state. Having criticised the cultural approach for treating blacks as a homogeneous group, Nzimande, paradoxically, refers to generalizations acceptable in his own ideological community, such as "working class culture and black petty (sic) bourgeousie culture". (I have nothing against such generalizations, I wish only to point to Nzimande's intellectual inconsistency).

Nzimande moves on in his article to a discussion of science and in particular its misuse. "First of all it must be pointed out that science can be subject to misuse. There is a very real danger, as it is already happening that science can be used quite successfully to serve particular

interests" (p.68). This is hardly a revelation and in any case the point is not whether science can be misused, but whether it is misused in "mainstream" South African industrial psychology. Nzimande goes on to inform us that "science is not immune to ideological infiltration" (p.69). Indeed not! Presumably Nzimande's proposed materialist industrial psychology would not be immune to this kind of contamination. He tells us: "... I feel obliged to explode the myth that science can be practised without being influenced by the social, political, economic and ideological factors in the particular environment in which it is practised" (p.70). Any cursory reading of the vast literature on the sociology of knowledge would have shown Nzimande that this myth had been exploded a few years before he wrote his article (However, the blame for this may reside in the compartmentalization of social science education in South Africa, of which he discusses later in the paper). He talks of "positivism in the social sciences" (p.71) without defining what he means by positivism, which is, after all a much bandied about concept. Finally, he writes "Science does not emanate from 'supra' human beings or from the heavens in the sky. Such understanding will go a long way towards the demystification of science" (p.73). Does Nzimande really expect us "mainstream industrial psychologists" to take this seriously?
One wonders who, if anyone, ever supposed that science had such a heavenly existence, and how this knowledge helps in the demystification of science puzzles me.

I would agree with Nzimande's complaint that concepts devised in the United States are sometimes uncritically and without alteration transposed to South Africa (p.72); but I wonder how many mainstream industrial psychologists do this. Speaking for myself, Coldwell (1982), this is simply not the case. Again, paradoxically, on page 80, he criticises the use of an adapted version of the TAT designed specifically for South African blacks.

In short, it would seem that Nzimande has fallen into an ideological trap (p.78) of his own making.

There is one fallacious form of reasoning with which this paper is shot through which bears a rough resemblance to Moore's "naturalistic

fallacy", through quite different form it, of which Nzimande seems to be unaware.

Over and over again when Nzimande describes the "is" situation of South African industrial psychology (which we have already shown to be inaccurate) he immediately assumes this to be what mainstream industrial psychologists morally and ideologically stand for, the 'ought'. With absolutely no evidence cited to support that this is indeed the ideological stance taken by mainstream industrial psychologists, he makes a fallacious leap in reasoning by arguing that because the findings "fit hand in glove with the ruling ideas of this country" (p.77) (which in many cases they don't) they expose the ideological position of the industrial psychologists concerned. I have some sympathy with his complaints against industrial psychology in South Africa for being too compartmentalized and for it being over concerned with professionalization and specialization, though my reasons for doing so are somewhat different from Nzimande's (p.85-86).

In his conclusion Nzimande writes: "Industrial psychology must ditch once and for all the current management framework within which black workers are studied. The abandoning of this approach can only help the discipline to erase its present stigma of being a particular brand of managerial ideology" (p.37). One wonders whether the kind of ideological substitution Nzimande proposes would do anything of the kind. A more likely outcome would be to exchange one type of stigma with another. However, I would agree that industrial psychology is excessively management oriented and the remedial steps must be taken to correct this bias.

Finally, Nzimande's faith in history is misplaced "... to prove that the repository of objectivity on truth is history itself" (p.87). I would have thought that he who wrote the history would have a pronounced affect on what was written.

It is a pity that Nzimande stakes all on an ideological polemic for there are, if one looks closely enough, bits of real flesh among the straw.

Reply to Hountondji

Michael Cross

Hountondji's chapter African Philosophy, Myth and Reality, published in Psychology in Society (no 2, January 1985), raises issues of major importance to any scholar concerned with the development of philosophical thought in the contemporary Africa. The chapter is an attempt to show that the prevailing idea of 'African philosophy', in the literature devoted to the problem, "has so far been the subject of only mythological exploitation". 'African philosophy' has been erroneously identified with an allegedly existing African world-view. Rather, African philosophy exists not as "the fiction of a collective system of thought", but "as a set of philosophical discourses and texts".(p.13)

Two main types of literature articulating a popular concept of African philosophy are distinguished in the African philosophical tradition: i) that articulating the church's views, ii) and that expressing the general ethno-philosophical conceptions. The former, according to Hountondji, are preoccupied in finding a "psychological and cultural basis for rooting a Christian message in the African's mind". It conceives of philosophy "on the model of religion, as a permanent, stable system of beliefs, unaffected by evolution, impervious to time and history, ever identical to itself".(p.17) The latter, broader in scope, seeks, in the various manifestations of African civilization and history, a "solid bedrock which might provide a foundation of certitudes, i.e. a system of beliefs". (p.18) Its main task is a "passionate search for the identity that was denied by the colonizer". This, in Hountondji's explanation, is connected to the fact that the word philosophy itself is applied to African with different meaning, "to designate no longer the specific discipline it evokes in its Western context but merely a collective world-view, an implicit, spontaneous,

perhaps even unconscious system of beliefs to which all Africans are supposed to adhere".(p.19) Behind this use, he proceeds, "there is a myth at work, the myth of primitive unanimity, with its suggestion that in 'primitive' societies - that is to say, non-Western societies - everybody always agrees with everybody else".(p.19) The result is that "there can be no individual beliefs or philosophies but only collective systems of belief".(p.19) Thus, an African philosophy, in this sense, "has to account for an imaginary unanimity, to interpret a text which nowhere exists and has to be constantly reinvented, it is a science without an object, a 'crazed language' accountable to nothing, a discourse that has no referent, so that its falsity can never be demonstrated".(p.22)

What would be an alternative concept of African philosophy for Hountondji? Firstly, he reminds us that we cannot apply the same term to two different things: the collective world-view on the one hand and, on the other, the individual analytic activity which takes that world-view as its object. If one of these things has to be called philosophy, it would be the individual analytic activity. Thus, what in fact constitutes African philosophy is the body of philosophical literature written by African thinkers, dealing either with African issues or non-African issues.(p.24) He stresses that "what we are acknowledging is what it is, not what it says".(p.24) The criterion for this new definition is the geographical origin of the authors rather than an alleged specificity of content. The effect would be to treat African philosophy "as a methodical inquiry with the same universal aims as those of any other philosophy in the world", destroying the dominant "mythological conception of Africanness" and restoring the truth that "Africa is above all a continent and the concept of Africaan empirical, geographical concept and not a metaphysical one".(p.28) He warns, however, that "it is not enough to recognize the existence of an African philosophical literature".(p.34) This should be transformed, from "the simple collection of writings aimed at non-African readers and consequently upholding the pecularities of a so-called African 'world-view' that it is today, into the vehicle of a free and rigourous discussion among African philosophers themselves".(p.34)

This paper is a preliminary attempt to discuss ethno-philosophical thinking in South Africa in the light of Hountondji's re-assessment of African philosophy. It is assumed that the criticisms he made in the African

Philosophy, Myth and Reality do not apply exclusively to his own region (West Africa), but that they constitute a meaningful contribution for an understanding of the South African experience in so far as philosophical thought is concerned. The influence of ethnophilosophy has been quite strong in South Africa. It will be demonstrated through some examples how some of the myths challenged by Hountondji have been reproduced and developed by some South African philosophers, who, as many others, never 'questioned the nature and theoretical status of their own analyses'. As the paper in Psychology in Society 2 is preceded by an introduction written by Hayes and Nzimande, where some criticisms are advanced on Hountondji's thesis, this paper will start with a brief assessment of those criticisms.

Hayes' and Nzimande's criticisms

Hountondji is accused of dismissing the popular idea of African philosophy as ethnophilosophy too quickly. This is related to his unfortunate statements that "it has nothing beyond this ideological function: it is an inderterminate discourse with no object" and this "seemingly universal dialogue simply encourages the worst kind of cultural particularism ... because its supposed peculiarities are in the main purely imaginary". The critics think that Hountondji's 'notion of ideology, which seems influenced by an Althusserian conception, does not easily allow for a more concrete historical and scientific analysis of the social and theoretical practices of ethnophilosophy".(Hayes and Nzimande, p.9) To support this, they mention the fact that Hountondji was a student in Paris in the sixties at the time of A thusser ascendancy in Marxist philosophy. They believe that the notion of ideology evoked here has a theoretical or practical implication. It could "encourage identifying certain discourses and texts as ideological and hence rejecting them summarily, without subjecting them to a necessary and detailed political, historical and theoretical analysis".(p.9)

I shall argue that these criticisms do not do justice to Hountondji's thesis. Firstly, they do not recognize the method and academic discipline which, explicitly or implicitly, is incorporated in his book - a careful critical analysis of the sources. Surprisingly the critics have accepted this as a lesson to be drawn from his work. I quote:

> "... Hountondji's book is introduced with an excellent critical history of (West) African scolarship-mostly social science scholarship ... It critically assesses the work of African scholars in their attempts to struggle against the domination of their cultures and societies by colonialism and capitalism, from Senghorian negritude and its critiques to the 'new' philosophy of Marcien Towa and Houtondji in post-colonial Africa. A comprehensive and critical history of social science in South Africa would certainly help us in trying to develop a democratic social scientific practice in a politically transformed and free South Africa". (p.10)

Besides that, Hountondji is also concerned with the need for a rigourous scrutiny of the ethnophilosophical literature, though, probably, motivated by different reasons. For example, he mentions the fact that the diversity and contradictory nature of this literature could be easily assessed "if one could overcome one's understandable boredom, read all of them one by one, examine them patiently and juxtapose all the views they contain".(p.20) Secondly, and more important, the theoretical connection made by the critics between the two parts of their criticism is problematic and seems to be grounded on mere academic prejudices. I refer here to their assumption that the recognisance of ethnophilosophical literature as mere ideology would lead to a summary rejection of certain discourses and texts identified as ideological, "without subjecting them to a necessary and detailed political, historical and theoretical analysis". Why? Although Hountondji is probably mistaken that 'African philosophy' has nothing beyond its ideological function of being an indeterminate discourse with no object, there is not enough evidence that the notion of ideology evoked here is an expression of Althusserian thinking. The connection made with Althusser at a time when his thought had no significant projection in the social sciences seems to be a bit artificial. However, even accepting their supposed claims on Althusserian notion of ideology in Hountondji's statements, their objection remains problematic. For ideology, in the Althusserian sense, belongs to the ideologican state apparatus and exists dialectically in interaction with the economic and social base that inluences it or conditions it. Thus a rigourous understanding of a social process necessarily requires an understanding of the political, ideological and social practices of the society. Ethnophilosophy viewed in the

above-mentioned sense would be part of these social practices. I would say that what seems to constitute the grounds of Hayes and Nzimande's criticisms is an academic prejudice, i.e. the assumption that ideology belongs to an analytically worthless area of social practice. This is clearly false, although this is not the place to discuss this issue.

There is, nevertheless, another dimension in which Hayes and Nzimande could have based their criticisms. They could accuse Hountondji of falling into another extreme in his claims that 'African philosophy' has nothing beyond its ideological function as a 'smokescreen behind which each author is able to manipulate his own philosophical views'. For to manipulate one's own philosophical views it implies that there are some philosophical problems within the African world or elsewhere. Further, these views, systematised in form of literature, are accepted by Hountondji as the real African philosophy, i.e. "literature produced by Africans and dealing with philosophical problems".(p.24) About this they would, perhaps, argue that although this literature can play an ideological role, there is in it some expression of an African philosophy. Philosophy which, according to Hountondji, should be transformed into "the vehicle of a free and rigourous discussion among African philosophers themselves".(p.34) Hayes and Nzimande are themselves trapped by Hountondji's ambiquity. For example, after accusing Hountondji of dismissing ethnophilosophy too quickly, i.e. considering it ideological and an imaginary effect, they lasted basically assuming his thesis and identifying ethnophilosophy as the 'reality of the unreality' and as being ideological:

> "It is important that we detail <u>how</u> and <u>why</u> the 'imaginary effects' of the ideological discourses of 'African philosophy' conceal, obscure, lie about, avoid, romanticise the harsh political, economic and social realities of present-day struggles in Africa. This is in fact the urgent theoretical and political task facing social scientists, or in Hountondji's case - philosophers in (South) Africa at the moment. <u>It is the difficult reality of the unreality promoted by ethnophilosophers that we must analyse and expose, and not only identify as ideological, which it of course is</u>". (Hayes and Nzimande, p.9)

It is suggested here that a task of the philosophers should be the analysis and exposition of that reality of the unreality. Apparently it seems a simple game of quibbling or a play on words. That is not so. Indeed, they have missed the fact that beyond the 'reality of the

unreality' promoted by the ethnophilosophers there is another reality: the reality of African philophical literature, already recognized by Hountondji, no matter if it has or does not have an ideological function. There is much plausibility that this should be the main concern of the social scientists. This rules out a mere investigation into the African world-view as the main task of African philosophers. The task would be to identify, transform and develop the philosophical reality hidden in the ethnophilosophy tradition. Furthermore, the unreality does not express itself as such through an analysis of it but rather through a concrete analysis of a related concrete reality. In this sense the 'reality of the unreality' is not a starting point or an object which we can analyse and expose. It is itself the result or exposition of the results of an analytical work. Only an analytical work can make it reveal itself as an unreality.

Ethnophilosophical tradition in South Africa

There are two main extremes in the tradition of ethnophilosophy in South Africa. There are those who believe that philosophy should be centred and based on cultural diversity, particularly, on ethnic identity, incorporating the values, beliefs and forms of life of each different ethnic group. In this sense, each ethnicity would have a particular world view and, consequently, a particular philosophy. The particular ethnic world-view (often called philosophy of life) would constitute the object of analysis of the philosophers. This view is present, inter alia, in the writings of prominent philosophers like Professor J. Chris Coetzee and Professor P.C. Luthuli. However, Luthuli appeared during the last decade as the most representative proponent of Hountondji's myth of African unanimity within its particular South African version. This is the view that the Black people in South Africa as opposed to the White people have a specific understanding of their world's problems and a particular world-view which constitute their philosophy of life. It is important to note, however, that the ethnophilosophical approach in South Africa has the particularity of being conventional and dominant amongst philosophers dealing with educational problems. For example, philosophers following the line of Coetzee tended to defend the argument that 'in South Africa there is a diversity of cultures, therefore in South Africa we need a variety of 'philosophies of education'. (See Rose and Tunmer, and Morrow, 1984)

This was assumed even amongst the English-speaking White liberals. For example, during 1980 an attempt was made through a distribution of a questionaire to the English-speaking teachers in the Transvaal to discover their common view on educational matters, i.e. their philosophy of education. In general this was a failure and the last report did not mention any kind of English-speaking philosophy of education. Instead it was referred to as "Attitudes of teachers in English-speaking schools and tertiary instutions in South Africa to education".(Gluckman, 1981). This was proof that within the English-speaking teachers there is still a significant degree of disagreement, though the majority tended to agree (1). The ethnophilosophical conception in this initiative is well illustrated by the words of one of the promoters:

> "On many occasions, various members of the TTA had complained that they were expected by headmasters or inspectors to implement the CNE philosophy in their teaching. When they objected to this imposition of an Afrikaans culture on English-speaking children, they were informed that in terms of the 1967 Education Policy Act, it was their duty to do so. Their objection to this interpretation of the Act was met with the question, 'Well, how do you interpret the Act? What do you English believe in anyway?' Either because they had not thought through their educational beliefs, or because they were unable to articulate them in a systematic form, these teachers were unable to give an answer. But even if they had been able to do so, the rejoinder would have been, 'That's just your opinion. How can you prove that other English teachers agree with you?"
> This then was our motivation- to provide such teachers with a systematic philosophy of Education, which, we eventually hoped to prove, had the backing of the English-speaking community". (Gluckman, 1981, p.39)

Amongst the 'Black communities', Luthuli is one of the most representative ethnophilosophers in South Africa. In his D.Ed thesis, A Zulu-oriented Education and School Practice, he articulates the argument that to remedy the problems inherited by the Zulu people historically, education should be Zulu-oriented, i.e. based on the particular philosophy of life of the Zulu. The Zulu philosophy of life, an expression of the Zulu identity, is defined as that "immutable truths, values, sentiments, beliefs and traditions which make them to be recognized as Zulus and as different from Tswanas or Xhosas". (Thembela, 1982, p.27) In his perspective, Zulu philosophy would be the particular world-view of the Zulu people. In his later writings, this concept of philosophy and the

concept of education were broadened and conciliated with more general issues related to the future of South African Blacks (2). The new assumption is that there is a particular view of the world amongst Black people, that is a 'Black philosophy (of education), which expresses itself in 'Black terms' and from a 'Black perspective'. The supposed 'Black philosophy of education' - whether Zulu-oriented, Xhosa-oriented, etc. should be the basis of a Black oriented education.

The formulations of Luthuli raise many problems. As Thembela has pointed out in a reply, there is no way he can escape the charge of supporting the ideology of 'separate development'.(Thembela, 1982) His suggestion of an existence of a 'White perspective' is problematic. The recent debate on Problems of Pedagogics and 'Philosophies of Education for South Africa' constitute a sufficient proof that there has been divergences and contradictory philosophical views amongst the White groups (Afrikaans-speaking and English-speaking and even within these large groups)(3). The same divergences exist within the Black ethnicities. And in this case, Professor P C Luthuli resorted to fallacious premises. Take the example of his notion of Zuluness. For him, Zuluness is the expression of what is 'immutable' and timeless in Zulu way of life, i.e. "truths, sentiments, beliefs and traditions". The confusion here results from his belief that there is something 'immutable' amongst the Zulus beyond the colour of the skin. He fails to acknowledge that ethnicity is not a static and motionless entity, but is a dynamic and changing phenomenon. Social and cultural life-styles are in a constant and complex changing process. The Zulus did not escape the integrative pressures of the mass-media and economy, particularly the effects of the migrant labour. Those who fell into the circuit have brought new values, beliefs and life-styles. This is only one example among an almost infinite number of them. The immutability claimed by Professor P C Luthuli is a - historical and as such another myth. The alleged Zulu philosophy remains also a myth and his concern to set up an independent philosophical tree based on peculiarities of the Zulu people and to place himself as an interpreter cannot pass uncontested. Hountondji would correctly argue that if there is any philosophy in Luthuli's works, this is Luthuli's philosophy, though possibly based on Zulu people's traditions. Morrow (1982), who has launched severe criticisms to him would consider these works another

form of 'domestication' of philosophy, a remark implicit in P. Hountondji's book too.

Conclusion

What is at stake is the blind belief that any society ('community', 'ethnicity' or even race in a particular context) functions as a unitary, monolithic and harmonious unity, where, to use Hountondji's words, 'everybody agrees with everybody else', sharing the same world-view, based on common/particular values, beliefs, sentiments and traditions. Related to this, there is the assumption that particular and specific identities can be established or located at different levels, namely at the level of the ethnicity (ethnic identity), at the level of a continent (African or European or American identity), and at the level of race (White identity or Black identity). A particular set of values, beliefs, sentiments and traditions in general corresponds to each identity. In terms of philosophical practices, this is expressed by a determined and specific perceptions and interpretations of the world phenomena, i.e. particular world-view.

Hountondji has made an important contribution by reminding us that in all these creations there is a myth at work, the myth of unanimity. Those who believe in this unanimity proclaim that it should be the object of (ethno)philosophy, and that the role of the social scientists (philosophers?) would be to describe it. The first problem about this is that the diversity of opinions and views seems to prevail not only from 'identity' to 'identity', country to country, ethnicity to ethnicity but also between different social strata. In terms of philosophical perspectives, without falling into an absolute relativism, it would be significant to consider some of the individual variations. The second problem is about where to locate philosophy, whether at the level of the alleged common world-view or at the level of those who exercise the philosophical analytical activity. Here again, Hountondji is worth credibility in his suggestion that Philosophy is to be located at the second level-of those who pursue philosophical exercise when dealing with philosophical problems. As he has pointed out, this conforms to the universal concept of philosophy "as a methodical inquiry with the same universal aims as those of any other philosophy in the world".

Further, this rules out the risk of 'domestication' of philosophy. Philosophy, more than a body of timeless values, beliefs and sentiments, re-asserts itself as an activity. More than a special structure or body of 'knowledge' it can be regarded as an approach or a particular form of inquiry.

This is not to suggest that traditions have nothing to do with philosophy. A philosopher, to succeed in his/her enterprise needs, at least, a basic understanding of the traditions and the history of the particular society out of which the philosophical problems to be tackled arise. The current beliefs, values and traditions can, to a certain extent, inform or influence his philosophical perceptions, views and options without, nevertheless, changing the nature of his activity. The task of a philosopher as such will remain the same regardless the identity or specificity of the society.

FOOTNOTES

1. To follow this debate see "Interchange", Perspective in Education, 5 : 1, March 1981, and Gluckman (1981).

2. See P.C. Lutheli, Towards a Black Oriented Education and also A Philosophical Foundation of Black Oriented Education in S.A. (Dissertations).

3. See Beard and Morrow (1980).

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The Challenging Feminist: Notes on Germaine Greer's Sex and Destiny

Jacklyn Cock

This book has been cariacatured as a retraction of Greer's feminist commitment. (1) In reality it is an important source for those of us interested in adapting feminist ideas to a third world context. The book has weaknesses: most obviously the absence of a historical materialist framework means that her flashes of insight are informed by indignation, rather than any clear conceptualisation of the issues involved. However, several of her insights are important and challenging in that they cut across the mainstream of feminist thinking in advanced capitalist societies about, for example, 'the family' as the source of women's oppression, and the prioritizing of sexual fulfilment.

Sexuality.

Her starting point is that sexual organisation is an essential part of all cultures and that the proponents of birth control are often insensitive to the cultural patterns of sexual restraint (such as post-partum abstinence) in many third world societies. Such proponents often operate on the assumption that the sum total of sexual energy available for expression is uniform across all cultures. In advanced capitalist societies sex has become "the new opiate of the people" (p. 199), but behind what she terms "sex-religion" Greer sees a particular form of repression, namely a tremendous sexual orthodoxy. "We have long understood that different cultures express sexual activity differently; that while some have 'high affect' (that is, they are obsessed by sex in thought and word) they have low activity (that is, infrequent genital contact); others have low affect (that is, they take a very casual attitude to sex) and a very high level of activity". (p.204) She points to anthropological evidence on societies which have both low affect and low activity and no evidence of sexual energy sublimated in

war or artistic activity, and concludes, "the truth is that the sexual energy of the human animal is not a pan-cultural constant but rather developed in response to complex cultural stimuli to varying levels in various cultures". (p. 204) The implication is that "Freud's image of man as a highly sexual creature may in fact derive from his own experience of the victims of a culture of extremely high affect, principally expressed in detailed prohibitions and a vigorous pornographic subculture, as well as medical fasination with the subject, and low activity". (p. 204) This is clearly relevant to those contemporary psychologists who are the inheritors of Freud and Reich, and who tend to view the sexual orgasm as of overriding psychological i portance in releasing tension which will otherwise generate aberrant behaviour and neurosis.

That same intellectual tradition has informed what Lasch (1980) has termed the contemporary 'culture of narcissism' in which sexuality is debased by our self-involvement and inability tosustain meaningful relationships. (2) Without referring to the Lasch critique, Greer expresses the central insight: "The state of being inorgastic is sometimes described as being 'out of touch with oneself', a revealing phrase, for it gives away the basic self-centeredness of the whole cult, or 'not into one's body' which in turn reveals the drawing away of the individual's attention from the external world of politics and social activity". (p.201) It is this preoccupation with self-discovery and personal growth that Lasch terms "unseemly self absorption". In his view this signifies "a retreat from politics", a withdrawal from engagement with social issues, an erosion of "the will to change social conditions, to restore meaning and dignity to everyday life". Contemporary psychologists are culpable in that "the therapuetic solution justifies self absorption as authenticity and awareness".

Greer is aware of the link between modern obsessions with sexuality and consumerism. She writes, "sex is the lubricant of the consumer economy" (p. 198) and suggests that sexual commodities are possibly the most profitable area of capitalism "next to the market of aggression - the armaments industry". (p. 207) However, she fails to relate this commoditization of sexuality to capital's quest for a universal market.

Her views on the social construction of female sexuality in advanced

capitalism' hints at a deeper critique of the 'emasculation' of modern feminism. In South Africa this emasculation is currently taking two closely related forms: firstly the co-option of feminist politics by white bourgeoise women concerned with making more room at the top for an already privileged fraction of our population. Their demands, whether for equal pay or reforms in our marriage laws, are easily incorporated by a capitalist state. In this process the revolutionary potential of feminism is defused. Secondly, at the ideological level, feminism is being distorted ('masculinized') into male patterns of behaviour. This pattern involves an emphasis on competition and 'achievement' within the existing order, a process which Greer decries. She writes: "In order to compete with men, Western woman has joined the masculine hierarchy and cultivated a masculine sense of self". (p. 12) In her view western feminists have been "duped into futile competition with men in exchange for the companionship and love of children and other women". (p. 25) Greer sees this process operating in the sexual arena, "whether women like it or not, current sexual mores are conditioning them to become clitorally centred: their sexuality is being conditioned into the likeness and the counterpart of masculine responses". (p. 213) "There is now no reason why a woman can't be more like a man. Female sexuality has been tailored to fit male adequacy. One dimensional man has been joined by his one-dimensional woman". (p. 214)

At one level Sex and Destiny is a celebration of difference and diversity in the radical humanist tradition of writers such as Illich and Schumacher. At another level, her analysis is seriously weakened by the absence of a marxist understanding of how the private sphere under capitalism is structured upon and controlled bythe public sphere, notably by the economy and the state. The outcome is an uneasy tension between her emphasis on privacy and individual sexual choice, and her recognition of the importance of culturally imposed restrictions on sexual activity to maintain a balance between population and resources.

Greer's analysis is also weakened by a certain romanticism in that she undoubtedly views the various cultural apparatuses of third world societies through rose coloured spectacles. The most striking example

of this is the ommission of any discussion of female circumcision. In her earlier book, The Female Eunuch she attacks the "barbarous" practice of clitorectomy in America at the turn of the century as "cunt hatred". Millions of women are circumcised in some african and muslim societies. (3) Yet in Sex and Destiny this issue is reduced to a brief footnote.

The Family

Her romanticised view of the extended family in third world societies means that this is defended in feminist terms. It represents a network of female self help, "the dynamism of sisterhood in action". (p. 241) Greer acknowledges that "it may seem strange for a twentieth-century feminist to be among the few champions of the Family as a larger organisation than the suburban dyad, for most Families are headed by men and men play the decisive roles in them, or at any rate, usually appear to, but there are reasons for such a paradoxical attitude. For one thing, if the Family is to be a female sphere, then it is better for women's sanity and tranquility that they not be isolated in it, as they are in the nuclear family The Family offers the paradigm for the female collectivity; it shows us women co-operating to dignify their lives, to lighten each other's labour, and growing in real love and sisterhood, a word we use constantly without any idea of what it is". (p. 241) Her conceptualisation of the family as the necessary site of domestic labour, and her unproblematic acceptance of the sexual division of labour within it, is to ignore feminist struggles over many years.

While research in South Africa has documented the extent of women centered support networks among the african urban working class (4), this has surely to be understood in class terms. In such terms the family represents an arena to be defended against the assaults of capital and the state. The same research has pointed to the extent to which children are a central source of meaning in african women's lives. Greer emphasises the extent to which this is true in other societies. She writes, "My association with Italian peasants and with South Indian women and aborigines offered endless examples of the undemanding pleasure which children give to non-materialistic peoples, for whom they are the only entertainment, and the reason for undergoing all the hardships which are their daily life". (p. 220) But in the South African context the struggle involved means a working class increasingly divided along sexual lines.

The challenge to us in South Africa is to produce a feminism which theorises class and race as well as sexual inequalities and generates demands which strengthen working class struggles to achieve a more just and equal society. If nothing else, Germaine Greer's book is a warning that feminist demands cannot be simply transposed from an advanced capitalist context, and written onto the South African reality.

Notes

(1) See for example the cover of The Listener (15.3 1984) in which Greer is described as "the feminist who changed her spots".

(2) C. Lasch, The Culture of Narcissism. (Abacus, 1980)

(3) See for example, A. El Dareer, Women, why do you weep? Circumcision and its consequences. (Zed Press, 1982).

(4) J. Cock, E. Emdon and B. Klugman, Childcare and the working mother. (SALDRU, 1984)



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