

Article : **The South African  
Crisis of 1985**

Don Foster

University of Cape Town

For anyone who wishes to take seriously the relationship between psychology and society in South Africa, it would be iniquitous to ignore the dramatic and tragic events which rocked this country during 1985. For some people these events signified the incipient and inevitable slide into civil war, for optimistic others, the harbinger of a long-awaited revolution. For some state officials, no doubt, the events would falsely signal no more than the half-expected responses due to the opening up of a 'reform' era. For a further few, unhappily, the situation would be interpreted, via a conspiracy theory of sorts, as the outcome of 'agitators', 'communists' or similar mysterious forces of darkness. One way or another the events of 1985 require some reflection and understanding.

It is sufficiently clear that '1985' is not yet over. Whether or not historians eventually will regard this as a new phase of history, the events

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of 1985 have shaken the South African social order and psyche in considerably more than a trivial fashion. For those who have viewed life through the lenses of a traditional psychology, it will no longer be easy to entertain the erroneous assumptions of an ahistoric stance. For 1985, if nothing else, should have shown us that social and historical contexts cannot be ignored in attempting to understand individuals' lives.

The aim of this modest look at the recent and ongoing crisis is not dominantly psychological. Instead it merely intends to provide a summary description of events and the beginnings of an understanding. Before turning to details we would do well to ask what is meant here by the term crisis. Drawing from Gramsci's notion of an organic crisis referring to a set of structural contradictions, a crisis here means a dysjunction between existing institutions and practices of the ruling classes and the changing circumstances of social reality. It means that existing institutions will be unable to maintain the present ordering of social relations as before. 'Symptoms' of these underlying dysjunctions are likely to appear at different sites of the social order, and perhaps at different times, but will all reflect major challenges to the present order and to ruling institutions.

#### SURFACE DESCRIPTION OF THE CRISIS

Since the declaration of a state of emergency on 21 July 1985 represented merely the formal state response to an already-existing crisis, 3 September 1984 may be a better starting date. On this date the tricameral constitution got under way, and in response to protests over housing rent increases, the first wave of South African Defence Force troops entered the Transvaal townships of Sharpeville, Sebokeng, Evaton and others. This pattern of



violent clashes between 'security' forces and township dwellers was to persist and spread to well over 100 townships and suburbs in wide areas of the country throughout 1985.

The characteristic events of the 1985 crisis are well known and are presented here in the form of summary statistics. While bland figures catch nothing of the tragedy of the many deaths, the agony of assaults, the suffering of the wounded nor the fear of the detained, they do give some idea of the sheer scope of the crisis.

Damage to property amounted to roughly R140 million according to official figures.<sup>1</sup> Attacks were largely directed to symbols of state and capitalist domination : government buildings, schools, police vehicles and police stations, beerhalls and bottlestores, shops and factories, buses and trucks, houses of policemen, councillors, members of the tricameral parliament and other perceived collaborators. The bus industry alone lost over R30 million in damages and lost revenue.<sup>2</sup> Guerilla activity and sabotage increased dramatically in 1985, with 136 recorded incidents, 34 percent of all incidents over the past ten years.<sup>3</sup>

The death toll since September 1984 has risen to well over a thousand people, roughly two-thirds killed by state forces.<sup>4</sup> The mass shootings at Langa, Mamelodi, Alexandra and in the notorious 'Trojan Horse' incident at Athlone will become part of the memorial history of the liberation movement.

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1. Minister of Law and Order, Cape Times, 7 February 1986.
  2. Schlemmer, L. (1986). Unrest : the emerging significance. Indicator South Africa (Political Monitor), 3, 3-6.
  3. Schlemmer (1986), p 6.
  4. The South African Institute of Race Relations gives the number of deaths in 'unrest' between 1 September 1984 and 31 January 1986 as 1158 (Weekly Mail, 28 Feb to 6 March 1986). Official figures from the Minister of Law and Order said that 628 had been killed by security forces and 327 'by their own people', between 1 September 1984 and 24 January 1986 (Cape Times, 7 February 1986).

The pattern of 'security force repression in the dorps and townships took on a sadly repetitive form of everyday violence. Sjamboks, teargas, birdshot, buckshot, rubber bullets, live ammunition, shootings, roadblocks, sealing off areas, searches and arrests became the daily round. It has been estimated that roughly 25 000 people (excluding detainees) were arrested on 'unrest'- or politically related charges, many of them for public violence, attending unlawful gatherings, and Demonstration Act contraventions.<sup>5</sup> In terms of the laws of this country most forms of peaceful protest are rendered a crime, and this is reflected in the figures of arrests. Sentences for the convicted, particularly of public violence, were severe, including long prison sentences even for first offenders and corporal punishment for juveniles.

Almost 8 000 people were detained under emergency regulations in the Transvaal, Eastern Cape and Western Cape during the 226 days of the emergency (21 July 1985 - 7 March 1986).<sup>6</sup> Of these emergency detainees 2 106 were children under the age of 16 years.<sup>7</sup> This figure given by the Minister of Law and Order came after the same Minister last year denied that children were being held. An additional 1 684 people were detained under South African security legislation (Internal Security Act, 74 of 1982), and a further 1 953 under similar laws in the bantustans, mainly the Transkei.<sup>8</sup> There were widespread allegations of abuse and torture of both emergency and security law detainees, and of police brutality in general.<sup>9</sup> Numerous

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5. Detainees' Parents Support Committee (1986). Review of 1985. Bramley.
  6. Cape Times, 9 March 1986 reported police figures of total emergency detainees as 7 996.
  7. Minister of Law and Order as reported in the Cape Times, 12 February 1986.
  8. DPSC (1986). Review of 1985. Bramley, p 1.
  9. See the following: Foster, D. and Sandler, D. (1985) A Study of Detention and Torture in South Africa. Institute of Criminology, University of Cape Town; CPSC & DESCOM (1985) Democratic Movement Under Attack : a report on the State of Emergency July - September 1985. Bramley; Amnesty International (1986). South Africa : Briefing. London : AI Publications.



temporary inderdicts were handed down by the courts restraining the police from further assaults upon detainees.<sup>10</sup>

Meetings, gatherings, individuals and organisations were banned.<sup>11</sup>

Under various provisions a wide range of gatherings were banned including carol services, fun runs, concerts, conferences, indoor political meetings and commemorations. Funerals, virtually the only legitimate form of large-scale gathering possible, increasingly took the shape of huge political rallies until they too fell under severe restrictions.<sup>12</sup> However, funeral restrictions themselves became a site of resistance as bans were challenged and restrictions ignored.

During 1985 a total of 56 persons faced treason charges in eight different trials.<sup>13</sup> A number of political activists disappeared or were assassinated. The year also saw unprecedented attempts to curb the press. Under emergency provisions press freedom was severely limited but on 2 November 1985 further curbs were placed on the media, effectively preventing any recording (sound or visual) or 'unrest' situations, and demanding police accreditation of all journalists in emergency areas.<sup>14</sup>

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10. See the Human Rights Index of the South African Journal on Human Rights, 1985, 3, 304-307.

11. On 28 August the Congress of South African Students (COSAS), a leading UDF affiliate, was banned. In its six years of existence COSAS had become the largest high school students' organisation in the country, mobilising thousands of students through its 42 branches nationwide. In the Western Cape, all meetings of 102 organisations were banned for the duration of the state of emergency.

12. As examples, a press-estimated crowd of about 30 000 attended the funeral of Unionist Andries Raditsela who died in detention, while workers country-wide held lunch hour prayer meetings and two-hour work stoppages. (Cape Times, 15 May 1985). At the funeral of Mathew Goniwe and 3 other Eastern Cape community leaders in Cradock on the very afternoon of the declaration of the state of emergency, the estimated attendance was 30 000 (The Argus, 20 July 1985). The murderers of these four men have not yet been traced.

13. DPSC (1985) Review of 1985. Bramley. Of these treason trials 4 were completed in 1985 during which 8 persons were convicted and 16 acquitted (12 of them in the yet uncompleted Pietermaritzburg UDF trial).

14. Cape Times, 4 November 1985.

The label of 'unrest' which has come to signify politically-related incidents of the past year is not really the most appropriate term. It captures nothing of the organised nature of resistance, and suggests too much of an unrestrained and random aggression. It would be more appropriate to characterise events in terms of a more systematic cycle, or spiral, of resistance and repression. A close examination of 'unrest' incidents shows that most do not constitute events of random violence. On the contrary, actions have been directed in the main at particular symbols of oppression and exploitation. Resistance has occurred on a number of fronts and may be described as follows.

Resistance : Since 1976, black education has been a key site of resistance. The grievances are too well known to discuss here.<sup>15</sup> Official figures for 1985 claim that 907 black schools and 674 275 pupils under the Department of Education and Training (this represents 38 percent of the African school-going population) were affected by school boycotts. The increasing militancy of black youth has been one of the characteristic features of increased resistance to the state in general. Specific educational demands gave way during 1985 to broader political demands. It may be noted that before its banning, roughly one out of every five emergency detainees was a COSAS member. It was also notable during 1985 that scholars showed an increasing propensity to link their demands with those in other areas such as consumer boycotts and trade unions.

The new constitution also has been a site of organised resistance. Formation of the United Democratic Front (UDF) in 1983 was in substantial part effected in resistance to constitutional proposals. Sustained protests

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15. See : Kane-Berman, J. (1978). *Soweto : Black Revolt, White Reaction*, Ravan; Kallaway, P. (ed) (1984) *Apartheid and Education*, Ravan.



and the poor polling returns in the 1984 tricameral parliament elections testify to the success of resistance to the new constitution.

Further resistance on a large scale has been directed against the repressive apparatus itself. During 1985 this situation came to resemble in many areas the front-line of a war zone, with running pitched battles between riot-police and civilians. The inequality of this war is reflected in official statistics of casualties (between 1 September 1984 and 24 January 1986) : 25 security force members killed and 534 injured, while civilians killed by police action totalled 628 with a further 2 229 injured.<sup>16</sup> Resistance has also been directed at other areas of the repressive apparatus; protests and campaigns against detention, bannings and political prisoners (the 'free Mandela' campaign, for instance) have been both consistent and widespread.

A feature of 1985 resistance was the wide use of consumer boycotts, starting in late July, most successfully in the Eastern Cape. While directed largely at white capital, boycotts were coupled with explicitly national political demands including release of all detainees and political prisoners, removal of police and troops from townships, and lifting the state of emergency. Organisations displayed different perceptions of the role of boycotts. Some saw it as a form of protest action designed to get big business to put pressure on the state for meeting of political demands. Others saw it as a direct challenge to the capitalist economy. Consumer boycotts were frequently linked however to local demands and tactics varied regionally. Starting in the Eastern Cape, consumer boycotts spread rapidly to the

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16. Minister of Law and Order as reported in the Cape Times, 7 February 1986. These figures exclude those deaths and injuries due to so-called "faction fights", and those "killed by their own people" in the Minister's words.

Transvaal and Western Cape. Boycott leaders were frequently detained leading to a cycle of further protests and campaigns for release.<sup>17</sup>

The state-imposed system of community councils, as well as councillors' actions, have offered further grounds for resistance. Councillors are seen as part of the machinery of state oppression. Furthermore councillors are often seen to be associated with vigilante groups as well as the police, thus responsible for initiation of violent repression. There is no doubt that the local government system has been a source of considerable tension and violence, particularly in small towns.<sup>18</sup>

Resistance to economic exploitation also showed a substantial increase in this period of crisis. Work stayaways in Vaal triangle townships in September 1984 in opposition to rent increases marked the start of the crisis. This was followed in the Transvaal, early November 1984, by the largest and most successful work stayaway, involving an estimated half-a-million workers, in the 35 years that the stayaway strike has been used as a political strategy.<sup>19</sup> In Port Elizabeth on 16-18 March 1985 almost the entire African workforce stayed at home. Demands focused on petrol and paraffin price increases, GST increases, busfare increases and massive retrenchment in the area.<sup>20</sup> Furthermore there was a sharp increase during 1985 in the official figures for overall number of strikes, involving almost quarter-of-a-million workers.<sup>21</sup>

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17. Obery, I. and Jochelson, K. (1985). Two sides of the same bloody coin. *Work in Progress*, 39, 9-30. Also see: 1985 - the year of the consumer boycott. *Indicator South Africa (Political Monitor)*, 1986, 3 (3), 8-9.
  18. Seekings, J. (1986). Probing the links : vigilantes and the state. *Work in Progress*, 40, 26-29.
  19. See Prof. E. Webster's assessment in this regard, *Cape Times*, 9 Nov. 1984.
  20. Pillay, D. (1985). Community organisations and unions in conflict : the Port Elizabeth stayaways. *Work in Progress*, 37, 4-13.
  21. *Cape Times*, 13 April 1985.



The launch of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) occurred in December 1985. Involving 33 unions representing roughly 450 000 workers, COSATU is the largest ever trade union federation in the history of South Africa. While the full strategic significance of this federation will only be assessed at a future date, the overtly political demands at the launch suggest a powerful force of both political and economic resistance.<sup>22</sup>

Since a crisis period is characterised by a dysjunction between outdated institutions/organisations and current demands, one would expect to see development of new organisations in a time of organic crisis. This is what has occurred. Recent years have seen the foundation of important new political alignments in the National Forum and the United Democratic Front. One of the features of 1985 was the astonishing gains in popular support and in credibility of these movements, in particular the UDF. On other terrains, new alignments and associations have mushroomed. The launch of COSATU has been mentioned. In the educational arena, latter stages of 1985 saw the formation of the Soweto Parents' Crisis Committee (SPCC), the Western Cape Teachers' Union (WECTU) and many Parents' Action Committees. Even in white areas some movement was seen; for example the formation in the Western Cape of Edasa (Education for an aware South Africa). A significant aspect of the 1985 crisis in education in contrast to earlier periods 1976-77, and 1980, was the degree of support for new demands shown by both teachers and parents. In the earlier periods, scholars were virtually on their own. Another important feature of 1985 was the substantial development in grass-roots organisations, and in the sustained resistance, found in small towns

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22. See Carrim, Y. (1986). Working class politics to the fore. Work in Progress, 37, 4-13.

in the Eastern and Western Cape, CRADORA (Cradock Residents Association) being one example.<sup>23</sup>

While some of the new organisations may be transitory, as anyone who attempts to follow the changing South African organisational acronyms would know, there is also a decided air of vibrancy, movement and progression, and a degree of popular participation unknown previously in South Africa. It is also quite apparent that the gains in popular support for organisations linked to the broad liberation movement has been considerable. Ground level support for ANC symbols at massed funerals throughout the country in 1985 gives some idea of the changed mood.

Repression : If resistance is one side of the cycle, then repression on the part of the state is the other. There are countless examples of spirals in which repressive actions (for example, police shootings, or detention of popular figures) in turn produce angry resistance, protest meetings, marches, stonings, attacks on government property and the like. In the Western Cape for example, the very declaration of the state of emergency immediately produced the response of galvanising large meetings, protests, school and consumer boycotts. State response to this situation in turn led to police shootings and deaths in Guguletu, which led to further funerals and protest actions. The state's claim that the state of emergency led to decrease in unrest, violence or fatalities simply cannot be sustained. The later entry of the Western Cape (late July and August 1985) into the crisis spiral can be accounted for, as we have seen, to a large degree as a response to repressive tactics. Furthermore death rates were highest in August 1985

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23. See: Cradock : building a tradition of resistance. *Work in Progress*, 1985, 38, 4-8; Little to be thankful for : Bongweni township, Colesburg. *Work in Progress*, 1985, 39, 31-32; Moss, G. (1986) Fort Beaufort under emergency rule. *Work in Progress*, 40, 18-25.; Unrest in smaller towns and villages. *The Black Sash*, 1985, 28 (3), 28-32.



and January 1986, that is, well after the declaration of emergency. In addition, the noted increased support from older citizens for the new resistance organisations must in part be due to the unprecedented levels of open brutality on the part of forces of "law and order".

The "reform" programme has had little impact on the majority of citizens of the country. The removal of laws symbolic of apartheid, such as the Mixed Marriages and Immorality Acts passed almost without notice during the year dominated by repression on an unparalleled scale. The range of repressive forms are well known, have already been discussed and may simply be listed again here. They include the use of political trials covering a wide range of charges, five separate forms of detention without access to due process of law, riot control using a range of weapons, wide powers of arrest and control under emergency laws and indemnity of forces against prosecution for any acts carried out in "good faith", a further range of security laws enabling banning of meetings, persons and organisations, the use of roadblocks and house-to-house searches, and heavy curbs on the media. Further "everyday" acts of repression include influx control laws, removals, censorship of political literature, and use of municipal by-laws to prevent distribution of pamphlets. It is impossible to gain accurate figures of the number of people subjected to the full range of repressive apparatus, but it must have been many millions during 1985. Millions of others would have experienced indirectly or symbolically the same forces.

The question remains about the efficacy of the state's repressive machinery in successfully quelling the resistance. In order to answer it, a deeper understanding of the crisis is required.

## DEEPER UNDERSTANDING OF THE CRISIS<sup>24</sup>

According to Bundy's probing analysis, the 1985 crisis grew out of, and can only be understood in terms of a treble-layered crisis which had developed through the 1970s. Succinctly, these refer to an economic crisis, a geo-political and military crisis, and a crisis of the resurgence of mass-based black resistance.

Viewed historically in broad sweeps, the earlier mass-resistance politics of the 1950s, then still protected to a degree in law, had been forced underground by the early 1960s with the banning of the ANC and PAC in 1960 and subsequent sabotage trials. Most activists were driven into exile and the routing of black political opposition was almost complete.

The period between mid 1962 through to 1973-74 was the high point of relatively unchallenged white rule. It was a period characterised by sustained booming economic growth, low inflation, weak labour organisation, a pattern of low wages and high investment, and a strong state (personified by the caricature of a jackbooted Vorster) with increasing executive powers at the cost of the judiciary. It was the high point of Apartheid social engineering policy, epitomised by the bantustans and group areas, and mass removals under both of these policies. The National Party showed a considerable gain in strength, while with foreign investors pumping money in, white South Africans displayed unprecedented levels of consumerism.

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24. This section of the paper is drawn almost entirely from Professor Colin Bundy's outstanding lecture series entitled Understanding 1985 : a Crisis Examined, delivered at the University of Cape Town summer school in January 1986. Since the lecture series has not yet been published, and this interpretation is based on notes, any errors should not be attributed to Prof. Bundy. In addition his analysis was far more extensive than space allows here, therefore full justice cannot be done to Prof. Bundy's wide-ranging and searching analysis.



By about 1972 pressures started to mount and contradictions to show. Investment had swelled the number of black workers, who carried with them increasing demands. At the same time, mechanisation of industry and agriculture created large numbers of unemployed blacks. It became more apparent that the bantustans "dumping ground" policies were becoming a source of more problems than solutions. Growth rate depended on a high level of importation of goods and skills while the domestic market remained fairly inelastic. There was rising inflation after 1972.

Between 1973 and 1977 the development of an acute crisis faced both state and capital. The crisis could be reduced to three main components. On the economic front the boom period declined along with world recession and the oil crisis. The economy contracted and combinations of rising inflation and unemployment led to problems and growing impoverishment in black townships. On the geo-political and military front, the South African subcontinent had become substantially altered by the mid-1970s, and costs for sustaining the losing Rhodesian war were escalating. Buffer zones had given way and potential military threats to the state were far closer to home. In addition the renewal of resistance in the areas of both mass politics and labour became a significant source of problems for the state. The strikes of 1973 and subsequent growing labour organisation and resistance, along with the 1976 Soweto uprisings which spread through the country, led to state response in the form of a technocratic reformist programme. "Reform" was designed to accommodate black anger and contain the possibilities of challenge.

Bundy's thesis is that by the mid-1970s South Africa had entered a new historical phase which is still in progress; furthermore that the present surface political troubles can only be understood in terms of the underlying economic crises, now over a decade old. While there has been a steady

economic downturn since about 1973, it has been interspersed with short recovery periods. For example, due to the gold-price spiral, a boom period was experienced in 1979-1981. By the end of 1981, the gold price fell by fifty percent and the economy as a whole with it. Accompanying rising inflation fell most heavily on the shoulders of blacks. During 1982, unemployment figures for blacks were estimated at between 1,5 to 3 million. This was most notably the case for the increasing number of black school leavers who along with organised scholars have proved a volatile mix for renewed mass political resistance.

The mini-boom upswing of 1984, coinciding with apparent greater acceptance of South Africa abroad due to constitutional proposals, Nkomati agreement, USA policy of constructive engagement and Botha's much publicised European visit, seemed to offer a temporary respite of optimism for whites. This was to come tumbling down however with the steepest yet decline in the "switchback economy", in July 1984. The Rand shrank and counteracting monetarist policies brought soaring inflation.

The economic reverses came at the worst time for the state. Mounting opposition to the August 1984 tricameral parliament elections opened new opportunities for mass black resistance, and started a spiral of violence in response to heavy policing and widespread detention of UDF leaders in particular. In early September 1984 all the elements intersected with the Vaal Triangle stayaways, police shootings, violence directed at beerhalls, shops, vehicles, councillors houses, and troops being deployed in townships. As P W Botha took his new role as State President a press cartoonist marked the event with this cartoon caption: "I'm not sure whether that's the dawn of a new era or the glow of flames."<sup>25</sup> With hindsight the cartoonist's

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25. Cape Times, 6 September 1984.



only error, and a typical liberal one at that, was to show such uncertainty!

By 8 September 1984, more than 160 000 black students nationwide were boycotting classes, and some schools were closed.<sup>26</sup> By 12 September the stoning of bottle stores and police vehicles, attacks on buses, and petrol-bombing of councillors' houses had spread to Soweto, police responding with rubber bullets and teargas.<sup>27</sup> Publicity on the six detainees who were taking refuge in the British Consulate in Durban led to deterioration in international relations. Warnings were cast that the banning of all meetings critical of the government (11 September) could lead to more violence. As the new tricameral parliament cabinet was announced, it was reported that nearly 60 people had died in the Vaal Triangle conflicts.<sup>28</sup> Funerals were held, some were banned, and mourners were arrested or injured in police action. By October it was reported that the strike rate had increased 28 percent over the previous year.<sup>29</sup> At the same time, launching a strong attack on the UDF, the Minister of Law and Order announced a plan to increase cooperation between the South African Police and Defence Force.<sup>30</sup> Later that month, a "massive 7 000 strong police and army force invaded the trouble-torn Vaal townships of Sharpeville and Boipatong after they had pulled out of Sebokeng where 354 people were arrested."<sup>31</sup> In short, the full pattern of events, to continue unabated right through 1985 and into 1986, was already established. The surface pattern of crisis events, engendered by deeper structural crises, had become visible.

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26. Cape Times, 8 September 1984.

27. Cape Times, 13 September 1984.

28. Cape Times, 18 September 1984.

29. Cape Times, 5 October 1984.

30. Cape Times, 6 October 1984.

31. Cape Times, 24 October 1984.

Returning to the earlier question regarding the efficacy of 1985 repression in containing or "solving" the crisis, it is now possible to suggest that if one accepts the hypothesis of the 1985 crisis as emerging out of a decade-old, treble layered structural crisis, as posited by Bundy, then the possibility of providing any solution by merely repressive tactics must be seen as erroneous. Heavy handed repressive tactics, the well-worn South African 'reflex-action', were successful in the early sixties, but on each of the three levels of crisis, the present situation is substantially different. One can only conclude that the crisis will continue, even if at different sites and at a different pace, since the 'reformist' strategies, including repression, work only at the surface and are not intended to introduce social change in any substantive meaning of that concept. On the contrary, the state will attempt to resist any attempts at social change.

#### IMPLICATIONS FOR PSYCHOLOGY

Instead of attempting a detailed review of possibilities, the intention here is simply to mention some of the stances that are likely to be taken in considering this most grave situation. Two responses, which may be seen as at either end of a continuum of reactions, present themselves. On the one hand, psychologists will argue that their discipline is a science, and that science ought to remain neutral (or beyond, or above!) in relation to the tawdry vicissitudes of power struggles and political wrangles. On the other hand, different psychologists will suggest that the only solution lies in abandoning the 'bourgeoisie' discipline and turning fully to political activism. Closer to the ground it is probable that few psychologists are purists in either of these directions, but are somewhere in between with tendencies towards the sketched positions.



The contention here is that the first of these two positions is demonstrably false, on philosophy of science grounds at very least, and that the second position, while emotionally more appealing given the crisis as outlined above, is somewhat undesirable. It is also unfortunate, in the sense that it misunderstands the possibilities that do exist within the discipline for a more adequate and progressive theory of persons. In recent years, a number of new (or re-newed) terrains have begun to open up, offering fresh insights into "human nature" and the relationship between the person and the social. Realism, constructivism, ethogenics, structuration theory, reinterpretation of psychoanalytic theory, Marxist approaches to psychology, post-structuralism, semiotics and new departure in the theory of ideology provide some examples of the rich, and bewildering, array of fertile theoretical ground to explore.

Whether the tattered remains of the former field of psychology has anything to forward in the way of a concrete practice, other than the remaining virtues of individual therapy (much of what passes for group- or family-therapy is hardly progressive), remains something of an open question. All one can say with some optimism is that much contemporary theorising, as listed above, is centrally concerned with the relationships between theory and practice.

Within South Africa it is sufficiently apparent from the above description of the ongoing crisis that the fierce nature of a struggle for a full democratic society will leave little room for the comforts of a "neutral" stance. In the absence of a clear vision of appropriate practices, it seems that only through the cut and thrust of involvement within the struggles of a developing democracy, will the "isolated" discipline of psychology begin to carve out the foundations of a practice which contributes towards the real, not imagined, social arrangements in which full human lives may be lived.