‘ENTERING THE RELATION OF MOVEMENT AND REST’:
CONSIDERING THE STATE APPARATUS, BECOMING-WOMAN
AND ANARCHISM IN SOCIALLY JUST PEDAGOGIES

C. Gray van Heerden
Institute for Gender Studies
University of South Africa
Pretoria, South Africa
e-mail: gray.chantelle@gmail.com

ABSTRACT
Anarcho-feminist E. Moraletat (2009, 1) argues that feminism has moved everything but changed nothing. This statement intimates at least two ideas: 1) that feminism has gained some ground within existing structures; and 2) that structural violence against women has not changed in any radical way because the underlying regulatory regimes remain intact. Focusing on the philosophical collaboration between Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, as well as feminist thought based on their work, I investigate the role of the State apparatus – i.e. dominant, regularising structures, practices, arrangements and relations, such as rights discourse – in order to interrogate the normative axis of current feminist theories and practices in higher education. Specifically, I yoke anarchism to Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987, 232–309) notion of becoming-woman as a nomadic political praxis which takes into account embodied locations and historically embedded biological-symbolic-material conditions (Braidotti 1989; 2003; Grosz 1987) to explore what this might mean for socially just pedagogies in South Africa.

Keywords: anarchism; becoming-woman; Deleuze and Guattari; feminist praxis, nomadic praxis, smooth space, socially just pedagogies, State apparatus, striated space

FEMINIST PRAXIS IN SOUTH AFRICA: A BRIEF INTRODUCTION

The question is not, or not only, that of the organism, history, and subject of enunciation that oppose masculine to feminine in the great dualism machines. The question is fundamentally that of the body – the body they steal from us in order to fabricate opposable organisms. (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 276).

Melissa Steyn (1998, 50) writes that ‘South African feminists are in a fortunate position to be able to construct a praxis informed by contemporary postcolonial and poststructural thinking’. However, since the dismantling of Apartheid, South African feminism has had to undergo a radical transformation in order to be both relevant and effective in facing the challenges presented by the many diversities of race, class and culture, especially considering the fact that
enormous discrepancies continue to exist in terms of the socioeconomic status of women. Additionally, a relevant feminist praxis would have to take into account the high occurrence of domestic violence and rape that many South African women face, often on a daily basis (Vogelman and Eagle 1991, 209). What this highlights is ‘the need for an integrated, democratic process, and the role of culture’ (Steyn 1998, 43) to address aspects such as rights discourse and equality before the law; cultural norms and codes and how these relate to South African feminist issues of, for example, polygamy; and poverty, race and class conditions and how these affect, for instance, health issues, including HIV, and other matters like access to education.

It is, in light of the legacy of Apartheid, easy to understand why rights discourse has been important in the political restructuring of South African feminism as women (and the formerly disenfranchised in general) needed to ‘gain access to resources and power’ (Steyn 1998, 43). Equality before the law was thus not only important as a formal, constitutional right, but in terms of individual power experienced on a daily basis. But while laws, such as the Domestic Violence Act of 1998, have ameliorated the plight of victims ‘by substantially expanding the ambit of legal protection’ (Kruger 2004, 170), certain challenges remain unaddressed. For example, victims frequently ‘do not obtain real protection due to certain cultural and religious perspectives and a lack of public awareness and involvement’ (Kruger 2004, 171). Such concerns were addressed in South Africa after the first democratic elections in 1994 by, amongst others, the Women’s Coalition during the creation of the Women’s Charter (Steyn 1998, 41) but, despite their achievements, i.e. the fact that women are represented constitutionally, I argue that women continue to be subjected to patriarchal power formations which have remained in place and continue to produce and reproduce the ‘triple enslavement of women, to ignorance, to capital, and to men’ (Ackelsberg 1985, 64).

With regard to cultural norms and codes in South Africa, Steyn (1998, 45) argues that ‘this interface is probably one of the most difficult the feminist movement has to address’. Because every culture makes different demands on women, South African feminism has to take into account how cultural and customary laws affect, for example, a woman’s economic value (Pillay 1994) and, also, how to deal with issues such as different body ideals and polygamy.

Clearly cultural norms affect women in different ways and dealing with the many cultural influences in South Africa from a feminist perspective requires robust critique, analyses and practices as these issues have far-reaching consequences, also for socially just pedagogies. Of course the issues I am touching on in this article in no way encompass all the feminist concerns dealt with in South Africa, but they do represent at least some of the core underlying themes. These leitmotifs are, however, almost always underscored by poverty, race and class conditions
which also continue to affect access to education. And while education reform has attempted to address these inequalities, a more serious consideration of women’s labour and how this relates to education in South Africa is still needed. There is, currently, much talk about decolonisation practices in the restructuring of higher education curricula which, I agree, should form part of our ongoing assessment of socially just pedagogies, although I would argue that we also need to develop a politics that effectuates a feminist praxis in all spaces. But what is a feminist praxis and how can it help us realise socially just education?

Amanda Gouws (2010, 14) argues that a feminist praxis ‘is the internalisation of feminist theoretical principles to the extent that these principles are used to turn spaces into feminist spaces’; i.e. spaces which cultivate empathy for the conditions of other women (and people in general) and an understanding of one’s location, as well as an ‘ethic of openness, honesty and self-awareness’ (Gouws 2010, 15). But, she argues, feminist praxis in South Africa has, since the early 1990s, become depoliticised and replaced by institutional politics, although she acknowledges the ‘authentic feminist praxis’ of grassroots movements which go beyond institutional ‘tool kits’ and ‘checklists’ (Gouws 2010, 16–17). The 1990s thus saw both ‘feminist activists and feminist activist academics’ (Gouws 2010, 14) in alliance to secure a place for women in parliament or State structures, yet these State structures, I put forth, have not, except legally and constitutionally, radically changed the lives of women in South Africa. To further elucidate my argument, I shall, in the next section, address Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts State apparatus and becoming-woman. After that I shall discuss more recent developments in feminist praxis and specifically feminist praxis aimed at achieving socially just pedagogies, and end with some thoughts on what we might learn from anarchist pedagogies.

WARDING OFF THE STATE APPARATUS: BECOMING-WOMAN AS NOMADIC PRAXIS

History is always written from the sedentary point of view and in the name of a unitary State apparatus ... (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 23).

The nomads invented a war machine in opposition to the State apparatus. History has never comprehended nomadism ... (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 24).

Becoming-woman is not imitating this entity or even transforming oneself into it. We are not, however, overlooking the importance of imitation, or moments of imitation ... All we are saying is that these indissociable aspects of becoming-woman must first be understood as a function of something else: not imitating or assuming the female form, but emitting particles that enter the relation of movement and rest, or the zone of proximity, of a microfemininity, in other words, that produce in us a molecular woman, create the molecular woman. (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 275).

In the chapter or plateau entitled ‘Treatise on nomadology – The war machine’, Deleuze and
Guattari state two problems in connection with the State apparatus: ‘Problem 1: Is there a way of warding off the formation of a State apparatus (or its equivalents in a group?)’ and ‘Problem 2: Is there a way to extricate thought from the State model?’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 356; 374). Before I address these questions, it is necessary to take a step back and explain what a State apparatus is which, according to Deleuze and Guattari (1987, 368), ‘always finds it necessary to repress the nomad and minor’ movements, or even to appropriate and subordinate such deterritorialisations.¹

A State apparatus does not refer not to an entity, but rather to a hierarchical principle of organisation which functions to capture flows and processes and to divide or striate space through binary overcoding. In other words, there is a kind of territorial organisation or overcoding that takes place which posits this type of organisation as ‘better’ than others. Deleuze and Guattari (1987, 448) refer to such State overcoding as the ‘structural violence that defines the law’ through its ‘binary organisation’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 221) or logic. As a result, we have systems, such as patriarchy, set against women and feminism, capitalism against communism, the social against the natural, materiality against discourse or the linguistic, and so on. Through enacting this kind of structural violence, a State apparatus gains the capacity to control, to a large extent, the development of collective subjectivity and exerts power over such subjectivities through, for instance, the normalisation of certain modes or practices, e.g. patriarchy, heteronormativity, class structures, etc. This, in turn, produces a kind of machinic enslavement in that many subjectivities become accepted as the ‘norm’ and thus reproduced unquestioningly as such or, in Deleuze and Guattari’s terms, as molar movements – the status quo. It was, in the context of the events of May 1968, that Deleuze and Guattari became increasingly sensitive to the political dimension of socio-cultural stratification and the effects/affects these produce. And it is precisely these considerations of the State apparatus and its production of the molar which led them to ask what might produce becomings-minor or the molecular. For, as they remind us, it is in fact the very overcoding of the State apparatus which ‘makes possible and gives rise to new flows that escape from it’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 448) or, we could say that the field of experience is concurrently territorialised, deterritorialised and reterritorialised, transversally, immanently and materially.² To better understand the State apparatus and how it functions in education, I shall talk more of Deleuze and Guattari’s conceptions of nomadology, smooth and striated space, and becoming-woman.

Smooth and striated spaces (or nomad and sedentary/State apparatus spaces) are not dialectical opposites. As Deleuze and Guattari (1987, 474) argue, ‘we must remind ourselves that the two spaces in fact exist only in mixture; smooth space is constantly being translated,
transversed into striated space; striated space is constantly being reversed, returned to smooth space’. There is, thus, a continuous slippage from one to many variable others. The State apparatus continually striates space to various degrees in various places with the aim of centralising power, making the space governable and homogeneous. The nomads, on the other hand, continually smooth space, decentralising power in favour of horizontal structures, of heterogeneity and nonconformity.3 ‘Smooth space’, write Deleuze and Guattari (1987, 371), ‘is precisely the space of the smallest deviation’ and such a deviation – such a deterritorialisation – might be described as the fissure that initiates becomings: becomings-nomad, becomings-minor, becomings-woman which, in turn, effectuate lines of flight away from rigid segmentarity. It could thus be argued that State schooling and university systems teach pupils and students to be conformist – to larger and lesser degrees, depending on the organisation – and encourage ‘a shallow, bulimic approach to learning’ which ‘entails the rote consumption and regurgitation of contextually isolated facts and figures on command’ (Mueller 2012, 28). Nomadic schooling systems, for example the Summerhill school, critical pedagogy (as espoused and practiced by Paulo Freire), the Modern School (as developed by Francisco Ferrer) and anarchist free schools, to name a few, are, conversely, aimed at ‘developing and encouraging new forms of socialisation, social interaction, and the sharing of ideas in ways that might initiate and sustain nonauthoritarian practices and ways of relating’ (Shantz 2012, 126).4 Nomadic praxis is, then, about critical experimentation rather than about conforming to some or other transcendental condition. And while the formation of a State apparatus may be inevitable – i.e. the entanglement of smooth and striated spaces – nomadic thought and action allow for breaks or deterritorialisations towards becomings.

It is important to note, however, that for Deleuze and Guattari (1987, 213) ‘everything is political’ and, as such, becomings do not merely connote a creative movement or undertaking. Such an understanding of becoming – and becoming-woman in particular – is not only a crude reading, or a misreading of their work, but in fact, I argue, undermines the whole of their philosophical association and output which are aimed at situating philosophy within the messiness of the socio-political; at describing society in its multiple macropolitical and micropolitical organisations, intersecting flows, processes and resonances, overcodings, territorialisations, lines of flight, reterritorialisations, collapses; at formulating new problems and creating new concepts for dealing with the complexities and potentialities of the myriad machinic subjectivities of contemporary life. Thus, the notion of becoming, which is central to Deleuze and Guattari’s project, indicates a criticality of binary processes and the primacy afforded to identity and representation (Stagoll 2005, 21). Simultaneously, it describes the
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capacities of assemblages to escape these and thus denotes the ‘continual production of difference immanent within the constitution of events’ (Stagoll, 2005, 21). A nomadic praxis, unlike a normative one, can thus be described as a *politicised* philosophy and practice of becoming which is situational – i.e. embedded and embodied within a specific location – and one which allows for the emergence of new subjectivities. As Patricia MacCormack (2014) argues, becoming ‘initiates an existence whereby subjectivity is propelled into new ways of thinking the immanence of being, as multiple, as highly specific and also as immediate, serialising itself into a process where each moment and thing is defined in terms of its *haecceity* ...’.

One way of effectuating such a new subjectivity, according to Deleuze and Guattari, is through becomings-woman which allow for deterritorialisations from ‘conventional subjectivity and the patterns of signification and subjectification that sustain it’ (Lorraine 2011, 105). Deleuze and Guattari argue that ‘all becomings begin and pass through becoming-woman. It is the key to all other becomings’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 277; my emphasis). What is being emphasised here is thus the significance of ‘the binary machine of sex and gender in sorting out social identity’ (Lorraine 2011, 102). In this sense, Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophical scope and aims exhibit numerous overlaps with feminism as both endeavours offer a critique of phallocentrism, dominant theories and practices of the West, and a decentering of traditional humanism and metaphysical essences. But while Deleuze and Guattari argue for the primacy of becoming-woman ‘in relation to the other kinds of social and political becoming-minoritarian’ (Patton 2000, 81), many feminists, including Deleuzian scholars, are or have been critical of the notion of becoming-woman. For example, Alice Jardine (1985, 223) argues that Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of becoming-woman makes ‘no room for new becomings of women’s bodies and their other desires in these creatively limited, monosexual, brotherly machines’. Similarly, both Rosi Braidotti and Elizabeth Grosz have critiqued Deleuze and Guattari’s work, Braidotti (1991, 120–121) claiming that ‘Deleuze becomes normative by omission’ by not engaging with feminist and related movements, while Grosz (1993, 168) argues that becoming-woman is Deleuze’s way of ‘using women to obscure an examination of his own investments in women’s subjugation’. But, as Iris van der Tuin (2015, 55, my emphasis) contends, such representationalist arguments ‘have in fact prevented feminists from asking what feminists could do with Deleuze’. Many feminists, including Braidotti and Grosz, have since moved away from such representationalism, recognising that becoming-woman may also be viewed as a nomadic praxis; vectors actively seeking out ontological intensity and irreducibility. As nomadic subjectivity, becoming-woman thus
‘provokes and sustains a critique of dominant visions of the subject, identity, and knowledge’ (Braidotti 2011, 7–8), offering novel and creative ways of dealing with the complex manner in which the world is structurated, ‘emitting particles that enter the relation of movement and rest, or the zone of proximity, of a microfemininity, in other words, that produce in us a molecular woman, create the molecular woman’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 275).

This, then, is also why becomings – and particularly becomings-woman – are important for feminist socially just pedagogies (and socially just pedagogies in general), themselves concerned with becoming-minoritarian and opening up ‘a view of pedagogy that conceives widely of those who are marginalised by normative educational contexts’ (Goodley 2007, 318). Furthermore, socially just pedagogies and feminist praxis aimed at initiating these kinds of becomings, take into consideration ‘the field of knowledge production and that of reproduction’ (Lingard 2005, 166) so that epistemology becomes relational and co-constructed and thus, at least to some extent, mutually accounted for. In so doing, the increased inequalities that have come about from neoliberalism become not only visible, but are actively challenged. I argue, however, that because much of the socially just pedagogy debate centres on rights discourse – it is often seen in terms of a ‘social justice issue’ (Lingard 2005, 166) or statutory assessments of, for example, special educational needs (Goodley 2007; Madriaga and Goodley 2010), and so on – it remains constrained by the State apparatus. Change thus necessarily takes place within existing structures and mainly in terms of content because the underlying regulatory regimes remain intact. For example, women’s rights remain rights within a patriarchal system. This is, of course, a crude example, as rights do in fact have material effects/affects in the world. I am not arguing against rights wholesale here, nor am I justifying them; rather, I am proposing that rights discourse and other similar strategies have certain limitations which can be better understood in light of the State apparatus, what it does, and how we might ward it off by deterritorialising along lines of flight. I shall return to this, but first I shall provide a brief overview of critical posthumanism and new materialist feminism as, in part, extensions of Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy. While there will, most certainly, be lacunae, I aim, in the limited space of the following section, to at least provide a context for these, especially in terms of their contributions and challenges towards achieving socially just pedagogies.

POSTHUMANISM AND NEW MATERIALIST FEMINIST PRAXIS:
CONTRIBUTIONS AND CHALLENGES TOWARDS ACHIEVING SOCIALLY JUST PEDAGOGIES

We will never find the sense of something (of a human, a biological or even a physical
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Patricia MacCormack (2012, 1) remarks that ‘[p]osthuman theory asks in various ways what it means to be human in a time where philosophy has become suspicious of claims about human subjectivity’. Posthumanism is thus, as its signifier suggests, about ‘the decentering of the human’ though, as Cary Wolfe (2009, xvi) argues, while a conversation about posthumanism may start here, this is not all it entails. It is also, and importantly, ‘about how thinking confronts that thematics, what thought has to become in the face of those challenges’ (Wolfe 2009, xvi) which, in late capitalism, are becoming more and more complex at an ever-accelerating pace. Posthuman ethics or praxis thus asks how we can produce ‘a robust account of the materialisation of all bodies – “human” and “nonhuman” – and the material-discursive practices by which their differential constitutions are marked’ (Barad 2003, 810). Grounded in situated cartographies, critical posthumanist/new materialist feminists often draw ‘on the physical and biological sciences’ and ‘repudiate the notion that biology and matter are passive or inert’ (Frost 2011, 69). Instead they posit, like Deleuze and Guattari, that biology or matter have (emergent, immanent) agency in their connections with other assemblages, thus challenging theories of linear causation and elucidating ‘the processes through which norms and power relations are incorporated as forms of subjectivity or materialised in institutions, cultural practice and facts’ (Frost 2011, 70). As Braidotti (2013, 145) rightly argues, posthuman subjectivity has reshaped ‘the identity of humanistic practices, by stressing heteronomy and multi-faceted relationality, instead of autonomy and self-referential disciplinary purity’. These perspectives have thus contributed critically to the humanities in a number of ways, including, but not limited to, methodologically, through the questioning of nationalist agendas, epistemologically, by problematising knowledge production and processes, and ontologically, by rethinking the structural anthropomorphism of the humanities. Far from signaling the crisis of the humanities, Braidotti (2013, 155) argues that these and other related fields of study, such as postcolonialism, critical race studies, gender studies, etc. indicate ‘the vitality of this field’. However, these contributions – though valid, important, varied and ongoing – have critiqued and restructured mainly, though not exclusively, the content of socially just pedagogies, remaining auspiciously silent or cursory about its form; i.e. the State apparatus which informs it and which will continually striate the smoothed space it has effectuated. Being critical of the form is not always an easy position to be in, I agree, especially if one is compensated by that form (e.g. salaries, funding, status, etc.). But if we remain uncritical of the underlying regimes – specifically the State and capitalism and how these shape education through neoliberal and
other agendas – even radical becomings such as critical posthumanism and new materialist feminisms, I argue, might succumb to the State apparatus and, in contemporary society, be ‘reterritorialised onto the commodity’. As Deleuze (2006, 256) warns, unless we ‘know the force which appropriates the thing, which exploits it, which takes possession of it or is expressed in it’, we cannot ‘find the sense of something (of a human, a biological or even a physical phenomenon)’. It is thus, I argue, imperative to critique both content and form if we are to materialise a socially just feminist pedagogical praxis that escape processes of subjectivisation which result in subservient, State-enslaved citizens through education.

Having said this, some notable work is currently being done internationally as well as locally towards achieving socially just education. For example, the NRF (National Research Foundation) project, entitled ‘Posthumanism, the affective turn and socially just critical higher education pedagogies’ (Bozalek 2014), aims to address challenges and social injustices stemming from the apartheid era which historically positioned educational institutions in such a way that it privileged the white population. Many of these discrepancies continue to exist even though South Africa is now a democracy. By promoting critical debate and exploring posthumanist and new materialist approaches, the project is designed to facilitate and implement a movement towards attaining socially just pedagogies. Leibowitz, Bozalek, Carolissen, Nicholls, Rohleder and Swartz (2010, 123), for example, describe a module that was implemented as part of a collaborative project on Community, Self and Identity (CSI) in which fourth year students ‘interacted and learnt collaboratively across the boundaries of the institution, discipline, race and social class, about the concepts of community, self and identity’. What educators learned in this situation and argue for in the paper is that, in order to teach students about ethicality, caring and reflection, educators too ‘should reflect on who we are and what we are hoping to achieve, and should allow for the discomfort that such learning entails’ (Leibowitz et al. 2010, 131). It is such discomfort, I would argue, that will allow for a contestation of the structural violence caused by existing regimes; i.e. a contestation of form along with a critique and transformation of content. Due to space limitations, I cannot here list all the work that is beginning to question the structural violence of existing regimes, but it is worth noting that feminists (and other academics) are addressing these issues from a wide range of perspectives (see for example Rolfe and Peel 2011, 317–335; Nykänen 2012; Olivieri and Leurs 2014; Rajan and Desai 2013; and the special issue of Women’s Studies International Forum, volume 41, part 1, which specifically questions the potential of reform processes, etc.). I do, however, want to highlight one article in particular by Lyn Ossome, entitled ‘In search of the State? Neoliberalism and the labour question for pan-African feminism’.
In this article, Ossome outlines the gendered processes of globalisation, migration and neoliberalism in terms of informal work. She argues that ‘the era of economic liberalisation has seen informalisation take on increasingly gendered manifestations’ (Ossome 2015, 7). And while Bretton Woods institutions put forth that ‘the market is fair and neutral’, she, like other theorists, claim that neoliberalism is ‘a mask for practices designed to maintain, reconstitute and restore elite class power’ (Ossome 2015, 8). This is also the case in South Africa and directly affects the movement towards socially just pedagogies in a number of ways. First, as studies by, for example Sylvia Chant and Caroline Pedwell (2008) and Saskia Sassen (2002) show, the informal economy, more often than not, creates a ‘poverty trap for women, concentrating them in low-skill, low-income activities with little prospect of advancement’ (Ossome 2015, 6). This, in effect, means that women remain marginalised in terms of access to education in general but, also, particularly in terms of higher education. Effectuating socially just pedagogies thus means that we as educators have to take this into consideration and address these issues at a grassroots level. Feminist praxis cannot afford to ignore the structural incongruities caused by the State in its relations with neoliberal theories, policies and practices. Second, if neoliberalism is designed to maintain, reconstitute and restore elite class power, and I argue, like many other theorists, that this is in fact the case, then the discrepancies between higher education institutions in South Africa emanating from the apartheid era will not be eradicated through the State apparatus but will, rather, be reinforced and should, therefore, be addressed by academics in union with grassroots movements to achieve socially just pedagogies. These continuing inequalities have recently been challenged by the #Rhodesmustfall and #Feesmustfall student movements. Interestingly, Corinne Knowles (2016) argues that these movements, organised by students as well as university employees, including gardeners and cleaners, can be understood through feminist lenses as emphasising ‘interconnectedness and intersectionality’, and ‘was strongly influenced by black feminist principles’. These movements, along with work done by feminist educators, are beginning to inform theories and practices that effectuate socially just pedagogies and could, I argue, benefit from further incorporating an anarchist pedagogical praxis.

Bearing this in mind, I explore in the next section the intersection between Deleuze and Guattari’s work and anarchism and how critical posthumanism/new materialist feminisms might benefit from these towards creating truly socially just pedagogies.
WHY ANARCHISM? LESSONS FROM ANARCHISTS’ PEDAGOGICAL PRACTICES

But it is in concrete social fields, at specific moments, that the comparative movements of
deterritorialisation, the continuums of intensity and the combinations of flux that they form must
be studied. (Deleuze and Parnet 2007, 135).

While much of academia remains wary of the term anarchism, there has been a ‘growing
interest in anarchism’ which is now also ‘expressed through scholarly work’ (Amster, DeLeon,
Fernandez, Nocella and Shannon 2009, 1). Emma Goldman (1988, 59) sums anarchism up as
follows:

Anarchism, then, really stands for the liberation of the human mind from the dominion of religion;
the liberation of the human body from the dominion of property; liberation from the shackles and
restraint of government. Anarchism stands for a social order based on the free grouping of
individuals for the purpose of producing real social wealth, an order that will guarantee to every
human being free access to the earth and full enjoyment of the necessities of life, according to
individual desires, tastes, and inclinations.

In other words, anarchists reject hierarchical organisation and divisions between those in
authority and those dominated by that authority. This extends to all spheres in life: the social,
the economic, the political, the educational, etc., and includes a critique of both form and
content which, for anarchists, are neither discrete nor hierarchised. Even though Deleuze and
Guattari did not identify as anarchists, they share at least the following assumptions with
anarchism in their work: both traditions (analyses, critique and practices) are anti-State, anti-
authoritarian and anti-essentialist but, more importantly, both traditions imagine ‘a political
theory and praxis that lies outside the framework of modern political philosophy’ (Jun 2012a,
 xvii, my emphasis) and existing political and economic structures, thus encouraging
simultaneous critique of both form and content. However, as Nathan Jun (2012a, 112) argues,
anarchism should not be understood – as it often is – in terms of a reductio ad politicum which
posits its tenets only in terms of what it is opposed to: ‘states, governments, or other sovereign
political powers’. Rather, anarchism should be understood as ‘(a) universal condemnation of
and opposition to all forms of closed, coercive authority (political, economic, social, etc.),
coupled with (b) universal affirmation and promotion of freedom and equality in all spheres of
human existence’ (Jun 2012a, 116). Deleuze and Guattari too are noted for their affirmative
praxis, aimed at multiple connections and collectively produced conditions of its own
expressions and, like anarchists, they are extremely critical of the State and capitalism, but only
as ‘incidental byproducts’ (Mueller 2012, 15) of the hierarchical arrangements of the State
apparatus.8
The effects of the State and capitalism on education is that knowledge, nowadays, is recognised and treated as a tradable good with profit benefits, with the result that there are ‘massive international movements to standardise curriculum, commodify knowledge, and privatise institutions’ (Haworth 2012, 4). Thus, while changes in content are invaluable, an interrogation of the underlying State apparatus is needed if feminist praxis is to effectuate becomings-woman that can transform pedagogies to be truly socially just in that they do not rely on centralised power arrangements and hierarchical organisation. It is to this end, I argue, that critical posthumanism and new materialist feminisms could gain from incorporating anarchist theory and pedagogical practices, because anarchist praxis ‘provides an identifiably distinct perspective for understanding and approaching education as a political, prefigurative, and transformative encounter, regardless of one’s politics’ (Mueller 2012, 29). This is especially important for the South African context with its highly stratified society which continues to marginalise the larger part of the population. Testament to this are the recent #Rhodesmustfall and #Feesmustfall movements which highlight the disaffection experienced by students on a daily basis. Such actions have been labelled by many as ‘anti-democratic’, but I argue that such actions need more adequate discourses and forms of critique in order to be fully understood. One way of doing so is analysing such insurgent practices in terms of direct action. The anarcha-feminist, Voltairine de Cleyre (n.d., 1), writes that ‘[e]very person who ever thought he [sic] had a right to assert, and went boldly and asserted it, himself, or jointly with others that shared his convictions, was a direct actionist’. Rob Sparrow (1997, 6) describes it as follows:

> The distinguishing feature of direct action is that it aims to achieve our goals through our own activity rather than through the actions of others. Direct action seeks to exert power directly over affairs and situations which concern us. Thus it is about people taking power for themselves. In this it is distinguished from most other forms of political action such as voting, lobbying, attempting to exert political pressure through industrial action or through the media.

Although the #Rhodesmustfall and #Feesmustfall movements were not organised exclusively by anarchists and there are many valid critiques of these movements (in part because they took place in a context that includes a politics of demand), they nonetheless represent a form of direct action and demonstrate what can be achieved in this way which, as the outcomes of these movements have shown, is not insignificant. Underlying direct action, however, is the principle of prefiguration and it is specifically this I want to argue for because, as Thomas Nail (2010, 3) argues, ‘radical political theory [including critical posthumanism/new materialisms] can no longer be satisfied with the mere critique of various forms of representation and essentialism in favour of difference and the affirmation that “another world is possible”’. These critiques, as I
have argued, are invaluable, but must begin ‘to create a new praxis adequate to the world that will have been emerging: our political future anterior’ (Nail 2010, 3). And the creation of such a new praxis, I contend, can be effectuated through prefigurative practices.

But what is prefigurative politics? Wini Breines (1980, 421) defines it as an ‘antiorganisational politics’ aimed at embodying ‘personal and antihierarchical values’ and developing ‘seeds of liberation and the new society (prior to and in the process of revolution) through notions of participatory democracy grounded in counter-institutions’; i.e. non-capitalist and communitarian institutions. Thus, prefigurative politics, action or labour, deterritorialises present political conditions, constructing ‘a new political present within and alongside the old’ (Nail 2010, 10), but also with the capacity to create something entirely novel. Deleuze and Guattari (1987, 292) also argue for such prefigurative action in their philosophy in terms of a becoming-minoritarian which, according to them, ‘is a political affair and necessitates a labour of power (puissance), an active micropolitics’. Deleuze also sees Nietzschean affirmation and active nihilism as a kind of prefiguration, i.e. as opposed to ressentiment. On practicing such a micropolitics or prefigurative labour, Guattari (Guattari and Rolnik 2008, 339) writes the following:

If there is a micropolitics to be practiced, it consists in ensuring that these molecular levels do not always succumb to systems that coopt them, systems of neutralisation, or processes of implosion or self-destruction. It consists in apprehending how other assemblages of the production of life, the production of art, or the production of whatever you want might find their full expansion, so that the problematics of power find a response. This certainly involves modes of response of a new kind.

All of us, to some extent, ‘are obliged to live more or less in contradiction with our ideals’, writes the anarchist Erico Malatesta (1993, 142); we are all ‘accomplices with the State and Capital’ (Jun 2012b, 286). But this does not mean that we have to accept these conditions wholesale. Rather, by interrogating form and content in educational spaces, such as higher education, and joining forces with grassroots movements and students we can, together, minimise such complicity towards effectuating socially just pedagogies. A feminist praxis that combines the contributions made by critical posthumanist/new materialist feminisms and prefigurative anarchist pedagogical practices, I argue, smooths the striated space of the State apparatus through deterritorialisations that set in motion radical and nomadic becomings-woman.
CONCLUSION: TOWARDS A NOMADIC (PREFIGURATIVE) FEMINIST PRAXIS FOR SOCIAILY JUST PEDAGOGIES

In this article I asked how a socially just feminist pedagogical praxis can escape processes of subjectivisation that produce subservient, State-enslaved citizens through education. I argued that Deleuze and Guattari’s notions of the State apparatus and becoming-woman as nomadic praxis, in conjunction with anarchist pedagogies, have much to offer South African feminist praxis in that they allow for robust critique, analyses and practices in terms of both form and content. That is, a radical becoming-woman cannot rely solely on critiques and transformation of content, but should also be accompanied by the creation of a new praxis which, for Deleuze and Guattari, refers to an active micropolitics or prefigurative politics that, rather than wait for the Revolution, constructs a new political present within and alongside the old through the enactment of emerging events. Such enactment of emerging events, I contend, allows us not only to reconceptualise educational content, but also, and simultaneously, to effectuate a new form, thus smoothing the striated space of the State apparatus and materialising pedagogies that are truly socially just.

NOTES

1. The term line of flight is used here in the sense that Deleuze and Guattari use it in their philosophical collaboration and denotes a bifurcating vector or, more simply, a creative movement or deterritorialisation (along a line of flight) that produces a change or changes in a specific lattice or organisation of relations and practices, and can be physical, mental or spiritual.

2. Reterritorialisation is connected to deterritorialisation and might and often do, in fact, occur simultaneously as movements, but whereas deterritorialisation denotes a rupture or movement of change, reterritorialisation denotes a movement towards stabilisation. Thus, if deterritorialisation allows for a shift in structural power relations, reterritorialisation is a movement towards more normative power relations. It should be kept in mind, however, that this a rather crude explanation, but one which I use deliberately to elucidate the meaning of deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation. In actual fact these movements do not take place in such a binary fashion as relations and practices are far more complex than this explanation suggests.

3. The concepts nomad or nomadic space (as well as nomadology and nomadism) are used by Deleuze and Guattari to refer to smooth space without intrinsic properties that predetermine a set or sets of relations; that is, the space is undifferentiated and only produce relations through movement in and between assemblages.

4. Anarchist pedagogies, e.g. free schools, may take many forms, but is always based on free collaboration and collaborative curriculum development. Based on models experimented with in existing anarchist communities and popularised by Francisco Ferrer, such schools encourage independent and critical thinking, personal and collective development, participatory involvement, consensual practices, heterogeneity and creativity, and ‘the limiting of stratifications based on expertise or experience’ (Shantz 2012, 132). They are also non-authoritarian, anti-State, counter-cultural, reliant on mutual aid and often constitute collaborative efforts between grassroots movements and other individuals.

5. Deleuze and Guattari’s conception of assemblages refers to the arrangements of processes and relations within and between structures, as well as that which emerges from such junctures. This pertains to everything from ‘imaginary representations, to language chains, to [the] economic,
political, aesthetic, [and] microsocial’ (Guattari 2009, 24), thus capturing the complexity of non-unitary subjects and other intersecting configurations, movements and practices. Interestingly, the original French term, *agencement*, now translated and widely accepted as ‘assemblage’ in English, not only connotes ‘the arrangement of these [assemblage] connections’ (Phillips 2006) in French, but also connotes the *agency of becomings*. Both of these inferences are lost in the English translation so it is useful to bear this in mind.

6. While I cannot, in this article, spend time on problematising the delineation of the terms/concepts *West* and *Western*, I do think it necessary to state at least that these should not be oversimplified in our thinking. At any rate, what I am conveying is Eurocentric (colonial) heritage and privileged ways of seeing and being which is coupled with Platonism, Christianity and other features of biopower (defined, at least, by capitalism and state nationalism) and includes, besides EU countries and the UK, the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, though even this is contestable and certainly not stable. What should be clear is that these concepts, while informed by certain overarching principles and transversal flows and processes, are highly complex and, in a Deleuze-Guattarian vein, should be considered as such so as to allow for a nomadic affectivity which can adequately account for contemporary realities and the creative lines of flight these require.

7. Representationalism posits that we cannot have first-hand knowledge of our ideas or interpretations about humans and objects in the world because there is a ‘veil of perception’ between the mind and everything exterior to it. This has led to what is commonly known as the Cartesian mind/body dualism. The philosophy of, for example, Deleuze and Guattari, posthumanism and new material feminisms, and other related theories, question the primacy of representation (and specifically linguistic representation) and argue, instead, that the mind/body is co-imbricated through material-discursive practices.

8. I do not have space in this article to argue, point for point, the overlaps between anarchist philosophy and Deleuze and Guattari’s project, but scholars such as Todd May, Nathan Jun and Diana Masny, amongst others, can be consulted on this.


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